Paulson v. Mascuch

136 F.2d 706, 30 C.C.P.A. 1165
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 1, 1943
DocketNo. 4695; No. 4696
StatusPublished

This text of 136 F.2d 706 (Paulson v. Mascuch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paulson v. Mascuch, 136 F.2d 706, 30 C.C.P.A. 1165 (ccpa 1943).

Opinion

LenRCOt, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

There is here brought before us for review two appeals from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office in an interference proceeding. The decision appealed from awarded Mascuch priority of the invention defined in the single count in issue, which reads as follows:

In a spark plug of the type haying a cylinder engaging shell carrying one electrode and a shielded conductor electrically connected to the other electrode, the combination with said conductor and shell of a shield having a cylindrical portion secured at its lower end by direct, locking contact with said shell and a second angularly directed portion embracing the end of said conductor and [1166]*1166electrically connected with tlie shield thereof and means for holding the two portions of said shield in engagement with each other whereby an electrical connection is maintained from the shield of said conductor through the two portions of said shield to said shell.

Tlie object of the combination stated in the count is to prevent the electromagnetic waves generated by the operation of the spark plug from interfering with the operation of radio receivers.

The interference is between the following applications, viz, the application of Mascuch filed April 27,1929, the application of Hyland filed July 1,1929, and the application of Paulson filed July 15,1929.

It thus appears that Mascuch is the senior party, and the burden was upon Hyland and Paulson respectively to establish priority of invention over Mascuch by a preponderance of evidence. ■

The record shows that the applications have been assigned as follows : The Mascuch application to Breeze Corporations; the Hyland application to a subsidiary of the Benclix Aviation Corporation; and the Paulson application to the B. G. Corporation.

The general subject matter here involved is also involved in a series of appeals decided concurrently hereAvith, Shumaker v. Paulson and Hyland, 30 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1136; Paulson v. Hyland, 30 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1150; and Shumaker v. Paulson, 30 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1156.

The Examiner of Interferences decided that Mascuch was the first to conceive the invention, that none of the parties had established an actual reduction to practice prior to the filing date of the Mascuch application, and therefore, he being the first to conceive the invention :and the first to reduce it to practice by the filing of his application, Avas adjudged to be the prior inA^entor.

The Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the examiner upon all points, and as hereinbefore indicated, Hyland and Paulson have filed separate appeals from such decision.

Inasmuch as the issue involves principally questions of fact upon which the Patent Office tribunals concurred, the rule is here applicable that concurring findings of fact by such tribunals will be accepted by us unless they are manifestly wrong.

It appears that Mascuch is president of the Breeze Corporations, which is engaged in the manufacture of spark plugs; that during the years 1920 to 1923 he Avas engaged in the manufacture and sale of spark plugs; that thereafter until 1926 he was engaged in the design and sale of automobile bumpers. He testified that in the latter part of 1925 he became interested in the shielding of spark plugs; that in February 1926 he conceived the involved invention and shortly thereafter had made for him ten spark plugs embodying the invention and placed eight of them in a Lincoln car containing a radio, and that the opera[1167]*1167tion of tlie car showed the plugs Avorked an improvement in radio reception.

The’Examiner of Interferences held that a sketch introduced in evidence as Mascuch Exhibit 9 clearly discloses the elements of the count. This sketch is dated April 1, 1926, and bears the signature of appellee and the signatures of J. T. Mascuch, a brother of appellee, and one S. H. Roberts, an employee of the Breeze Corporations.

Upon the point of corroboration of -this sketch, the Examiner of Interferences stated:

It is considered necessary, however, only to discuss Mascuch exhibit 9 which clearly shows the issue and if proven as of the date on the sketch by the two witnesses ,T. T. Mascuch and Roberts, both of whom state that they signed the sketch (Mascuch record, pages 404, 574) on April 1, 1926, will be sufficient to establish prior conception on behalf of the senior party Mascuch.
While neither witness specifically stated that the drawing Mascuch exhibit 9 was in the same condition at the time of taking testimony as it was when they witnessed and dated it, both did, however, state that within a week or so after the sketch was made, Mascuch exhibit 10 or a similar device, was fabricated (Mascuch record, pages 405, 575). Mascuch exhibit 10 corresponds closely to Mascuch exhibit 9 and the drawing considered with the witnesses’ testimony that similar devices were built is held to carry sufficient probative force to establish the existence of the subject matter of the count on behalf of Mascuch as early as April, 1926, which date is awarded him as his date of conception.
Maseuch will accordingly prevail as the first to conceive and constructively reduce to practice regardless of his diligence should neither junior party establish as actual reduction to practice prior to Mascuch’s date of filing since his date of conception is long prior to any date available to either junior party or attempted to be proved in their behalf.

The Board of Appeals did not discuss the question of the date of conception to which Mascuch is entitled, but merely stated the holdings of the Examiner of Interferences as last above quoted, and its‘ approval thereof ivas indicated by the general affirmation of the decision of the examiner.

With respect to the question of whether the Mascuch Exhibit 9 discloses the involved invention, we are in accord Avith the Patent Office tribunals that it is there disclosed.

With regard to AAThether the proof establishes the date of April 1, 1926, as the date of disclosure of the invention by Mascuch to others, Ave Avould first observe that after the original decision of the Examiner of Interferences herein, the case was, upon order of the commissioner, reopened to permit the introduction of newly discovered eAddence, consisting of the record of the conviction of appellee of the crime of perjury in the state of New York while these inter-’ ference proceedings were pending. The crime for which appellee was convicted had no relation to the matters here involved. Subsequent to the reopening of the case, the examiner adhered to his original decision, stating that his conclusion as to the date of conception [1168]*1168to which Mascuch is entitled was arrived at wholly upon the testimony of his corroborating witnesses, whose credibility had not been attacked.

Upon the entire record we cannot hold that the Patent Office tribunals were manifestly wrong in holding that Mascuch is entitled to a date for conception of the invention as early as April 1926.

In view of our conclusions hereinafter stated, it is unnecessary to discuss the contention of Mascuch. that upon the evidence he is entitled to a finding of actual reduction to practice of the invention in 1926 or at any other time prior to his filing date.

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136 F.2d 706, 30 C.C.P.A. 1165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paulson-v-mascuch-ccpa-1943.