Paz v. Long Island Railroad

128 F.3d 121
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedNovember 5, 1997
DocketNo. 459, Docket 97-7376
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 128 F.3d 121 (Paz v. Long Island Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paz v. Long Island Railroad, 128 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1997).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Mark Paz appeals from Judge Raggi’s dismissal of Paz’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In February 1996, Paz filed suit under Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), for the sole purpose of recovering attorney’s fees incurred in successfully pursuing state-law discrimination claims commenced between 1987 and 1991. Those discrimination claims did not allege a violation of Title VII. Paz’s claim for attorney’s fees did not, therefore, arise from an “action or proceeding under this subehapter,” as required by Section 706(k). Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in Judge Raggi’s opinion. Paz v. Long Island R.R. Co., 954 F.Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mark Paz v. Long Island Railroad Company
128 F.3d 121 (Second Circuit, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
128 F.3d 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paz-v-long-island-railroad-ca2-1997.