Payne v. Chance

4 S.W.2d 328
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided January 18, 1928·No. No. 2883.·Published·Cited by 16 cases

Opinion

On September 30, 1922, Dan Hogan executed a will, in which he gave his property, in certain proportions, to the children of L. W. Chance, Miss Bessie Elliott, and an aunt of the testator, Miss Nora Moran. Thereafter on November 9, 1923, he made another will in which he gave his property to the children of appellant, J. H. Payne, Miss Margaret Elliott, and Miss Nora Moran. Testator died April 20, 1924.

On the 23d of April, 1924, the appellant filed his application to have the last-mentioned will probated. On November 18, 1925, the appellee filed an answer contesting the probate of said will on two grounds, namely: (1) Lack of testamentary capacity; and (2) undue influence. On the same day, the county court admitted the will to probate. From this order, Chance appealed to the district court, and on March 14, 1927, the case was tried in that court to a jury.

Two issues were submitted to the jury. The first, with the finding, is, in effect, that at the time Dan Hogan signed the last will, *Page 329 dated November 9, 1923, he did not have testamentary capacity. The second issue, which related to the question of undue influence, was not answered. Based upon the verdict, the court denied appellant's prayer for the probate of the will. From a judgment entered in accordance with the verdict, this appeal is prosecuted.

The sole issue before us is that of the testamentary capacity of Dan Hogan at the time he executed the last will. There is no issue of insanity of any character, senility, or undue influence in the case. It is insisted by appellant: (1) That there is no evidence to support the jury's finding; (2) that the great preponderance and overwhelming weight of the evidence is that the testator had sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will at the time he executed it on November 9, 1923, and that the undisputed evidence in behalf of the proponent showed that testator was more than 21 years of age, was of sound mind, and executed the will with all the formalities and solemnities required by law. These contentions require us to review the statement of facts and the evidence relevant to the issue to be decided. In determining the issue presented by this appeal, there are certain fundamental principles of law and procedure which govern in such cases and which may be stated as follows:

The question of testamentary capacity is ordinarily one of fact for the jury. Rienhardt v. Nehring (Tex.Civ.App.) 283 S.W. 347; 1 Alexander on Wills, p. 548, § 403.

It is held that a testator is capacitated if he knows the nature of the business or transaction in which he is engaged, the extent of his property, and the persons who are the objects of his bounty. Vance v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476, 1 S.W. 179; In re Bartels' Estate (Tex.Civ.App.)164 S.W. 859; Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S.W. 543; Morris v. Morris (Tex.Com.App.) 279 S.W. 806.

Ordinarily less capacity is requisite to enable a testator to make a valid will than for the same person to enter into a contract or engage in intricate and complex business matters and transactions. Vance v. Upson, supra; 1 Alexander on Wills, p. 444. The testator's mental capacity must be determined as of the date of the will. Vance v. Upson, supra; Warren v. Ellis (Tex.Civ.App.) 137 S.W. 1182; 1 Alexander on Wills, p. 435.

While the tendency of the courts is to uphold wills (1 Schouler on Wills [6th Ed.] § 200), the rule in Texas is that the burden is on the proponent to show by positive evidence, at the time he seeks to have the will probated, that the testator was possessed of mental capacity at the time the will was executed, sufficient to make a valid will.

Upon the issue involved, about 25 witnesses testified pro and con. It was shown that the testator was an old bachelor about 55 years of age, a native of Ireland, and had lived at Ralls and in that vicinity for about 20 years. He was a painter by trade, had been a cowboy in earlier days, and at about the time of his death owned a wagon yard and had been running a small restaurant. When he first came to Ralls, it appears that he was taken into the home of L. W. Chance, the contestant, where he was treated practically as a member of the family. During this period, he executed the first will. Later he moved into a small house in his wagon yard and lived there until his death. It is conceded that he was an habitual drunkard, and at times would become so intoxicated that he was not mentally or physically able to attend to his business. The contestant insists that at the time the last will was executed, he was intoxicated and that he had been so weakened mentally by heavy drinking prior to that date that he was not capable of making a valid will.

Proof of habitual intoxication raises no presumption that incapacitating drunkenness existed at the time the will was executed. 1 Schouler on Wills (6th Ed.) § 214.

As said in 1 Alexander on Wills, § 475:

"A person may drink and yet retain his mental faculties, although some may claim they are blurred to an extent, yet the use of intoxicants does not necessarily mean a complete loss of understanding. The same may be said regarding drugs, yet without question, a person, through a superabundance of alcoholic drinks or the excessive use of drugs, may become so mentally obscured that he is, for the time being, comparable to a mad man. In such a condition, he cannot make a valid will, for understanding is lacking, but the effects of alcohol and of drugs wear off and although they may leave the user weakened, both in mind and in body, yet so long as there has not been a destruction of that mentality which the law requires for the making of a will, it cannot be said that the fact that the testator is addicted to the habit of drinking or of drugs incapacitates him from making a will. Such fact alone does not raise a presumption that the necessary intelligence is lacking. The question to be determined is the mental capacity of the testator at the time he makes his will and the fact that he may be then under the influence of liquor does not invalidate his testament unless he had no intelligent comprehension of what he was doing, and the effect of the intoxication on his capacity is not a question for experts but depends upon common observation and the facts of the particular case."

Upon the issue of Hogan's mental capacity, as affected by his habits of intoxication, four witnesses for the proponent and one for the contestant testified as to such condition on November 9th, when the last will was executed. The statement of facts is voluminous, comprising over 100 pages, and we will merely give a summary of such testimony from the various witnesses, bearing upon this issue.

It appears that on the morning of the 9th of November, the testator, with Payne, concluded to go to Crosbyton, but they were *Page 330 prevented from leaving Rails until about noon. About that hour they left Rails and went to Crosbyton, the county seat, 8 or 10 miles distant. Upon arrival at Crosbyton, the testator went immediately to the office of Mr. Green Harrison, the county attorney, who had been his legal adviser for a number of years, and stated that he wanted Harrison to draft his will. He gave Harrison a statement of what disposition he desired to make of his property as well as a statement of the property, including several town lots in Ralls. The county attorney wrote the will and it was attested by the County Judge Jake Made, and the sheriff, John D. McDermett.

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Payne v. Chance, 4 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928).

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