Paulson v. Andicoechea

926 P.2d 955, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 161, 1996 WL 661694
CourtWyoming Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1996
Docket95-300
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 926 P.2d 955 (Paulson v. Andicoechea) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wyoming Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paulson v. Andicoechea, 926 P.2d 955, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 161, 1996 WL 661694 (Wyo. 1996).

Opinion

LEHMAN, Justice.

The issue presented in this ease is whether appellee owes appellant a duty to clear snow and ice from a parking lot. Finding that the natural accumulation rule bars imposition of such a duty under the specific facts of this case, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

ISSUES

Appellant presents the following issue:

I.May the natural accumulation rule serve as a foundation for summary judgment in the face of specific common law and statutory duties which mandate the removal of snow and ice fl-om the property where a citizen was hurt?
Appellee states, the issues:
I. Is summary judgment appropriate in a slip and fall case when the summary judgment is based on undisputed facts, well-settled Wyoming case law concerning the natural accumulation rule, and the obvious danger rule?
II. If a landowner in Wyoming cleans a parking area following a snowfall, is there a common law duty created requiring landowner to clean the parking area each subsequent snowfall thereafter?
III. Does Rock Springs’ city ordinance requiring snow removal from sidewalks create a duty to remove snow from parking areas not located on sidewalks?

FACTS

On December 10, 1991, Appellant Judith Paulson (Paulson) arrived at the Appellee Cody Motel (Cody Motel) in Rock Springs, Wyoming to perform her janitorial cleaning service. It had snowed, and Cody Motel had not cleared away the snow and ice which had accumulated in the parking lot. When Paul-son arrived at the Cody Motel, she drove into the parking lot, got out of the truck, and entered the main office. She then returned to her truck and drove to the laundry room, whereupon she supervised the cleaning of the rooms. As Paulson drove around and walked on the parking lot, she recognized that it was packed and slick with snow and ice.

When Paulson’s duties were finished, she drove her vehicle back to the main office to clock out. Paulson parked her vehicle in the parking lot; and, upon stepping out of her truck, she slipped' and fell on some snow and ice injuring herself. Subsequently, Paulson *957 filed an action in district court against Cody Motel and its owner, Jose Andioeoechea, based upon negligence. Cody Motel submitted a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Paulson and, thus, a negligence action could not survive. The district court agreed with Cody Motel and granted summary judgment. Paulson timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

Summary judgment is proper, even in negligence cases, when there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pullman v. Outzen, 924 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo.1996); Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 518 (Wyo.1994); Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 894-95 (Wyo.1994). When we review a motion for summary judgment, we view the record on appeal in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and accept all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the record in favor of that party. Pullman, at 418; Downen, at 518; Eiselein, at 894.

II. Natural accumulation and obvious danger rules

In Wyoming, this court has made a distinction between natural and unnatural accumulations of snow and ice regarding slip and fall cases. The owner or occupier of the premises is not liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on a natural accumulation of snow and ice. Pullman, 924 P.2d at 418; Eiselein, 868 P.2d at 897. We have further held that there is no liability when the dangers surrounding such natural accumulation are obvious or are as well known to the plaintiff as the defendant. Pullman, at 418; Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo.1982). In Eiselein we defined and clarified the reasoning underlying these rules:

[A] proprietor is not considered negligent for allowing the natural accumulation of ice due to weather conditions where he has not created the condition. The conditions created by the elements, such as the forming of ice and falling of snow, are universally known and there is no liability where the danger is obvious or is as well known to the plaintiff as the property owner.

Bluejacket [v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494], at 497 [(Wyo. 1976)]. The rationale underlying this rule is that

in a climate where there are frequent snowstorms and sudden changes of temperature, these dangerous conditions appear with a frequency and suddenness which defy prevention and, usually, correction; consequently, the danger from ice and snow in such locations is an obvious one, and the occupier of the premises may expect that an invitee on his premises will discover and realize the danger and protect himself against it.

62A Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability § 699 (1990).

Eiselein, 868 P.2d at 897; see also Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 942-43 (Wyo.1981). It is significant to point out that one of the underlying principles of the natural accumulation rule is that the dangers of natural accumulations of snow and ice are obvious; thus, the obvious danger rule is contained within and is part and parcel of the natural accumulation rule.

Liability will only attach if the owner or occupier creates an unnatural accumulation that is substantially different in volume or course than would naturally occur. Pullman, 924 P.2d at 418; Eiselein, 868 P.2d at 898. To establish that an accumulation of snow and ice is unnatural, a plaintiff must show that the defendant created or aggravated the hazard, that the defendant knew or should have known of the hazard, and that the hazardous condition was substantially more dangerous than it would have been in its natural state. Pullman, at 418. Furthermore, no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its existence. Eiselein, at 895. In Sherman v. Platte County, we stated

there is the rule that no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its existence. Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation of snow and ice. The latter rule broadens the pro *958 tection accorded possessors of land under the former rule.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Blanton v. Gardner's Supermarket, Inc.
45 So. 3d 1223 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2010)
Pinnacle Bank v. Villa
2004 WY 150 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 2004)
McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank
2003 WY 2 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 2003)
Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc.
2002 WY 113 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 2002)
Selby v. Conquistador Apartments, Ltd.
990 P.2d 491 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
926 P.2d 955, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 161, 1996 WL 661694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paulson-v-andicoechea-wyo-1996.