(PC) Ackerson v. Elliott

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 5, 2024
• Docket: 2:21-cv-02205
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELTON ACKERSON, No. 2:21-cv-2205 WBS KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND ORDER MODIFYING 14 ELLIOTT, et al., SCREENING ORDER 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a former county jail inmate, now state prisoner, who proceeds pro se and in 18 forma pauperis. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is pending. Defendants argued that 19 plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment were not violated and noted the screening order 20 finding that plaintiff stated potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claims. 21 The Court has the “inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an 22 interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of Los Angeles v. Santa Monica 23 Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 24 Although courts have authority to reconsider prior orders, they “should be loath to do so in the 25 absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous 26 and would work a manifest injustice.’” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 27 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983)). Other “courts 28 have distilled various grounds for reconsideration of prior rulings into three major grounds for 1 | justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of 2 || new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) need to correct a clear error or to prevent 3 || manifest injustice.” Louen v. Twedt, 2007 WL 915226 (E.D. Cal. March 26, 2007). 4 Here, review of the record demonstrates that at the time of the January 26, 2021 incident 5 || at issue herein, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. Thus, plaintiff's claims are properly analyzed 6 || under the Fourteenth Amendment, which differs significantly from Eighth Amendment standards. 7 || See Castro v. Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (objective standard applies in 8 | evaluating excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainee); see also Gohranson v. Snohomish 9 || County, 2018 WL 2411756, *3-4 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2018) (discussing evolution of laws 10 || governing pretrial detainee’s constitutional claims). Such different governing standards requires 11 || that the Court modify the screening order to find that plaintiff states potentially cognizable claims 12 || under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Butler v. Anakalea, 472 F. App’x 506, 508 (9th Cir. 13 || March 19, 2012) (reversed and remanded “for the district court to apply the correct standard in 14 | the first instance.”) Similarly, because the motion for summary judgment is understandably based 15 || on the wrong standards, the Court is unable to resolve such motion on the papers submitted. See 16 | Gohranson 2018 WL 2411756, at *2. 17 In light of the above, defendants’ motion is vacated. Defendants are granted sixty days to 18 | file a motion for summary judgment based on the applicable Fourteenth Amendment standards. 19 || Such motion shall be briefed under Local Rule 230(1). 20 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 21 1. The screening order is modified to read that the amended complaint states potentially 22 || cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claims for relief (ECF No. 15 at 1); 23 2. The motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 41) is vacated; and 24 3. Defendants are granted sixty days to file a motion for summary judgment based on 25 || Fourteenth Amendment standards, which shall be briefed under Local Rule 230(). 26 | Dated: January 5, 2024 acke2205.vac He . jbl Nearer 28 KENDALL J. NE _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE