Payne v. City of Miami

53 So. 3d 258, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 18682, 2010 WL 4962873
District Court of Appeal of Florida·Decided December 8, 2010·No. No. 3D06-2409·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinions

On Riverside 22 Investments, LLC’s Motions for Rehearing

ROTHENBERG, J.

The City of Miami (“the City”) and Riverside 22 Investments, LLC (“Riverside”) filed Motions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. The City subsequently withdrew its motions. Riverside’s Motion for Rehearing is denied. We, however, withdraw this Court’s opinion issued on August 29, 2007, and issue the following opinion in its stead to address the dissenting opinion to the denial of the Motion for Rehearing En Banc.

Riverside owns a 4.3-acre parcel located on the south side of the Miami River at 2215 N.W. 14th Street, Miami, Florida. Riverside applied for and obtained from the City a small scale amendment to the Future Land Use Map (“FLUM Amendment”) of the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan (“Comprehensive Plan”), changing the land use designation of the property from Industrial to Restricted Commercial. Riverside also applied for and obtained a zoning change from SD-4.2 Waterfront Industrial to C-l Restricted Commercial, and a Major Use Special Permit (“MUSP”), thereby allowing Riverside to construct a multi-family development project with a maximum density of 150 units per acre on the property. The ordinance approving the FLUM Amendment was adopted by the City Commission on January 26, 2006, and was signed by the Mayor on January 31, 2006.1 The City approved the rezoning of the property and the MUSP on the same day. The approved development on this 4.3-acre waterfront parcel is for two twelve-story residential condominiums consisting of 633 dwelling units.

The following parties filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearing (“DOAH”), challenging the ordinance that approved the FLUM Amendment: Captain Herbert Payne (“Payne”), a boat captain who owns and operates one of the largest tugboat companies on the Miami River and who relies exclusively on commercial marine business on the Miami River for his livelihood; The Durham Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (“Durham Park”), a non-profit neighborhood association composed of approximately ninety homeowners and businesses located in the Durham Park area, which is located on the south side of the Miami River and to the east of the Riverside property; and The Miami River Marine Group, Inc. (“Marine Group”), a trade association representing marine and industrial businesses along the Miami River (collectively, “the appellants”). After a hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a Recommended Order, which was subsequently adopted by the State of Florida Depart[262]*262ment of Community Affairs (“the Department”), and to which the appellants now appeal.

Because the appellants are challenging agency action, our review is governed by section 120.68, Florida Statutes (2006), and Coastal Development of North Florida, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 788 So.2d 204 (Fla.2001). The relevant provisions of section 120.68 provide:

(7) The court shall remand a case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the court’s decision or set aside agency action, as appropriate, when it finds that:
(a) There has been no hearing prior to agency action and the reviewing court finds that the validity of the action depends upon disputed facts;
(b) The agency’s action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence ...;
(c) The fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action; or
(e) The agency’s exercise of discretion was:
1. Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law;
2. Inconsistent with agency rule;
3. Inconsistent with officially stated agency policy or a prior agency practice, if deviation there from is not explained by the agency; or
4.Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision!.]

(Emphasis added).

Amendments to a local government’s comprehensive plan are legislative in nature and, therefore, are subject to the fairly debatable standard of review. Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1295 (Fla.1997). Thus, where reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the planning action, it should be affirmed. Id.; see also Coastal Dev., 788 So.2d at 206 (applying the fairly debatable standard of review to small scale development amendments). However, because the future land use map of a comprehensive plan represents a local government’s fundamental policy decisions, any proposed change to that established policy is a policy decision that requires that those policies be reexamined. Coastal Dev., 788 So.2d at 209.

It seems to us that all comprehensive plan amendment requests necessarily involve the formulation of policy, rather than its mere application. Regardless of the scale of the proposed development, a comprehensive plan amendment request will require that the governmental entity determine whether it is socially desirable to reformulate the policies previously formulated for the orderly future growth of the community. This will, in turn, require that it consider the likely impact that the proposed amendment would have on traffic, utilities, other services, and future capital expenditures, among other things.

Id. at 209 (citing with approval City of Jacksonville Beach v. Coastal Dev. of N. Fla., Inc., 730 So.2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (emphasis added)).

In applying these standards, the City Commission recognized: the conflict in land use this Amendment would create (with Detroit Diesel to the west of the [263]*263Riverside property and Antillean Marine, a shipping company on the other side of the Miami River); the problems with “sandwiching]” a residential complex between two industrial complexes with Industrial land use designations; the “battles” that will result and the “nightmare” it will create over these “incompatible uses;” and the need for long-term planning on the Miami River. Nevertheless, the City Commission approved this FLUM Amendment without addressing the fundamental policy considerations and ramifications of its decision, leaving consideration of these issues for another day.

After performing a careful and thorough review of the record, we conclude that because the ALJ: (1) failed to examine the FLUM Amendment’s impact upon, and consistency with, fundamental policy decisions contained in both the Comprehensive Plan and the Miami River Master Plan; and (2) made material findings that are unsupported by competent, substantial evidence, we must reverse. We additionally conclude that had the ALJ considered the relevant portions of the Comprehensive Plan and the Miami River Plan and have only relied on the evidence that was supported by competent, substantial evidence, it would have compelled a finding that the Riverside FLUM Amendment is inconsistent with both the Comprehensive Plan and the Miami River Master Plan.

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Payne v. City of Miami, 53 So. 3d 258, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 18682, 2010 WL 4962873 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010).

53 So. 3d 258 (Payne v. City of Miami) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Durham Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Miami
53 So. 3d 245 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2010)