1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM ADAMS, No. 2:20-cv-1901-JDP-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA PRISON INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, et al. 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceedingwithout counsel,brings suit under42 U.S.C. § 1983, 19 alleging that the defendants violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act 20 (“ADA”) and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the “Rehabilitation Act”)by refusing to allow him to work his 21 prison job with tinted glasses that he needs for his light sensitivity. Plaintiff was eventually 22 terminated from his job after refusing to work without his glasses. The case is before the court 23 for screening, and I conclude that plaintiff’s official capacity claimscan proceed against the 24 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). All other claims and 25 defendants are dismissed with leave to amend for the reasons stated below.1 26 1 Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and a 27 trust fund account statement, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff has made the required showing, and I will grant this request. Plaintiff must pay the filing fee in accordance with the concurrently filed 28 collection order. 1 I. Legal Standards 2 This court screens cases in which prisoners seek redress from a either a governmental 3 entity or an officer or employee thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss the 4 complaint, or any portion of it,that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 5 relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief.” Id.§ 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must comply withRule 8(a) of the 7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which“require . ..a short and plain statement of the claim 8 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the 9 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 10 562-63 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 11 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of 12 Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twomblyand Ashcroft v. 13 Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Aclaim a complaint must contain more than “naked 14 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 15 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements,do not suffice.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678. 17 Acognizable claim must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 18 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court todraw the 19 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 20 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 21 court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89(2007), and construe 22 the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 23 236 (1974). 24 II. Analysis 25 A. Background 26 Plaintiff alleges that, in July 2019, he was hired by the California Prison Industry 27 Authority (“CALPIA”) fabrics product and sewing shop at Mule Creek State Prison. ECF No. 1 28 at 3. He reported for work in early August wearing glasses with tinted lenses due to his light 1 sensitivity. Id. Defendant Nancy Chamberlain—the supervisor of the fabrics shop—ordered 2 plaintiff to remove his glasses because being unable to see his eyes made her nervous. Id. He 3 declined and told her that the glasses were medically prescribed. Id. In the days that followed, 4 Chamberlain persisted in refusing to allow plaintiff to work with the glasses. Id. Thirteen days 5 after he first reported to work with his glasses, plaintiff’s employment in the fabric shop was 6 terminated. Id.at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Chamberlain filed a chrono that falsified the reason for 7 his removal by blaming him for failure to report to work. Id. Plaintiff informed Chamberlain’s 8 supervisor, defendant Tozi, of the actions taken against him, but Tozi declined to investigate. Id. 9 He alleges that defendant Molle failed to intervene insofar as he denied plaintiff’s grievances that 10 complained of Chamberlain’s actions. Id. 11 B. Analysis 12 Based on the foregoing, plaintiff is suingChamberlain, Tozi, Molle, and CALPIA for 13 violations of the ADAand the Rehabilitation Act. As an initial matter,plaintiff’s individual 14 capacity claims fail becausethere is no individual liability under either the ADA or the 15 Rehabilitation Act. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore 16 join the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by 18 Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). Plaintiff has also brought official 19 capacity ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against all defendants,however. ECF No. 1 at 1. 20 Those claims are adequately pled2 andmay proceed against the CDCR and, through it,the State 21 2 Under Title II of the ADA,a claimant must plead that “(1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against 22 with regard to a public entity's services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion or 23 discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, a claimant must plead that “(1) [he] 24 is handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2) [he]is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of her handicap; and 25 (4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id. The elements of both acts are, for screening purposes, satisfied. He has plausibly alleged 26 at this stage that his light sensitivity categorizes him as disabled and/or handicapped. And with 27 respect to the Rehabilitation Act, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[b]ecause California accepts federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, California has waived any immunity under the 28 Eleventh Amendment" as to that Act’s anti-discrimination provisions.” See Clark v. State of 1 of California. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM ADAMS, No. 2:20-cv-1901-JDP-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA PRISON INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, et al. 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceedingwithout counsel,brings suit under42 U.S.C. § 1983, 19 alleging that the defendants violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act 20 (“ADA”) and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the “Rehabilitation Act”)by refusing to allow him to work his 21 prison job with tinted glasses that he needs for his light sensitivity. Plaintiff was eventually 22 terminated from his job after refusing to work without his glasses. The case is before the court 23 for screening, and I conclude that plaintiff’s official capacity claimscan proceed against the 24 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). All other claims and 25 defendants are dismissed with leave to amend for the reasons stated below.1 26 1 Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and a 27 trust fund account statement, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff has made the required showing, and I will grant this request. Plaintiff must pay the filing fee in accordance with the concurrently filed 28 collection order. 1 I. Legal Standards 2 This court screens cases in which prisoners seek redress from a either a governmental 3 entity or an officer or employee thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss the 4 complaint, or any portion of it,that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 5 relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief.” Id.§ 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must comply withRule 8(a) of the 7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which“require . ..a short and plain statement of the claim 8 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the 9 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 10 562-63 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 11 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of 12 Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twomblyand Ashcroft v. 13 Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Aclaim a complaint must contain more than “naked 14 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 15 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 16 supported by mere conclusory statements,do not suffice.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678. 17 Acognizable claim must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 18 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court todraw the 19 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 20 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 21 court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89(2007), and construe 22 the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 23 236 (1974). 24 II. Analysis 25 A. Background 26 Plaintiff alleges that, in July 2019, he was hired by the California Prison Industry 27 Authority (“CALPIA”) fabrics product and sewing shop at Mule Creek State Prison. ECF No. 1 28 at 3. He reported for work in early August wearing glasses with tinted lenses due to his light 1 sensitivity. Id. Defendant Nancy Chamberlain—the supervisor of the fabrics shop—ordered 2 plaintiff to remove his glasses because being unable to see his eyes made her nervous. Id. He 3 declined and told her that the glasses were medically prescribed. Id. In the days that followed, 4 Chamberlain persisted in refusing to allow plaintiff to work with the glasses. Id. Thirteen days 5 after he first reported to work with his glasses, plaintiff’s employment in the fabric shop was 6 terminated. Id.at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Chamberlain filed a chrono that falsified the reason for 7 his removal by blaming him for failure to report to work. Id. Plaintiff informed Chamberlain’s 8 supervisor, defendant Tozi, of the actions taken against him, but Tozi declined to investigate. Id. 9 He alleges that defendant Molle failed to intervene insofar as he denied plaintiff’s grievances that 10 complained of Chamberlain’s actions. Id. 11 B. Analysis 12 Based on the foregoing, plaintiff is suingChamberlain, Tozi, Molle, and CALPIA for 13 violations of the ADAand the Rehabilitation Act. As an initial matter,plaintiff’s individual 14 capacity claims fail becausethere is no individual liability under either the ADA or the 15 Rehabilitation Act. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore 16 join the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by 18 Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). Plaintiff has also brought official 19 capacity ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against all defendants,however. ECF No. 1 at 1. 20 Those claims are adequately pled2 andmay proceed against the CDCR and, through it,the State 21 2 Under Title II of the ADA,a claimant must plead that “(1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against 22 with regard to a public entity's services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion or 23 discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, a claimant must plead that “(1) [he] 24 is handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2) [he]is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of her handicap; and 25 (4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id. The elements of both acts are, for screening purposes, satisfied. He has plausibly alleged 26 at this stage that his light sensitivity categorizes him as disabled and/or handicapped. And with 27 respect to the Rehabilitation Act, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[b]ecause California accepts federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, California has waived any immunity under the 28 Eleventh Amendment" as to that Act’s anti-discrimination provisions.” See Clark v. State of 1 of California. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997)(“[A] prison inmate 2 may state a claim under both the RA and the ADA that he was improperly excluded from 3 participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison service, program, or activity on the basis of 4 his physical handicap.”); see alsoDuvall v. County of Kitsap,260 F.3d 1124, 1141(9th Cir. 5 2001) (“When a plaintiff brings a direct suit under either the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the 6 ADA against a municipality (including a county), the public entity is liable for the vicarious acts 7 of its employees.”). 8 Before service onthe CDCR is directed, plaintiff will be given leave to amend so that he 9 may, if he desires, pursue any other legal theories for individual liability against the named 10 defendants. He is not obligated to amend his complaint and, should he wish to proceed only 11 against the CDCR, he may return the attached form indicating that decision. 12 III. Leave to Amend 13 Ifplaintiff chooses to amend, heis cautioned that any amended complaint must identify as 14 a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of his 15 constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that a 16 person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does anact, participates in 17 another’s act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged 18 deprivation). Plaintiff may also include any allegations based on state law that are so closely 19 related to his federal allegations that “they form the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. 20 §1367(a). The amended complaint must contain a caption that includes the names of all 21 defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging 22 new, unrelated claims. See Georgev. Smith, 507 F.3d605,607(7th Cir. 2007). 23 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in and of 24 itself, without reference to any earlier-filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an 25 amended complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is 26 filed, the earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. 27 California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, the court finds that, for screening 28 purposes, the fourth element of a Rehabilitation Act claim is plausibly satisfied. wOOe 2:OU VV VEY EVR MMU PR Ie AY VI
1 | Humana, 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (‘[The] ‘amended complaint supersedes the 2 | original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 3 || 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). 4 Any amended complaint should be as concise as possible while meeting the above 5 || requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should not include procedural or factual background 6 | that has no bearing on his claims. He should also make sure that his amended complaint is as 7 | legible as possible, considering not only to penmanship but also spacing and organization. 8 || Plaintiff should consider whether each of the defendants he names actually had involvement in 9 | the constitutional violations he alleges. A “scattershot” approach in which plaintiff names dozens 10 | of defendants will not be looked upon favorably by the court. 11 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that 12 1. Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED. 13 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to add the California Department of Corrections and 14 || Rehabilitation as a defendant to this action. 15 3, Plaintiffs complaint, ECF No. 1, states, for screening purposes, viable claims 16 | under Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act and 29 U.S.C. § 794 against the California 17 || Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 18 4. All other claims in the complaint are DISMISSED with leave to amend within 19 | thirty days of service of this order. 20 5. Within thirty days plaintiff shall return the notice below advising the court whether 21 | he elects to proceed with the cognizable claims identified above or file an amended complaint. If 22 | the former option is selected and returned, the court will enter an order directing service at that 23 || time. 24 6. Failure to comply with any part of this this order may result in dismissal for failure 25 || to prosecute. 26 || DATED: October 8, 2020 27 DN pana Caton —_ 28 STATE GISTRATE JUDGE
1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 WILLIAM ADAMS, No. 2:20-cv-1901-JDP-P 6 Plaintiff, 7 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION 8 CALIFORNIA PRISON INDUSTRY 9 AUTHORITY, et al., 10 Defendants. 11 12 In accordance with the court’s Screening Order, plaintiff hereby elects to: 13 (1) ______ proceed only with the claims under Title II of Americans with Disabilities 14 Act and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act) against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified in the screening order; 15 16 OR 17 18 (2) ______ delay serving any defendant and files an amended complaint. 19 20 _________________________________ 21 Plaintiff 22 Dated: 23 24 25 26 27 28