Pawl Washeleski v. Golnesa Monazamfar, et al.

Opinion

PAWL WASHELESKI, Case No. 25-cv-03135-EKL

Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT, v. DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND GOLNESA MONAZAMFAR, et al., RESOLVING PENDING MOTIONS Defendants. Dkt. Nos. 11, 12, 26, 74, 75, 105, 106, 107

Self-represented Plaintiff Pawl Washeleski filed this action and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”), No. 2 (“IFP Application”). The Court granted Washeleski’s IFP Application. ECF No. 104. In this Order, the Court screens the complaint and finds that it must be dismissed. This Order also resolves all pending motions in this case. This case arises out of Washeleski’s child custody matter in Santa Clara County Family Court. Compl. at 130.1 Washeleski alleges that Defendant Brooke Blecher – the state court judge who presided over that matter – engaged in judicial misconduct. Id. at 120, 183-255. Washeleski alleges that Judge Blecher made “biased rulings,” committed various evidentiary errors, and conspired and colluded with Defendant Golnesa Monazamfar, a private attorney who represented Washeleski’s former partner in the custody matter. See id. at 33, 36. Washeleski further alleges that Monazamfar committed “perjury, forgery, mail fraud, obstruction of justice,” and other misconduct during the course of the state court proceedings. Id. at 33. Washeleski claims that

1 Because some of Washeleski’s filings contain a combination of separate documents with Defendant Stephanie Finelli – also a private attorney – knew of this alleged misconduct but failed to intervene. See id. at 35.2 Finally, Washeleski asserts that the Campbell Police Department, Santa Clara Police Department, and Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office (“Police Defendants”) enforced “fraudulent court orders” and “block[ed] police reports” that Washeleski attempted to file. See id. at 28, 36; see also ECF No. 13. Based on the Court’s review, it appears that Washeleski asserts violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (“RICO Claim”); 42.U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) (“Civil Rights Claims”); and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA Claim”). It appears that these claims are asserted against all Defendants. Section 1915(e)(2) requires the Court to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). For the following reasons, the Court finds that the complaint as a whole is deficient because it does not contain a short and plain statement of Washeleski’s claims that gives fair notice to Defendants. The Court first addresses this threshold issue, then turns to jurisdictional issues, and finally addresses specific deficiencies with respect to each of Washeleski’s claims. A. The Complaint Does Not Comply With Rule 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To comply with Rule 8, the complaint must give “fair notice” and state the elements of the claim “plainly and succinctly.” Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted); see also Park v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 694 F. App’x 602, 603 (9th Cir. 2017). A complaint that is “needlessly long” or “highly repetitious, or confused” does not comply with Rule 8. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the document that Washeleski designated as his complaint does not comply with Rule 8. The document spans approximately 270 pages. See ECF No. 1. It combines numerous separate files, including letters directed to the United Nations Human Rights Council, the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the State Bar of California, police departments, and state courts. Id. at 21-64. The complaint also contains a 72- page list of 518 purported violations allegedly committed by Judge Blecher and Monazamfar in the state court proceedings. Id. at 183-255. Additionally, Washeleski has filed numerous other documents purporting to supplement the original complaint. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 13, 14, 16, 21. These numerous and extensive filings do not contain “a short and plain statement” of Washeleski’s claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8. B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction At its core, the complaint challenges rulings made by Judge Blecher in Washeleski’s state court custody matter. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims based on Judge Blecher’s judicial conduct in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts from exercising “jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals from state court judgments.” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). A suit brought in federal district court is a “de facto” appeal when a party contends a state court’s decision was erroneous and seeks federal relief from the state court judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). District courts “must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if “the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it,” or if “the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.” Fontana Here, Washeleski alleges that Judge Blecher made “biased rulings” and deprived him of custody rights by denying “court-ordered visitation.” Compl. at 36. The relief that Washeleski seeks is to nullify the “custody orders, financial penalties, and restraining orders issued by Judge Blecher” in the custody matter. ECF No. 11. Hearing these claims against Judge Blecher would require this Court to impermissibly decide whether the state court judgments were erroneous. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140. Additionally, to the extent Washeleski’s claims against the Police Defendants depend on allegations that they enforced erroneous orders by Judge Blecher, such claims are inextricably intertwined with issues decided by Judge Blecher as part of her custody orders. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims against Judge Blecher and the Police Defendants that challenge Judge Blecher’s rulings in the state court proceedings. See McCoy v. Uale, No. 21-16877, 2022 WL 10382922, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2022) (affirming dismissal of claims that sought to vacate a state court order terminating plaintiff’s parental rights). Second, the doctrine of sovereign immunity also bars this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the claims against Judge Blecher because Washeleski “impermissibly seeks retrospective relief” in the form of an order staying or vacating the state court judgments. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 900 (2022). “The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from bringing lawsuits against a state for money damages or other retrospective relief.” Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). State officials sued in their official capacities are generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Amendment thus applies to Judge Blecher, who serves as a state court judge and is being sued in her official capacity. Munoz v. Super. Ct., 91 F.4th 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[A]ctions against state courts and state court judges in their judicial capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); see also Lund, 5 F.4th at 969. Here, Washeleski is seeking retrospective relief against Judge Blecher because he challenges judgments and other rulings that issued in the state court proceedings. The Court must WL 1778824 (9th Cir. June 27, 2025) (affirming dismissal of claims barred by sovereign immunity). C. The RICO Claim Fails Washeleski alleges that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” To state a RICO claim, Washeleski must plausibly allege that Defendants participated in “(1) the conduct of (2) an enterprise that affects interstate commerce (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” Eclectic Props. East, LLC, v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). To satisfy the second element when the enterprise is not a legal entity, Washeleski must allege an association-in-fact enterprise. Id. Such an enterprise “must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). Washeleski’s RICO claim fails against all Defendants because he does not plausibly allege an association-in-fact enterprise. Critically, the complaint “does not allege how Defendants associated together for a common purpose.” Doan v. Singh, 617 F. App’x 684, 686 (9th Cir. 2015). The complaint asserts that Judge Blecher “work[ed] in tandem” and colluded with Monazamfar, and “active[ly] participat[ed] in conspiracy to commit fraud upon the court.” Compl. at 6, 36. These conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (holding that “labels and conclusions” are insufficient to state a claim). The complaint charges Finelli with “knowledge of procedural violations, denial of due process, obstruction, and deprivation of rights,” id. at 35, but does not allege Finelli’s relationship to any of the other Defendants, or that she shared a common purpose with them. Finally, as to the Police Defendants, Washeleski alleges only that they enforced unspecified court orders and failed to take his police reports. Id. at 28, 62. Based on these allegations, “it is not clear . . . how [Defendants] requires dismissal of Washeleski’s RICO claim.3 Washeleski’s RICO claim against Judge Blecher fails for the additional reason that judicial immunity bars damages claims. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam) (“[G]enerally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.”); see also Mindiola v. Arizona, No. 24-1842, 2025 WL 1983952, at *1 (9th Cir. July 17, 2025) (affirming dismissal of suit for damages arising from state court “decisions regarding discovery, custody, spousal support, and child support as barred by judicial immunity”). Judicial immunity applies here because the conduct that Washeleski challenges – judicial rulings and management of court proceedings – is judicial in nature as it relates directly to the “adjudicative process.” Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Washeleski fails to state a RICO claim against any Defendant. D. The Civil Rights Claims Fail Washeleski asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). Washeleski fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Monazamfar and Finelli because they are private lawyers. The Supreme Court has held that “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981). Additionally, private persons may be liable for a conspiracy under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff demonstrates “the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights. Crowe v. 3 To the extent Washeleski intends to assert a RICO conspiracy claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), that claim necessarily fails along with the underlying § 1962(c) claim. Chang v. Noh, Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999)). For the reasons stated above with respect to the RICO Claim, Washeleski fails to plausibly allege any common purpose between Monazamfar or Finelli and any state actor. Washeleski’s Section 1983 claim also fails against Judge Blecher because he seeks injunctive relief, which is not available. Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Washeleski does not allege that his Section 1983 claim is based on a declaratory decree, nor does he allege that declaratory relief was unavailable. Miroyan v. Manley, No. 16-cv-00958-JCS (PR), 2016 WL 2606727, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2016) (dismissing Section 1983 claim because the complaint did not support an inference “that a declaratory decree was violated, or that declaratory relief was unavailable”). Thus, Judge Blecher is immune from Washeleski’s injunctive relief claim. Washeleski’s Section 1983 claim against the Police Defendants fails because it rests primarily on their alleged enforcement of unspecified court orders. Generally, “public officials who ministerially enforce facially valid court orders are entitled to absolute immunity.” Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013). There are no allegations that the Police Defendants lacked the authority to enforce Judge Blecher’s orders, or that they engaged in conduct that was not prescribed by such orders. See id. at 1041. To the extent Washeleski claims that the Police Defendants refused to take reports or act on claims that he asserted against third parties, Washeleski has not plausibly alleged an official policy or custom as required for municipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Finally, Washeleski also asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which provides a cause of action against conspiracies to deprive “equal protection of the laws.” Among other elements, a Section 1985(3) claim requires a conspiracy and “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Here, Washeleski fails to plausibly allege a conspiracy for the reasons stated above, and he also fails to allege any racial or other class-based discriminatory animus. Given these pleading deficiencies, and the lack of a plausible Section 1983 claim, the Section 1985(3) claim must be dismissed as well. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]o state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim under § 1983.”). E. The ADA Claim Fails Washeleski’s ADA Claim is also deficient. To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, Washeleski must allege that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). First, Judge Blecher may not be held liable for violations of Title II of the ADA in her individual capacity. Ervin v. Jud. Council of Cal., 307 F. App’x 104, 105 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of ADA claims against “state court judges because, as individuals, they were not liable under the ADA”). Monazamfar and Finelli also cannot be liable for ADA violations because they are individuals. Constantin v. Navarrete, 22-cv-07075-VKD, 2023 WL 5725527, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2023). Second, judicial immunity bars the ADA claim against Judge Blecher in her official capacity. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). Washeleski appears to allege that Judge Blecher violated the ADA based on certain rulings and decisions to manage in-court proceedings. See, e.g., Compl. at 183-184, 187-188, 198-200, 205. “Ruling on a motion is a normal judicial function, as is exercising control over the courtroom while court is in session. Judge [Blecher] is therefore entitled to absolute judicial immunity.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133. Finally, the Court has not identified any relevant allegations to support the ADA Claim against the Police Defendants. *** For the foregoing reasons, Washeleski has not stated any viable claim against any Defendant. The complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. Because this is the Court’s first ruling on the legal sufficiency of Washeleski’s claims, and because he is self-represented, the Court GRANTS leave to amend the complaint. However, Washeleski is advised that the Court may dismiss the complaint without granting further leave to amend if Washeleski fails to plausibly allege a claim in his amended complaint. Washeleski is also advised that, although the Court considered his numerous, separate filings in screening the complaint, any amended complaint must be filed as one document that contains all relevant allegations and clearly identifies each claim asserted against each Defendant, the relevant legal theory, and the relief sought. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996). Finally, to the extent the amended complaint refers to Washeleski’s minor children, any such references must use the minor’s initials instead of their full names to protect their privacy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. The Court also advises Washeleski that the District Court has a guide for pro se litigants called Representing Yourself in Federal Court: A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants (https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-handbook/), which provides instructions on how to proceed with a civil case. Washeleski can access the guide, and additional resources for pro se litigants, on the Northern District Court’s website (https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/). Washeleski seeks “immediate injunctive relief to halt the enforcement of” various “custody orders, financial penalties, and restraining orders issued by Judge Blecher” in Washeleski’s state court proceedings. ECF No. 11; see also ECF No. 12 (requesting a stay of enforcement of state court orders).4 The motion must be denied for four reasons. First, the Court “may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). Washeleski has not filed any proof that notice of the motion was provided to any Defendant. Thus, the motion is improper.

4 Washeleski filed a motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 11, and a motion to stay Second, Section 1983 prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions against judicial officers, absent circumstances that are not present here. Therefore, the Court lacks the authority to issue the requested injunction. Munoz v. Super. Ct., 91 F.4th 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2024). Third, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts from awarding relief in de facto appeals of state court judgments. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-64. Yet that is precisely the relief that Washeleski seeks here in the form of an injunction to nullify custody and restraining orders that issued in his state court proceedings. Fourth, Washeleski has not satisfied the standard for obtaining the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Among other elements, Washeleski must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Id. at 20. Alternatively, he must raise “serious questions going to the merits” of his claim and show that “the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the movant’s] favor.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). To raise serious questions, the movant’s claim must be more than just “plausible.” Where Do We Go Berkeley v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 32 F.4th 852, 863 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, for the reasons discussed above, Washeleski has not alleged a plausible claim. Therefore, by definition, Washeleski has not raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim, and he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success. Because this element is lacking, Washeleski is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. For these reasons, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. V. THE MOTIONS FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS ARE DENIED Washeleski filed two motions for Rule 11 sanctions against Defendant Monazamfar. ECF Nos. 74, 75. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides in relevant part that: By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . . (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. If “the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). The motions must be denied for two separate reasons. First, before filing a motion for sanctions, the moving party must comply with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision by serving the motion on the opposing party at least 21 days before filing it with the court. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that actual service is required; an “informal warning” is insufficient). One purpose of this requirement is to provide the opposing party “an adequate opportunity to cure the alleged deficiencies.” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Washeleski has not submitted any evidence that he complied with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision, which “precludes an award of Rule 11 sanctions.” Winterrowd, 556 F.3d at 826; see also Hohu v. Hatch, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1176-78 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Second, Washeleski seeks sanctions for alleged conduct that falls outside the scope of Rule 11. Specifically, Washeleski contends that Monazamfar submitted false declarations and other documents in prior state court proceedings. See ECF Nos. 74, 75. But “behavior in prior proceedings do[es] not fall within the ambit of Rule 11.” Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, “Rule 11 sanctions are limited to misconduct regarding signed pleadings, motions, and other filings” in this case, id., and Monazamfar has not appeared in this case nor filed anything with this Court. Accordingly, the motions for sanctions are DENIED for failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision, and because the motions relate to alleged conduct that is not actionable under Rule 11. Washeleski filed a motion for an order “authorizing limited early discovery and compelling the immediate preservation of all relevant evidence.” ECF No. 105 at 1. Washeleski also seeks permission to “serve narrowly tailored Rule 34 requests or subpoenas.” Id. at 2. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. Generally, “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). “In the Ninth Circuit, courts use the ‘good cause’ standard to determine whether discovery should be allowed to proceed prior to a Rule 26(f) conference.” Rovio Ent. Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2012). To determine whether there is good cause for expedited discovery, courts typically consider: “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery request; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the request was made.” Id. The party seeking expedited discovery bears the burden of demonstrating good cause. Id.; see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2011). When a complaint “fail[s] to satisfy Rule 8’s plausibility standard,” the district court lacks “discretion to permit discovery” on the dismissed claims. Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 593 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014). As a threshold matter, the Court lacks discretion to permit early discovery because Washeleski’s claims have been dismissed for the reasons discussed above. See id. However, even if the Court could permit early discovery, Washeleski has not shown good cause. First, the reason for early discovery is to prevent loss or destruction of evidence, see ECF No. 105 at 1, but Washeleski “has not established that Defendants are predisposed to destroy or hide evidence,” Rovio, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. Second, the scope of the requested discovery is broad and unclear, and the corresponding burden on Defendants would be substantial. Washeleski requests an order instructing all Defendants to preserve evidence relating to his unspecified “civil-rights complaints,” and seeks leave to serve unspecified discovery requests as well as “subpoenas” to unidentified third parties. ECF No. 105. The Court cannot determine whether these requests are narrowly tailored, Rovio, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1100, and in any event, the burden on both Defendants and any third parties would be undue given the Court’s determination that Washeleski has not stated a plausible claim. Third, although Washeleski filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, that factor does not support good cause because the Court has denied the motion based on legal deficiencies of Washeleski’s claims. Accordingly, Washeleski’s request for discovery is Washeleski filed a motion seeking appointment of counsel because he is pursuing “complex, multi-party civil-rights actions,” and counsel is “necessary to ensure meaningful access to justice and effective presentation of the claims.” ECF No. 106 at 1. Washeleski notes that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appointment of counsel is appropriate where the plaintiff has “demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits” and either the case is complex or the plaintiff is unable to represent himself effectively. Id. Generally, the Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right to counsel in a civil case – except where an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442-49 (2011); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.”). However, a court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointing counsel is discretionary and is granted only in “exceptional circumstances.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims” without counsel in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, there are no exceptional circumstances that warrant appointment of counsel at this time. As discussed above, Washeleski has not demonstrated a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his case. See, e.g., Koch v. City of Santa Cruz, No. 24-cv-07684-HSG, 2025 WL 215567, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2025) (denying motion to appoint counsel on this basis). Additionally, the Court does not find that the issues in this case are complex, or that Washeleski is unable to articulate his claims. Although Washeleski has failed to plausibly state a claim for the reasons discussed above, this failure is a result of the legal deficiencies of his claims, and not due to his lack of counsel or the complexity of the issues involved. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to appoint counsel without prejudice to the Court sua sponte appointing counsel in the 2 Finally, Washeleski has filed requests for disability accommodations under the Americans 3 with Disabilities Act. See ECF Nos. 3, 26, 94. The Court directs Washeleski to the District 4 Court’s webpage, which can be accessed at the following web address: 5 https://cand.uscourts.gov/about-court/locations-hours/visitors-disabilities-special-needs. As the 6 website notes, “[a]lthough the United States Courts are not subject to the Americans with 7 Disabilities Act (ADA), it is the Court’s policy to remove disability-related barriers to court 8 services by providing reasonable accommodations.” Id. The webpage provides an overview of 9 available services and provides the following email address for users to submit questions that are 10 not answered on the webpage: accommodations @cand.uscourts.gov. Washeleski may contact 11 this email account to submit specific requests as necessary. 12 Ix. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 14 1. The Court DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend. Washeleski shall file 3 15 any amended complaint by January 16, 2026. If the amended complaint does not cure the 16 deficiencies discussed in this Order, the Court may dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. 2 17 2. Service by the United States Marshals Service of the complaint or any other papers Z 18 filed in this action is SUSPENDED until further order of this Court finding that Washeleski has 19 plausibly stated a claim for relief. 20 3. The Court DENIES all other pending motions for the reasons stated above. The 21 motion to file a supplemental declaration, ECF No. 107, is DENIED, but Washeleski may include 22 the facts in the proposed declaration in an amended complaint to the extent relevant to this case. 23 4. The case management conference scheduled for December 17, 2025, is VACATED 24 and may be rescheduled as appropriate pending the Court’s screening of an amended complaint. 26 Dated: December 8, 2025 27 28 Eumik.Lee United States District Judge