Paz Salgado v. taser/twin City

CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
DecidedApril 7, 2015
Docket1 CA-IC 14-0051
StatusUnpublished

This text of Paz Salgado v. taser/twin City (Paz Salgado v. taser/twin City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paz Salgado v. taser/twin City, (Ark. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

MARIA de la PAZ SALGADO, Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent Employer,

TWIN CITY FIRE INS. CO. THE HARTFORD, Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 14-0051 FILED 4-7-2015

Special Action - Industrial Commission ICA Claim No. 20130-980299 Carrier Claim No. YZS53406C The Honorable Layna Taylor, Administrative Law Judge

AWARD SET ASIDE

COUNSEL

Snow, Carpio & Weekley, PLC, Phoenix By Erica González-Meléndez Counsel for Petitioner Employee

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix By Andrew F. Wade Counsel for Respondent ICA Klein, Doherty, Lundmark, Barberich & La Mont, P.C., Tucson By Eric W. Slavin Counsel for Respondent Employer/Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of Arizona (“ICA”) decision upon review for a non-compensable claim. One issue is presented on appeal: whether the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding that the petitioner employee (“claimant”) failed to file her workers’ compensation claim within one year after her claim accrued. Because we find the ALJ’s award on untimeliness is erroneous, we set it aside. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶2 This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(2) (2003), 23-951(A) (2012), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10.1 In reviewing findings and awards of the ICA, we defer to the ALJ’s factual findings, but review questions of law de novo. Young v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 298, 301 (App. 2003). We will vacate an award if it is based on an erroneous application of the law. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 222 Ariz. 507, 511, ¶ 11, 217 P.3d 1212, 1216 (App. 2009) (“[A] court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching its decision or the record fails to provide ‘substantial support’ for the decision.” (citation omitted)). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 The claimant worked for the respondent employer, Taser International, Inc. (“Taser”), as a solder assembly worker. She filed a worker’s report of injury on April 5, 2013, for a gradual bilateral hand and arm injury resulting from performing repetitive work activities, claiming

1We cite the current version of the applicable statute when no revisions material to this decision have since occurred.

2 PAZ SALGADO v. TASER/TWIN CITY Decision of the Court

the date of injury was December 20, 2012. The respondent carrier, Twin City Fire Insurance Company c/o The Hartford (“Twin City”), denied her claim for benefits, and she timely requested an ICA hearing.

¶4 The ALJ held a hearing for testimony from the claimant and her treating surgeon. Following the hearing, the ALJ entered an award for a compensable claim based on an injury effective December 20, 2012. Taser requested administrative review solely on the theory that the claim was untimely filed. The ALJ then reversed her award and entered a decision upon review for a non-compensable claim, finding the claim was untimely filed. The claimant next brought this appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶5 The claimant argues the ALJ erred by finding that her workers’ compensation claim was untimely filed. The statute of limitations for workers’ compensation claims requires a claim to be filed “within one year after the injury occurred or the right thereto accrued. The time for filing a compensation claim begins to run when the injury becomes manifest or when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know that the claimant has sustained a compensable injury.” A.R.S. § 23-1061(A) (Supp. 2014).

¶6 The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the one-year period for filing a workers’ compensation claim does not begin to run until the injured employee recognizes or should have recognized: (1) the nature of his injury, (2) the seriousness of the injury, and (3) the probable causal relationship between the injury and the employment. Pac. Fruit Express v. Indus. Comm’n, 153 Ariz. 210, 214, 735 P.2d 820, 824 (1987). As the court explained, the time to file a claim “begins to run when the claimant knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury.” Id. at 213, 735 P.2d at 823. The court further explained, however, that “when an injury is ‘slight or trivial at the time and noncompensable and later on develops unexpected results for which the employee could not have been expected to make a claim . . . then the statute runs . . . from the date the results of the injury became manifest and compensable.’” Id. at 213-14, 735 P.2d at 823-24 (citation omitted). Thus, “[t]he time period for filing a claim does not begin to run until the claimant, judged by the standard of a reasonable person, recognizes the ‘nature, seriousness and probable compensable character’ of his injury.” Id. at 214, 735 P.2d at 824 (citation omitted). In other words, the time for filing a claim “begins to run when the injured employee perceives the nature and seriousness of the injury and recognizes the causal relationship between his injury and his employment.”

3 PAZ SALGADO v. TASER/TWIN CITY Decision of the Court

Id. Finally, the court held that “[f]or an injury to be serious and not slight or trivial, the symptoms must be of sufficient magnitude. . . . Awareness of the permanence of a condition is a factor when determining the magnitude of the injury.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).

¶7 Under that test, the record shows the time to file a claim began either in May or June 2012 or November 2012, within one year of when claimant filed her claim. The claimant testified she began work at Taser in August 2007. She initially worked on the assembly line, and then later, began soldering an average of 300 electronic circuit boards per day. The claimant worked ten hours per day, four days per week. She began to feel hand and arm pain in 2010, but she thought it was only temporary as she did not have pain on nonworking days. Although the claimant believed her work caused her pain, she did not report it to her employer because it was transient and her coworkers advised her not to do so.

¶8 In May 2012, the claimant began working a lot of overtime, including working much longer days and working on weekends. At this point, her symptoms substantially worsened and became constant. By November 2012, the pain and numbness in her hands had become unbearable and she had lost her grip strength, so in December 2012, she went to see her family practitioner. At that point, she was afraid of losing her hands and she could no longer handle the symptoms. Her doctor obtained EMG testing, and based on the results, referred her to Sebastian Ruggeri, M.D., a hand specialist, for treatment. The claimant’s family practitioner also recommended that she stop her soldering work and provided her with a doctor’s note for her employer. The claimant’s supervisor told her that there was no other work available.

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Related

Pacific Fruit Express v. Industrial Commission
735 P.2d 820 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1987)
American Family Mutual Insurance v. Grant
217 P.3d 1212 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2009)
Saylor v. Industrial Commission
831 P.2d 847 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1992)
Young v. Industrial Commission
63 P.3d 298 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2003)

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Paz Salgado v. taser/twin City, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paz-salgado-v-tasertwin-city-arizctapp-2015.