Paulson v. Meier

246 F. Supp. 36, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7428
CourtDistrict Court, D. North Dakota
DecidedAugust 10, 1965
DocketCiv. 618
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 246 F. Supp. 36 (Paulson v. Meier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. North Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7428 (D.N.D. 1965).

Opinion

REGISTER, District Judge.

Our previous opinion issued in this ease in July, 1964, and reported at 232 F.Supp. 183, states the nature of the case, the issues involved, and the factual background necessary for an understanding thereof.

During the month of June, 1964, the controlling principles and general guidelines to be applied in determining the issues heretofore raised had been announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Reynolds, etc. et al. v. Sims et al., 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, and related cases. 1 After carefully considering the then existing apportionment law of this state in the light of the teachings of the Supreme Court in the cases cited, we said: “It is our conclusion, and we so hold, that there is no constitutionally valid legislative apportionment law in existence in the State of North Dakota at this time.” (232 F.Supp., at page 187) In considering the appropriate remedy to be granted, we referred to several of the Supreme Court cases heretofore cited, and to specific portions thereof. These included:

" * * * And it (the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama), correctly recognized that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having'had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds, supra, 377 U.S. at page 586, 84 S.Ct. at page 1394;

and, in the Maryland Committee, supra, 377 U.S. at page 676, 84 S.Ct. at page 1440:

“Since primary responsibility for legislative apportionment rests with the legislature itself and since adequate time exists in which the Maryland General Assembly can act, the Maryland courts need feel obliged to take further affirmative action only if the legislature fails to enact a constitutionally valid state legislative apportionment scheme in a timely fashion after being afforded a further opportunity by the courts to do so.”

After discussing and analyzing the election laws of this state, the then proximity and imminence of the general election, the fact that the election machinery *38 was then in progress, the mechanics and complexities of the election laws, the disruptive effect upon the election process which would necessarily result from attempting to grant immediate relief, and after considering the applicable quoted admonitions of the Supreme Court, a majority of this Court, applying equitable principles, concluded:

“We hold that the Thirty-ninth Legislative Assembly (1965) of North Dakota, consisting of members elected under existing law, will have a de facto status; that at such regular session it should promptly devise and pass legislation creating and establishing a system of legislative districting and apportionment consistent with federal constitutional standards ; that the effective date of this Order and Decree will be stayed until after the 1964 general elections have been held and for a reasonable time after the commencement of the 1965 Legislative Assembly in order to afford such Assembly a reasonable and adequate opportunity to enact such apportionment legislation. * * We retain and reserve jurisdiction herein for such further relief and orders, if any, as may hereafter be deemed proper.” (232 F. Supp., at page 190)

Now pending before us is Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal and Clarification. The asserted basis upon which Defendant contends he is entitled to a dismissal of the action is that the Thirty-ninth Legislative Assembly did enact a new apportionment act, House Bill No. 566, which he contends is a “ * * * valid act and substantially meets the requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court”. A certified copy of the act is attached to the Motion as an exhibit; this exhibit discloses that it was duly passed by the Legislative Assembly (which convened on January 5, 1965, and adjourned on March 5, 1965), was filed in the office of the Defendant on March 20, 1965, and, being neither vetoed nor approved by the Governor of this state, became law on July 1, 1965. (Sections 67 and 79, Constitution of North Dakota.) In their Return to said Motion, insofar as this aspect of the case is concerned, Plaintiffs object to such a dismissal upon the ground that said House Bill 566 “ * * * provides for a system of legislative districting and apportionment which is discriminatory and not consistent with federal constitutional standards”, and, accordingly, Plaintiffs ask that this Court, “ * * * if it finds House Bill No. 566 to be unconstitutional or illegal, by decree create and devise a system of legislative districting and apportionment consistent with federal constitutional standards”. Defendant asserts, in view of Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief, that said Plaintiffs are, in effect, asking this Court to determine the constitutionality of House Bill 566, and urges that this question is not presently before the Court. Our previous order and directive was that the Legislative Assembly “ * "• promptly devise and pass legislation creating and establishing a system of legislative districting and apportionment consistent with federal constitutional standards”. (Emphasis supplied.) We are of the opinion that the first and basic question to be determined by us is whether House Bill 566 is “consistent with federal constitutional standards”, that this question is here present, and that whether the action taken by the legislature is valid or a nullity depends upon our determination of that question. We therefore direct our attention to the question of whether House Bill 566 is a valid reapportionment law.

Prior to oral argument on the pending motion, we granted the petition of State Senator William R. Reichert for leave to appear amicus curiae, and also the motion to appear, amicus curiae, of thirteen residents and qualified voters of this state who are designated, collectively, as the “Committee for Fair Reapportionment”. We have had the benefit and assistance of briefs and oral argument of both Mr. Reichert and of Mr. Herbert L. Meschke, counsel for said Committee. Mr. Reichert was a member of the Senate from Stark County during the 1965 Legislative Assembly and had been a member of the Legislative Research Committee, which *39 will be hereinafter referred to. Mr. Meschke was a member of the House of Representatives, from Ward County, at said Legislative Assembly. We express our gratitude and appreciation to these gentlemen, who appeared as “friends of the court”, for the information and assistance given us.

The test as to whether an apportionment act meets the federal constitutional standards has been stated by the Supreme Court in Reynolds, supra, as follows:

“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.” (377 U. S., at page 568, 84 S.Ct., at page 1385.)

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Bluebook (online)
246 F. Supp. 36, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paulson-v-meier-ndd-1965.