1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUPREE LAMONT ADKINS, Case No. 2:21-cv-00531-DJC-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED 14 DAVID HURTADO, et al., ECF No. 99 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 16 DAYS 17 18 Plaintiff brings this case alleging that defendant E. Marshak denied him access to the law 19 library because of his race and defendant David Hurtado failed to act to remedy this violation 20 despite having knowledge of it. ECF No. 41 at 6-10. Defendants have moved for summary 21 judgment on these claims, ECF No. 99, plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 108, and 22 defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 111. I find, for the reasons stated below, that defendants’ 23 motion should be granted, and judgment entered in their favor. 24 A. Legal Standards 25 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 26 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 27 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 28 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 1 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 3 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 4 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 5 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 7 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 8 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 9 motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 10 Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 11 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 12 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 13 (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 14 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 15 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 16 other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 18 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 19 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 20 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 21 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 22 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 23 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 24 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 25 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 26 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 27 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 28 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 1 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material 2 issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to 3 require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. 4 Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 5 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 6 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 7 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 8 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 9 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 10 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 11 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 12 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 13 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 Analysis 15 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Marshak, a senior law librarian at the California Medical 16 Facility, discriminated against him because of his race by refusing to allow him adequate library 17 access. ECF No. 41 at 6-7. He claims that, in August 2020, she refused to allow him library 18 services, including photocopying, despite providing those same services to other, similarly 19 situated white inmates (plaintiff is black). Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hurtado, a deputy 20 warden at the facility, was made aware of the racial imbalance in law library services but took no 21 action to remedy the situation. Id. at 8. He claims that, because of defendants’ respective action 22 and inaction, he missed two court deadlines. Id. at 19. In my screening order, I determined that 23 plaintiff had stated viable First Amendment access to court and Equal Protection claims against 24 both defendants. ECF No. 40 at 3. I also found that plaintiff had stated a potentially viable 25 retaliation claim against Marshak because he alleged that her refusal to grant him library access 26 was motivated, in part, by his filing of prison grievances. Id. Defendants argue that they are 27 entitled to summary judgment on all claims. I agree. 28 I.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUPREE LAMONT ADKINS, Case No. 2:21-cv-00531-DJC-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED 14 DAVID HURTADO, et al., ECF No. 99 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 16 DAYS 17 18 Plaintiff brings this case alleging that defendant E. Marshak denied him access to the law 19 library because of his race and defendant David Hurtado failed to act to remedy this violation 20 despite having knowledge of it. ECF No. 41 at 6-10. Defendants have moved for summary 21 judgment on these claims, ECF No. 99, plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 108, and 22 defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 111. I find, for the reasons stated below, that defendants’ 23 motion should be granted, and judgment entered in their favor. 24 A. Legal Standards 25 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 26 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 27 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 28 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 1 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 3 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 4 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 5 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 7 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 8 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 9 motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 10 Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 11 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 12 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 13 (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 14 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 15 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 16 other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 18 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 19 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 20 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 21 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 22 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 23 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 24 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 25 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 26 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 27 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 28 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 1 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material 2 issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to 3 require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. 4 Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 5 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 6 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 7 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 8 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 9 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 10 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 11 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 12 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 13 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 Analysis 15 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Marshak, a senior law librarian at the California Medical 16 Facility, discriminated against him because of his race by refusing to allow him adequate library 17 access. ECF No. 41 at 6-7. He claims that, in August 2020, she refused to allow him library 18 services, including photocopying, despite providing those same services to other, similarly 19 situated white inmates (plaintiff is black). Id. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hurtado, a deputy 20 warden at the facility, was made aware of the racial imbalance in law library services but took no 21 action to remedy the situation. Id. at 8. He claims that, because of defendants’ respective action 22 and inaction, he missed two court deadlines. Id. at 19. In my screening order, I determined that 23 plaintiff had stated viable First Amendment access to court and Equal Protection claims against 24 both defendants. ECF No. 40 at 3. I also found that plaintiff had stated a potentially viable 25 retaliation claim against Marshak because he alleged that her refusal to grant him library access 26 was motivated, in part, by his filing of prison grievances. Id. Defendants argue that they are 27 entitled to summary judgment on all claims. I agree. 28 I. Access to Courts 1 As to plaintiff’s access to court claims, defendants correctly argue that plaintiff did not 2 suffer any actual injury. ECF No. 99 at 13-14. They note that in the case at issue, Adkins v. 3 Kernan, 2:19-cv-00458-DMC, plaintiff received multiple extensions of time to file his third 4 amended complaint. Id. at ECF Nos. 28, 30, 33, 34, 35, 37, & 38.1 To sustain an access to court 5 claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an actual injury, like having a claim or 6 complaint dismissed because of an inability to access library services. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 7 343, 351 (1996). Plaintiff’s opposition has failed to point to any contradictory evidence of actual 8 injury. The fact that restriction of library services required plaintiff to ask for and receive 9 extensions of time does not constitute an actual injury. See Acker v. Armenta, 61 F.3d 909 (9th 10 Cir. 1995); reported at 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20572, *3 (“Acker identified only a single instance 11 where she missed a filing deadline by one day due to defendant Armenta’s failure to photocopy a 12 500-page document in a timely fashion. Acker also stated, however, that the district court granted 13 an extension to file the document and thus failed to establish an actual injury.”). Thus, I find that 14 defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s access to courts claims. 15 II. Equal Protection Claims 16 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s equal protection clause claims fail because he cannot 17 show that he was similarly situated to other inmates who did have library access during the 18 relevant time. Specifically, they contend that only inmates who submitted proper requests for 19 priority legal user (“PLU”) were permitted physical library access at that time. ECF No. 99-2 at 6 20 ¶ 6. Defendants note that the time period in question, late summer 2020, was one of the high 21 points of the COVID-19 pandemic, when non-PLU inmates could access the law library and its 22 amenities only though a paging service. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 6, 29. Plaintiff was granted PLU status from 23 August 8, 2020, to August 21, 2020, based on his need to file an amended complaint in Kernan. 24 Id. at 7 ¶ 8. Plaintiff, in his response to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, does not 25 appear to dispute this, though he argues that he was wrongfully denied law library access on 26 1 I find it appropriate to take notice of these court records for the purposes of ruling on 27 defendants’ summary judgment motion. See Rowland v. Paris Las Vegas, No. 3:13-cv-02630- GPC-DHB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24718, 2014 WL 769393, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) 28 (“Judicial notice of court records is routinely accepted.”). 1 September 7, 2020. ECF No. 108-2 at 32. Marshak attests that she did not receive any other 2 requests for PLU status or paging services until May 3, 2021. ECF No. 99-2 at 7 ¶ 9. In his 3 response to defendants’ undisputed facts, plaintiff points to a grievance he filed on September 7, 4 2020, alleging that he asked to access the law library in accordance with Marshak’s “law library 5 slip instructions” and was, presumably, denied. ECF No. 41 at 33. In his response to that 6 grievance issued October 13, 2020, defendant Hurtado noted that, after the expiration of 7 plaintiff’s PLU status on August 21, 2020, no new PLU form or evidence of a new deadline had 8 been submitted. Id. at 32. The response stated that Marshak had received his request slip, but 9 that only PLU prisoners were able to access the library at that time. Id. It went on to state that 10 plaintiff would be provided physical access once normal programming resumed and that, in the 11 meantime, he could access services by paging. Id. 12 Defendants correctly argue that, by prison policy, the only class of inmates who were able 13 to access the law library during the relevant period were PLU users. The records discussed above 14 indicate that, after plaintiff’s status expired on August 21, 2020, he no longer belonged to that 15 category. Thus, plaintiff cannot sustain a “class of one” equal protection claim. To state such a 16 claim, he would be required to show that he is a member of an identifiable class, that he has been 17 treated differently from others similarly situated, and that there is no rational basis for the 18 difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Here, he 19 cannot establish the second element. That is, he has failed to show that other inmates were not 20 subject to the modified library access requirements. 21 Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that plaintiff was 22 discriminated against because of his membership in a protected class. Plaintiff alleges that white 23 inmates were allowed library access while similarly situated black inmates were not. “To avoid 24 summary judgment on a claim of racial discrimination, the plaintiff must produce evidence 25 sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that [the 26 challenged action] was racially motivated.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1037 (9th Cir. 27 2015). Here, plaintiff has failed to do so. Rather, the record indicates that plaintiff’s denial of 28 access to the law library was predicated on prison policy and plaintiff’s failure to properly request 1 PLU status. Plaintiff has not advanced any evidence that white inmates were given access to the 2 law library without PLU status or that they were otherwise not subject to the modified program 3 requirements in place to curtail transmission of COVID-19. Moreover, in his deposition plaintiff 4 alleged that at least one other black inmate was granted library access during the relevant period, 5 despite not having PLU status. ECF No. 115 at 20-21. If true, this cuts against his claim that 6 Marshak was discriminating against black inmates to -the benefit of white inmates. 7 III. Retaliation Claim 8 Finally, plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Marshak fails because, to sustain such a claim, 9 he must show five elements: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 10 an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 11 inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 12 legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, 13 he cannot show that denying him access to the library as a non-PLU prisoner did not advance the 14 legitimate correctional goal of curtailing the spread of COVID-19. See Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 15 F.3d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that curtailing the spread of contagious disease is a 16 legitimate penological objective). 17 Conclusion 18 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for 19 summary judgment, ECF No. 99, be GRANTED and judgment be entered in their favor. 20 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 21 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 22 service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 23 court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 24 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 25 within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 26 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 27 Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 28 1991). 1 > IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 ( | { Wine Dated: _ October 8, 2024 Q_—— 4 JEREMY D. PETERSON 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28