1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HECTOR ANDERSON, Case No. 1:19-cv-00255-JLT (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION and MOTION TO RETRACT 14 H. ANGLEA, SWORN STATEMENT AND FOR PARTIAL SUMM[ARY] ADJUDICATION 15 Defendant. (Docs. 62, 66) 16 ORDER DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO 17 ADMIT AND PROCEED
18 (Doc. 76)
19 Plaintiff has filed a motion for a prohibitory injunction, a motion to retract sworn 20 statement and for partial summary judgment, and a motion to admit and proceed. (Docs. 62, 66, 21 76.) For the following reasons, each of these motions is DENIED. 22 I. Motion for Prohibitory Injunction 23 Plaintiff filed a motion for an injunction preventing Valley State Prison or CDCR from 24 transferring him to another facility following a reclassification hearing scheduled for April 16, 25 2021. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. 26 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary 27 injunction, a plaintiff must establish (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of 28 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her 1 favor; (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. An injunction is unavailable absent 2 a showing of irreparable injury, i.e., “any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be 3 wronged again—a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” City of Los 4 Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 A preliminary injunction may be prohibitory or mandatory. “A prohibitory injunction 6 prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a determination of the 7 action on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 8 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009) “[T]he ‘status quo’ refers to the legally relevant relationship between the 9 parties before the controversy arose.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 10 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012)). “A 11 mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d 12 at 878–79. 13 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner litigants 14 seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, “[p]reliminary 15 injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the 16 court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that 17 harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The PLRA limits the court’s power to grant preliminary 18 injunctive relief to inmates and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 19 federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts 20 grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 21 minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 987, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 The Court’s jurisdiction is “limited to the parties in this action” and the pendency of an 23 action “does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in general or over the conditions 24 of an inmate’s confinement unrelated to the claims before it.” Ray v. Sullivan, No. 1:20-cv- 25 01699-NONE-HBK, 2021 WL 1346023, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2021) (quoting Beaton v. 26 Miller, 2020 WL 5847014, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020)). Convicted prisoners have no 27 reasonable expectation that they will remain in any particular facility, and prison officials have 28 broad authority to transfer prisoners from one facility to another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 1 215, 225, 228 (1976). “An inmate's liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his 2 conviction so that the state may change his place of confinement even though the degree of 3 confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in 4 another.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224– 5 25; Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1982)). 6 During the pendency of this motion, on July 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of 7 address, advising that he had been transferred from Valley State Prison to Richard J. Donovan 8 Correctional Facility. (Doc. 78.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for an injunction is moot. 9 Additionally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over prison officials who authorized the transfer, and 10 Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate irreparable injury to warrant injunctive relief. Accordingly, the 11 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a prohibitory injunction. (Doc. 62.) 12 II. Motion to Retract Sworn Statement and for Partial Summary Adjudication 13 Plaintiff has filed forty-seven-page motion for partial summary adjudication on the issue 14 of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 66.) Defendant filed a response in opposition, in 15 which Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff completely exhausted his remedies concerning the 16 May 17, 2018, riot at Sierra Conservation Center, through the third level of review. (Doc. 72.) 17 Notwithstanding this acknowledgment by Defendant, Plaintiff’s motion must be DENIED for 18 failure to comply with Local Rule 260 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 19 To succeed on a motion for partial summary judgment or adjudication, the movant must 20 show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 21 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of 22 proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 23 322–23 (1986). The moving party may accomplish this by presenting evidence that negates an 24 essential element of the non-moving party’s case. Id. Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate 25 that the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim 26 that must be proven at trial. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). “[A] complete failure of proof 27 concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 28 immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. 1 to establish “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 2
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HECTOR ANDERSON, Case No. 1:19-cv-00255-JLT (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION and MOTION TO RETRACT 14 H. ANGLEA, SWORN STATEMENT AND FOR PARTIAL SUMM[ARY] ADJUDICATION 15 Defendant. (Docs. 62, 66) 16 ORDER DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO 17 ADMIT AND PROCEED
18 (Doc. 76)
19 Plaintiff has filed a motion for a prohibitory injunction, a motion to retract sworn 20 statement and for partial summary judgment, and a motion to admit and proceed. (Docs. 62, 66, 21 76.) For the following reasons, each of these motions is DENIED. 22 I. Motion for Prohibitory Injunction 23 Plaintiff filed a motion for an injunction preventing Valley State Prison or CDCR from 24 transferring him to another facility following a reclassification hearing scheduled for April 16, 25 2021. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. 26 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary 27 injunction, a plaintiff must establish (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of 28 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her 1 favor; (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. An injunction is unavailable absent 2 a showing of irreparable injury, i.e., “any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be 3 wronged again—a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” City of Los 4 Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 A preliminary injunction may be prohibitory or mandatory. “A prohibitory injunction 6 prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a determination of the 7 action on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 8 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009) “[T]he ‘status quo’ refers to the legally relevant relationship between the 9 parties before the controversy arose.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 10 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012)). “A 11 mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d 12 at 878–79. 13 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner litigants 14 seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, “[p]reliminary 15 injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the 16 court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that 17 harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The PLRA limits the court’s power to grant preliminary 18 injunctive relief to inmates and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 19 federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts 20 grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 21 minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 987, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 The Court’s jurisdiction is “limited to the parties in this action” and the pendency of an 23 action “does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in general or over the conditions 24 of an inmate’s confinement unrelated to the claims before it.” Ray v. Sullivan, No. 1:20-cv- 25 01699-NONE-HBK, 2021 WL 1346023, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2021) (quoting Beaton v. 26 Miller, 2020 WL 5847014, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020)). Convicted prisoners have no 27 reasonable expectation that they will remain in any particular facility, and prison officials have 28 broad authority to transfer prisoners from one facility to another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 1 215, 225, 228 (1976). “An inmate's liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his 2 conviction so that the state may change his place of confinement even though the degree of 3 confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in 4 another.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224– 5 25; Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1982)). 6 During the pendency of this motion, on July 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of 7 address, advising that he had been transferred from Valley State Prison to Richard J. Donovan 8 Correctional Facility. (Doc. 78.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for an injunction is moot. 9 Additionally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over prison officials who authorized the transfer, and 10 Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate irreparable injury to warrant injunctive relief. Accordingly, the 11 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a prohibitory injunction. (Doc. 62.) 12 II. Motion to Retract Sworn Statement and for Partial Summary Adjudication 13 Plaintiff has filed forty-seven-page motion for partial summary adjudication on the issue 14 of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 66.) Defendant filed a response in opposition, in 15 which Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff completely exhausted his remedies concerning the 16 May 17, 2018, riot at Sierra Conservation Center, through the third level of review. (Doc. 72.) 17 Notwithstanding this acknowledgment by Defendant, Plaintiff’s motion must be DENIED for 18 failure to comply with Local Rule 260 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 19 To succeed on a motion for partial summary judgment or adjudication, the movant must 20 show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 21 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of 22 proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 23 322–23 (1986). The moving party may accomplish this by presenting evidence that negates an 24 essential element of the non-moving party’s case. Id. Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate 25 that the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim 26 that must be proven at trial. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). “[A] complete failure of proof 27 concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 28 immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. 1 to establish “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 2 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The non-moving party cannot simply rely on the pleadings and 3 conclusory allegations in an affidavit. Lujan v. Nat’1 Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); 4 see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 5 trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. 6 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, when deciding a motion 7 for summary judgment, the court must view any inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a 8 light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 9 The Ninth Circuit has “held consistently that courts should construe liberally motion 10 papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules 11 strictly.” Soto, 882 F.3d at 872 (quoting Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 12 2010)). While prisoners are relieved from strict compliance, they still must “identify or submit 13 some competent evidence” to support their claims. Soto, 882 F.3d at 872. Plaintiff’s verified 14 complaint may serve as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if based on personal 15 knowledge and specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 16 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 17 Although the court must construe pleadings liberally, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the 18 same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 19 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty, 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). 20 Additionally, Local Rule 183 provides: “Any individual representing himself or herself without an 21 attorney is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, these Rules, and all other 22 applicable law. All obligations placed on ‘counsel’ by these Rules apply to individuals appearing in 23 propria persona.” L.R. 183(a). 24 Even with a liberal construction of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 25 failed to comply with Local Rule 260, which provides: 26 Each motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication shall be accompanied 27 by a ‘Statement of Undisputed Facts’ that shall enumerate discretely each of the specific material facts relied upon in support of the motion and cite the particular 28 1 other document relied upon to establish that fact. 2 L.R. 260(a). Instead of enumerating material facts that support his motion for summary 3 adjudication, Plaintiff’s motion is a narrative of events and individuals unrelated to the riot that 4 occurred on May 17, 2018. In addition to these pleading deficiencies, on the merits, Plaintiff’s 5 motion fails to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that he is 6 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 7 Plaintiff also seeks to retract a sworn statement, apparently in an attempt to establish the 8 absence of a factual dispute. However, Plaintiff has not identified the particular statement he 9 seeks to retract. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to retract sworn statement for 10 partial summary adjudication. (Doc. 66.) 11 III. Motion to Admit and Proceed 12 Defendant lodged objections to Plaintiff’s exhibits submitted in support of Plaintiff’s 13 motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 73.) In response, Plaintiff filed a motion to admit 14 the exhibits. (Doc. 76.) Because the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 15 judgment, Defendant’s objections and Plaintiff’s motion to admit exhibits are DENIED as moot. 16 (Docs. 73, 76.) 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 In summary, for the foregoing reasons, this Court ORDERS as follows: 19 (1) Plaintiff’s motion for prohibitory injunction (Doc. 62) is DENIED. 20 (2) Plaintiff’s motion to retract sworn statement and for partial summary adjudication 21 (Doc. 66) is DENIED; 22 (3) Defendant’s objections to evidence (Doc. 73) are DENIED as moot; and 23 (4) Plaintiff’s motion to admit and proceed (Doc. 76) is DENIED as moot. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 Dated: July 7, 2021 _ /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27