Payne v. Highline School District

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 12, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00586
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 JAMES D. PAYNE, II, CASE NO. C23-0586-JCC 10 ORDER 11 Plaintiff, v. 12 HIGHLINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 13 Defendant. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 16 No. 27). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS 17 in part and DENIES in part the motion for the reasons explained below. 18 Plaintiff is the father of two children attending North Hill Elementary School, which is 19 within the Highline School District (“the District”). (See Dkt. No. 7 at 4.) He takes issue with, 20 amongst other things, the District’s “condon[ing] and/or promot[ing] biased messages,” in the 21 form of posters and communications supporting “LGBTQ+ Students,” the “Black Lives Matter 22 organization,” and “Leftist political icons,” along with images of “communist murderer 23 Che’Gueverra and displays of transsexualism.” (Id. at 5) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff 24 contends his (and others’) children suffer “emotional distress and cognitive dissonance” as the 25 “messages conflict[] with their traditional upbringing at home.” (Id. at 6.) 26 1 Plaintiff, in addition to attending and testifying at various Highline School District Board 2 meetings, sent a letter to the District’s Chief Policy and Strategy Officer, threatening litigation if 3 she did not take certain action, including removing “the LGBTQ messages [that] are offensive to 4 traditional Christian, Muslim, Jewish and most other religious traditions.” (Dkt. No. 30-4 at 3.) 5 Dissatisfied with the result, Plaintiff failed the instant suit, accusing the District of “denigrating 6 religious beliefs.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 7.) 7 As best as the Court can surmise,1 Plaintiff asserts a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8 § 1983 for First Amendment violations, namely the Establishment Clause2 and the Free Speech 9 Clause, along with a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on Substantive Due Process. (See 10 id. at 9–10.) He also brings causes of action for a violation of Article IX, Section 4 of the 11 Washington State Constitution, which prohibits sectarian control or influence of public schools, 12 as well as a claim for the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See id. at 9– 13 12.) Plaintiff asks for a declaratory judgment that the District’s policies and practices are 14 unlawful, injunctive relief regarding the same, and money damages and attorney fees. (Id. at 14– 15 15.) 16 The District moves for summary judgment, asserting Plaintiff lacks standing. (See Dkt. 17 No. 27 at 4–7.) The District argues the complaint is rife with generic allegations of harm to the 18 student body writ large (and in some instances his own children), but contains no concrete and 19 particularized assertions of injury to Plaintiff or his children. (See id.) Further, as it relates to the 20 First Amendment claim based on a free speech violation, the complaint lacks the requisite 21

22 1 The complaint is not a model of clarity. (See generally id.) 2 Despite allegations that the District’s policies and procedures “humiliate[e], embarrass[], and 23 [result in the] fear of unwanted retaliation,” Plaintiff now contends he “makes absolutely no Free 24 Exercise claim” and that he only brings claims based on the Establishment Clause and Article IX, Section 4 of the Washington Constitution. (See Dkt. No. 30 at 10.) This results from the 25 District’s “promulgat[ion of] a quasi-religious orientation,” espousing views aligned with “Secular Humanism, Neo-Marxism, Critical Race Theory, Queer Theory and vague self-serving 26 proclamations of ‘equity.’” (Id. at 10–11.) 1 allegations of a concrete plan to violate the District’s relevant policy or the credible threat for 2 doing so. (See Dkt. No. 32 at 7.) The District further contends that, even if Plaintiff could support 3 standing through amendment, his claims fail on the merits, as they are legally flawed. (See Dkt. 4 Nos. 27 at 7–12, 32 at 7–12.) The District seeks dismissal with prejudice on all claims. (See id.) 5 Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 6 the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views 7 facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolves ambiguity in that party’s 8 favor, but it must not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. See Anderson v. 9 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 255 (1986); Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th 10 Cir. 1994).3 11 Standing is a foundational requirement. If a plaintiff lacks it, the Court does not have 12 subject matter jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 13 Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998). To have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in 14 fact that is concrete and particularized, which is fairly traceable to a defendant’s challenged 15 actions. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). And “a plaintiff must 16 demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 17 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 18 To support injury, Plaintiff leans in on his allegations of exposure to the offending 19 messages, (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 30 at 8), and generically references resulting emotional injury. 20 (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 7 at 6.) But he fails to describe (or now establish at summary judgment) how 21 such injury then manifested in himself or his children, whether that be through sleepless nights, 22 the need for counseling, or something else. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 7, 30.) This is critical to 23 demonstrating the particularity and concreteness necessary for standing. See, e.g., Lindsey v. 24

25 3 A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit,” and a dispute of fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 26 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 1 Visitec, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (finding a failure to “manifest 2 objective symptoms of emotional distress” as controlling); Meyer v. Bayerische Motoren Werke 3 AG, 2022 WL 3566748, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (emotional distress must “manifest by 4 objective symptomology”) (internal citations omitted).4 5 While Plaintiff is correct—this injury requirement does not exist for First Amendment 6 violations based on freedom of speech—Plaintiff must still establish that he or his children have 7 a “concrete plan” to violate the District’s relevant policy precluding free speech and face a 8 credible District-sanctioned threat if they do. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commn., 220 9 F.3d 1134, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2000). The complaint is devoid of such assertions, and the briefing 10 opposing summary judgment similarly lacks such facts. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 7, 30.) 11 Accordingly, the Court must find that it does not have standing to adjudicate Plaintiff’s 12 federal claims. Without this jurisdictional anchor, the Court will not exercise supplemental 13 jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).5 Therefore, Defendant’s 14 motion for summary judgement (Dkt. No. 27) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 15 Plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED withou t pre judi ce. 16 17 DATED this 12th day of June 2024. A 18 19 20 John C. Coughenour 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 4 In fact, as the District points out, Plaintiff—when deposed on the topic—failed to identify any 23 such manifestations. (See Dkt. No. 27 at 5–6.) 24 5 The Court further notes that, before renewing any of the claims now dismissed, Plaintiff should revisit his legal analysis. The Court largely agrees with the District’s contentions regarding why 25 those claims lack merit, at least as pleaded and supported through Plaintiff’s summary judgment briefing. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 27, 32.) Nevertheless, the Court cannot reach this issue, given 26 its lack of jurisdiction.