Payne v. Chance

4 S.W.2d 328
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 18, 1928
DocketNo. 2883
StatusPublished

This text of 4 S.W.2d 328 (Payne v. Chance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Payne v. Chance, 4 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

HALL, O. J.

On September 30, 1922, Dan Hogan executed a will, in which he gave his property, in certain proportions, to the children of L. W. Chance, Miss Bessie Elliott, and an aunt of the testator, Miss Nora Mor. an. Thereafter on November 9,1923, he made another will in which he gave his property to the children of appellant, J. H. Payne, Miss Margaret Elliott, and Miss Nora Moran. Testator died April 20, 1924.

On the 23d of April, 1924, the appellant filed his application to have the last-mentioned will probated. On November 18,1925, the appellee filed an answer contesting the probate of said will on two grounds, namely: (1) Lack of testamentary capacity; and (2) undue influence. On the same day, the county court admitted the will to probate. Erom this order, Chance appealed, to the district court, and on March 14, 1927, the case was tried in that court to a jury.

T.wo issues were submitted to the jury. The first, with the finding, is, in effect, that at the time Dan Hogan signed the last will, [329]*329dated November 9, 1923, be did not bave testamentary capacity. Tbe second issue, which related to tbe question of undue influence, was not answered. Based upon tbe verdict, tbe court' denied appellant’s prayer for tbe probate of tbe will. Prom a judgment entered in accordance with tbe verdict, this appeal is prosecuted.

Tbe sole issue before us is that of tbe testamentary capacity of Dan Hogan at tbe time be executed tbe last' will. There is no issue of insanity of any character, senility, or undue influence in tbe case. It is insisted by appellant: (1) That there is no evidence to support tbe jury’s finding; (2) that tbe great preponderance and overwhelming weight of tbe evidence is that tbe testator had sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will at tbe time be executed it on November 9, 1923, and that tbe undisputed evidence in behalf of tbe proponent showed that testator was more than 21 years of age, was of sound mind, and executed tbe will with all tbe formalities and solemnities required by law. These contentions require us to review tbe statement of facts and tbe evidence relevant .to tbe issue to be decided. In determining tbe issue presented by this appeal, there are certain fundamental principles of law and procedure which govern in such cases and which may be stated as follows:

Tbe question of testamentary capacity is ordinarily one of fact for the jury. Bienhardt v. Nehring (Tex. Civ. App.) 283 S. W. 347; 1 Alexander on Wills, p. 548, § 403.

It is held that a testator is capacitated if be knows the nature of the business or 'transaction in which be is engaged, tbe extent of bis property, and the persons who are the objects of his bounty. Vance v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476, 1 S. W. 179; In re Bartels’ Estate (Tex. Civ. App.) 164 S. W. 859; Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S. W. 543; Morris v. Morris (Tex. Com. App.) 279 S. W. 806.

Ordinarily less capacity is requisite to enable a testator to make a valid will than for tbe same person to enter into a contract or engage in intricate and complex business matters and transactions. Vance v. Upson, supra; 1 Alexander on Wills, p. 444. Tbe testator’s mental capacity must be determined as of the date of the will. Vance v. Upson, supra; Warren v. Ellis (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 g. W. 1182; 1 Alexander on Wills, p. 435.

While tbe tendency of tbe courts is to uphold wills (1 gchouler on Wills [6th Ed.] § 200), tbe rule in Texas is that tbe burden is on tbe proponent to show by positive evidence, at the time be seeks to bave tbe will probated, that tbe testator was possessed of mental capacity at the time tbe will was executed, sufficient to make a valid will.

Upon tbe issue involved, about 25 witnesses testified pro and con. It was shown that tbe testator was an old bachelor about 55 years of age, a native of Ireland, and bad lived at Balls and in that vicinity for about 20 years. He was a painter by trade, bad been a cowboy in earlier days, and at about tbe time of bis death owned a wagon yard and bad been running a small restaurant. When be first came to Balls, it appears that be was taken into tbe home of L. W. Chance, tbe contestant, where he was treated practically as a member of tbe family. During this period, he executed tbe first will. Later be moved into a small house in bis wagon yard and lived there until bis death. It is conceded that he was an habitual drunkard, and at times would become so intoxicated that he was not mentally or physically able to attend to his business. Tbe contestant insists that at tbe time tbe last will was executed, be was intoxicated and that be bad been so weakened menially by heavy drinking prior to that date that be was not capable of making a valid will.

Proof of habitual intoxication raises no presumption that incapacitating drunkenness existed at tbe time tbe will was executed. 1 gchouler on Wills (6th Ed.) § 214.

As said in 1 Alexander on Wills, § 475:

“A person may drink and yet retain his mental faculties, although some may claim they are blurred fo an extent, yet the use of intoxicants does not necessarily mean a complete loss of understanding. The same may be said regarding drugs, yet without question, a person, through a superabundance of alcoholic drinks or the excessive use of drugs, may become so mentally obscured that he is, for the time being, comparable to a mad man. In such a condition, he cannot make a valid will, for understanding is lacking, but the effects of alcohol and of drugs wear off and although they may leave the user weakened, both in mind and in body, yet so long as there has not been a destruction of that mentality which the law requires for the making of a will, it cannot be said that the fact that the testator is addicted to the habit of drinking or of drugs incapacitates him from making a will, gucli fact alone does not raise a presumption that the necessary intelligence is lacking. The question to be determined is the mental capacity of the testator at the time he makes his will and the fact that he may be then under the influence of liquor does not invalidate his testament unless he had no intelligent comprehension of what he was doing, and the effect of the intoxication on his capacity is not a question for experts but depends upon common observation and the facts of the particular case.”

Upon the issue of Hogan’s mental capacity, as affected by bis habits of intoxication, four witnesses for tbe proponent and one for tbe contestant testified as to such condition on November 9th, when tbe last will was executed. Tbe statement of facts is voluminous, comprising over 100 pages, and we will merely give a summary of such testimony, from tbe various witnesses, bearing upon this issue.

It appears that on the morning of the 9th ■of November, the testator, with Payne, concluded to go to Crosbyton, but they were pre[330]*330vented from leaving Ralls until about noon. About that hour they left Ralls and went to Crosbyton, tbe county seat, 8 or 10 miles distant. Upon arrival at Crosbyton, tbe testator went immediately to tbe office of Mr. Green Harrison, tbe county attorney, wbo bad been his legal adviser for a number of years, and stated that be wanted Harrison to draft bis will. He gave Harrison a statement- of wbat disposition be desired to make of bis property as well as a statement of tbe property, including several town lots in Ralls. Tbe county attorney wrote tbe will and it was attested by tbe County Judge Jake Made, and the sheriff, John D. McDermett. These three

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Related

In Re Bartels' Estate Jones v. Milam
164 S.W. 859 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1914)
Reinhardt v. Nehring
283 S.W. 347 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1926)
Vance v. Upson
1 S.W. 179 (Texas Supreme Court, 1886)
Prather v. McClelland
13 S.W. 543 (Texas Supreme Court, 1890)
Morris v. Morris
279 S.W. 806 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1926)

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Bluebook (online)
4 S.W.2d 328, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/payne-v-chance-texapp-1928.