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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 DOMINIQUE PAVAGEAU, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00332-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. EXTEND CASE SCHEDULE AND MOTION FOR ACCOMMODATIONS 13 DELTA AIRLINES, INC., 14 Defendant. 15
16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Dominique Pavageau’s motion to extend 17 case scheduling deadlines, Dkt. No. 33, and motion for disability-related accommodations, Dkt. 18 No. 34. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both motions. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Ms. Pavageau filed her pro se complaint in March 2024. Dkt. No. 1. After the Court granted 21 her motion to amend, Dkt. No. 9, she filed an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 11. She accuses Delta 22 Airlines, Inc. (“Delta”), her current employer, of disability discrimination in violation of the 23 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”). Id. at 4–5. She alleges that Delta “failed to 24 interact in the disability accommodation process in a timely ma[nn]er and suspended [her] from 1 flight attendant training the day before [her] graduation.” Id. at 4. She also contends that “[p]rior 2 to any investigation of the accusations, [she] was labeled a workplace bully.” Id. Based on these 3 contentions, she asserts ADA claims for failure to promote, failure to accommodate her disability, 4 unequal terms and conditions of her employment, and retaliation. Id. Her amended complaint also
5 includes an allegation of national origin discrimination, although it does not indicate a statutory 6 basis for that claim. Id. at 5; see also Dkt. No. 28 at 1 (requesting that the Court appoint counsel 7 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 8 On June 13, 2025, Ms. Pavageau filed a motion for court-appointed counsel, Dkt. No. 28, 9 and Delta filed a motion to compel discovery, Dkt. No. 29. On July 22, 2025, the Court denied 10 Ms. Pavageau’s motion for court-appointed counsel and granted Delta’s motion to compel, 11 ordering Ms. Pavageau to provide full and complete responses to Delta’s discovery requests within 12 seven days of the Court’s order. Dkt. No. 32 at 10. 13 On August 11, 2025, Ms. Pavageau filed her motion to extend case scheduling deadlines, 14 Dkt. No. 33, and motion for accommodations, Dkt. No. 34. Delta opposes both motions. Dkt. Nos.
15 35–36. 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 A. The Court Denies Ms. Pavageau’s Motion for Accommodations 18 Ms. Pavageau moves “for reasonable accommodations pursuant to the Americans with 19 Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and this Court’s inherent authority to manage 20 proceedings in a manner that ensures access to justice.” Dkt. No. 34 at 1. She does not identify her 21 disability, but states that she “has been diagnosed with a medical condition that substantially limits 22 one or more major life activities, including the ability to manage stress, process and organize large 23 volumes of documents, and meet tight legal deadlines without health consequences.” Id. She
24 requests the following accommodations: 1 1. Additional time to comply with discovery deadlines and respond to communications from opposing counsel. 2 2. Flexibility in scheduling case-related proceedings. 3 3. Any other accommodations the Court deems reasonable and appropriate to 4 ensure Plaintiff’s continued access to this proceeding. Id. at 1–2. Delta responds that the Court “cannot provide Plaintiff’s requested extensions as a 5 reasonable accommodation under the ADA” and must instead “evaluate Plaintiff’s request under 6 a good cause standard in conjunction with her Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order.” Dkt. No. 7 36 at 2. It further argues that Ms. Pavageau has not met the good cause standard. Id. 8 Ms. Pavageau filed her reply in support of this motion on September 8, 2025, Dkt. No. 38, 9 more than a week after her reply was due, LCR 7(d)(3). Ms. Pavageau did not file a motion for 10 leave to file her reply late. Pro se litigants “are subject to the same procedural requirements as 11 other litigants,” Muñoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022), and the Court 12 accordingly “expects all parties—pro se and those represented by counsel—to comply with the 13 Court’s procedural rules.” Capello v. Sziebert, No. C13-5275BHS-JRC, 2014 WL 2465283, at *1 14 (W.D. Wash. June 2, 2014). The Court thus does not consider Ms. Pavageau’s late-filed reply, but 15 notes that the result would not change even if the Court considered that brief.1 16 Turning to the substance of the motion, the Court’s prior order explained to Ms. Pavageau 17 that the ADA does not apply to the federal courts. Dkt. No. 32 at 9 n.3 (citing Murray v. United 18 States Attorney’s Off., No. 2:25-cv-00259-LK, 2025 WL 774918, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 19 2025)). Moreover, even assuming that Ms. Pavageau has a disability, she has not established a 20 need for the accommodations she seeks. Her first accommodation request—for additional time to 21 22
23 1 Ms. Pavageau’s reply requests that the Court order mediation as an accommodation. Dkt. No. 38 at 1–2. The Court does not consider this new request, to which Delta has had no opportunity to respond. Regardless, Ms. Pavageau has 24 not shown that forcing Delta to mediate is an appropriate accommodation. 1 comply with discovery deadlines and respond to communications from opposing counsel— 2 appears unnecessary when she has already received a de facto months-long extension to respond 3 to Delta’s discovery requests as the Court previously noted, Dkt. No. 32 at 9, and she has not 4 expressed an ongoing specific need for any further extension to meet her discovery obligations.
5 Her second and third accommodation requests are untethered to any specific deadlines and are too 6 vague to evaluate. Accordingly, the Court denies Ms. Pavageau’s motion for accommodations, 7 and will address her separate request for an extension of the case schedule below under the 8 applicable good cause standard. 9 B. The Court Denies Ms. Pavageau’s Motion for an Extension of the Case Schedule 10 1. Legal Standard 11 Scheduling orders “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Rule 16(b) “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 13 [extension].” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Under 14 this standard, a schedule modification is permissible if the current deadline cannot be met despite
15 the diligence of the moving party. Id. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party 16 opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the 17 inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. “If that party was not 18 diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. In the same vein, the provisions of Local Civil Rule 16 are 19 “strictly enforced” in order to “accomplish effective pretrial procedures and to avoid wasting the 20 time of the parties, counsel, and the court[.]” LCR 16(m)(1). Carelessness is incompatible with a 21 finding of diligence, Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609, as is “[m]ere failure to complete discovery within 22 the time allowed,” which “does not constitute good cause for an extension or continuance,” LCR 23 16(b)(6). In evaluating whether a party has been diligent, some courts consider:
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 DOMINIQUE PAVAGEAU, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00332-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. EXTEND CASE SCHEDULE AND MOTION FOR ACCOMMODATIONS 13 DELTA AIRLINES, INC., 14 Defendant. 15
16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Dominique Pavageau’s motion to extend 17 case scheduling deadlines, Dkt. No. 33, and motion for disability-related accommodations, Dkt. 18 No. 34. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both motions. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Ms. Pavageau filed her pro se complaint in March 2024. Dkt. No. 1. After the Court granted 21 her motion to amend, Dkt. No. 9, she filed an amended complaint, Dkt. No. 11. She accuses Delta 22 Airlines, Inc. (“Delta”), her current employer, of disability discrimination in violation of the 23 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”). Id. at 4–5. She alleges that Delta “failed to 24 interact in the disability accommodation process in a timely ma[nn]er and suspended [her] from 1 flight attendant training the day before [her] graduation.” Id. at 4. She also contends that “[p]rior 2 to any investigation of the accusations, [she] was labeled a workplace bully.” Id. Based on these 3 contentions, she asserts ADA claims for failure to promote, failure to accommodate her disability, 4 unequal terms and conditions of her employment, and retaliation. Id. Her amended complaint also
5 includes an allegation of national origin discrimination, although it does not indicate a statutory 6 basis for that claim. Id. at 5; see also Dkt. No. 28 at 1 (requesting that the Court appoint counsel 7 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 8 On June 13, 2025, Ms. Pavageau filed a motion for court-appointed counsel, Dkt. No. 28, 9 and Delta filed a motion to compel discovery, Dkt. No. 29. On July 22, 2025, the Court denied 10 Ms. Pavageau’s motion for court-appointed counsel and granted Delta’s motion to compel, 11 ordering Ms. Pavageau to provide full and complete responses to Delta’s discovery requests within 12 seven days of the Court’s order. Dkt. No. 32 at 10. 13 On August 11, 2025, Ms. Pavageau filed her motion to extend case scheduling deadlines, 14 Dkt. No. 33, and motion for accommodations, Dkt. No. 34. Delta opposes both motions. Dkt. Nos.
15 35–36. 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 A. The Court Denies Ms. Pavageau’s Motion for Accommodations 18 Ms. Pavageau moves “for reasonable accommodations pursuant to the Americans with 19 Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and this Court’s inherent authority to manage 20 proceedings in a manner that ensures access to justice.” Dkt. No. 34 at 1. She does not identify her 21 disability, but states that she “has been diagnosed with a medical condition that substantially limits 22 one or more major life activities, including the ability to manage stress, process and organize large 23 volumes of documents, and meet tight legal deadlines without health consequences.” Id. She
24 requests the following accommodations: 1 1. Additional time to comply with discovery deadlines and respond to communications from opposing counsel. 2 2. Flexibility in scheduling case-related proceedings. 3 3. Any other accommodations the Court deems reasonable and appropriate to 4 ensure Plaintiff’s continued access to this proceeding. Id. at 1–2. Delta responds that the Court “cannot provide Plaintiff’s requested extensions as a 5 reasonable accommodation under the ADA” and must instead “evaluate Plaintiff’s request under 6 a good cause standard in conjunction with her Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order.” Dkt. No. 7 36 at 2. It further argues that Ms. Pavageau has not met the good cause standard. Id. 8 Ms. Pavageau filed her reply in support of this motion on September 8, 2025, Dkt. No. 38, 9 more than a week after her reply was due, LCR 7(d)(3). Ms. Pavageau did not file a motion for 10 leave to file her reply late. Pro se litigants “are subject to the same procedural requirements as 11 other litigants,” Muñoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022), and the Court 12 accordingly “expects all parties—pro se and those represented by counsel—to comply with the 13 Court’s procedural rules.” Capello v. Sziebert, No. C13-5275BHS-JRC, 2014 WL 2465283, at *1 14 (W.D. Wash. June 2, 2014). The Court thus does not consider Ms. Pavageau’s late-filed reply, but 15 notes that the result would not change even if the Court considered that brief.1 16 Turning to the substance of the motion, the Court’s prior order explained to Ms. Pavageau 17 that the ADA does not apply to the federal courts. Dkt. No. 32 at 9 n.3 (citing Murray v. United 18 States Attorney’s Off., No. 2:25-cv-00259-LK, 2025 WL 774918, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 19 2025)). Moreover, even assuming that Ms. Pavageau has a disability, she has not established a 20 need for the accommodations she seeks. Her first accommodation request—for additional time to 21 22
23 1 Ms. Pavageau’s reply requests that the Court order mediation as an accommodation. Dkt. No. 38 at 1–2. The Court does not consider this new request, to which Delta has had no opportunity to respond. Regardless, Ms. Pavageau has 24 not shown that forcing Delta to mediate is an appropriate accommodation. 1 comply with discovery deadlines and respond to communications from opposing counsel— 2 appears unnecessary when she has already received a de facto months-long extension to respond 3 to Delta’s discovery requests as the Court previously noted, Dkt. No. 32 at 9, and she has not 4 expressed an ongoing specific need for any further extension to meet her discovery obligations.
5 Her second and third accommodation requests are untethered to any specific deadlines and are too 6 vague to evaluate. Accordingly, the Court denies Ms. Pavageau’s motion for accommodations, 7 and will address her separate request for an extension of the case schedule below under the 8 applicable good cause standard. 9 B. The Court Denies Ms. Pavageau’s Motion for an Extension of the Case Schedule 10 1. Legal Standard 11 Scheduling orders “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Rule 16(b) “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 13 [extension].” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Under 14 this standard, a schedule modification is permissible if the current deadline cannot be met despite
15 the diligence of the moving party. Id. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party 16 opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the 17 inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. “If that party was not 18 diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. In the same vein, the provisions of Local Civil Rule 16 are 19 “strictly enforced” in order to “accomplish effective pretrial procedures and to avoid wasting the 20 time of the parties, counsel, and the court[.]” LCR 16(m)(1). Carelessness is incompatible with a 21 finding of diligence, Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609, as is “[m]ere failure to complete discovery within 22 the time allowed,” which “does not constitute good cause for an extension or continuance,” LCR 23 16(b)(6). In evaluating whether a party has been diligent, some courts consider:
24 1 whether the movant was diligent in helping the court to create a workable Rule 16 order; whether matters that were not, and could not have been, foreseeable at the 2 time of the scheduling conference caused the need for amendment; and whether the movant was diligent in seeking amendment once the need to amend became 3 apparent. 4 United States ex rel. Terry v. Wasatch Advantage Grp., LLC, 327 F.R.D. 395, 404 (E.D. Cal. 2018) 5 (citation omitted). As the moving party, Ms. Pavageau has the burden of demonstrating good 6 cause. See White v. Ethicon, Inc., No. C20-952-BHS, 2022 WL 596407, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7 28, 2022). 8 When a deadline has already passed, as the deadline for expert witness disclosures has here, 9 see Dkt. No. 26 at 1, a party must also show “excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). 10 Excusable neglect focuses on the equities underlying whether to excuse a party’s noncompliance. 11 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (“conclud[ing] 12 that the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances 13 surrounding the party’s omission”). 14 2. Ms. Pavageau Has Not Been Diligent 15 Ms. Pavageau requests a two-month extension of the deadlines to disclose expert and 16 rebuttal witness, complete discovery, and file discovery-related and dispositive motions. Dkt. No. 17 33 at 2. As justification, she states that she “continues to experience chronic pain, since May 2025, 18 from a lumbar injury sustained during employment with Defendant and will be under evaluation 19 by a spine specialist, with the earliest appointment available on August 14, 2025”; she “has been 20 treated in urgent care twice since May 2025 for pain management”; she has been assisting her 21 mother with post-operative care; she “has suffered the deaths of two close family members in the 22 last 60 days, contributing to grief-related delays”; and her application for court-appointed counsel 23 was denied. Dkt. No. 33 at 2. Delta responds that Ms. Pavageau has not been diligent. Dkt. No. 35
24 at 4. Delta also notes that Ms. Pavageau waited to file this motion until “barely one month before 1 the close of discovery on September 22, 2025.” Id. at n.3. Ms. Pavageau notes in her reply brief 2 that she has served and responded to “dense” discovery requests while parenting a teenager and 3 attending to “therapy appointments[] and health issues[.]” Dkt. No. 37 at 2. 4 Ms. Pavageau has not demonstrated diligence. Her belated participation in discovery—
5 preceded by a months-long delay—does not demonstrate diligence or good cause for an extension. 6 Nor does her juggling of litigation-related and personal responsibilities distinguish her from any 7 other litigant. Moreover, as Delta notes, Ms. Pavageau’s “two urgent care visits over the last four 8 months do not explain why [she] has not complied with the current scheduling order that has been 9 in place since January 2025.” Dkt. No. 35 at 4. Although Ms. Pavageau has experienced two deaths 10 in her family—seemingly in the winter and spring of 2025, Dkt. No. 30-1 at 27, 43—she fails to 11 explain why she did not seek an extension sooner. And while she references chronic pain, see Dkt. 12 No. 33 at 2, she does not explain how the additional time would assist her in litigating this case. 13 See, e.g., Griepsma v. Andersen, No. C21-302 LK-TLF, 2022 WL 683214, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 14 Mar. 8, 2022) (denying motion for an extension when plaintiff cited to his permanent hand pain
15 but did “not explain how extra time would help with his permanent condition and his ability to 16 litigate his case”). Ms. Pavageau’s lack of diligence is sufficient to deny her motion, see Johnson, 17 975 F.2d at 609, and the Court does so.2 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Ms. Pavageau’s motion to extend case 20 scheduling deadlines, Dkt. No. 33, and her motion for accommodations, Dkt. No. 34. The Court 21
22 2 The Court notes two additional issues that weigh in favor of denying the motion. First, Ms. Pavageau’s request for a December 22, 2025 deadline for dispositive motions runs afoul of the Court’s “120-day rule” for dispositive motions, Dkt. No. 15-1 at 2, and if granted, would leave the Court insufficient time to rule on such motions once briefing was 23 complete. Second, and relatedly, adopting Ms. Pavageau’s proposed schedule would require the Court to continue the trial date, prejudicing Delta by prolonging this litigation, which was been pending since March 2024. See Dkt. No. 1; 24 see also Dkt. No. 35 at 5–6. 1 also directs the Clerk to seal Dkt. No. 38-1 because it contains personal data identifiers. Ms. 2 Pavageau is reminded that she must comply with all Court rules, including Local Civil Rule 5.2 3 regarding the redaction of such personal information in filings. 4 Dated this 10th day of September, 2025.
5 A 6 Lauren King United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23