Paulk v. Sexton

45 S.E.2d 768, 203 Ga. 82, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 590
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedNovember 14, 1947
Docket15935.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 45 S.E.2d 768 (Paulk v. Sexton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paulk v. Sexton, 45 S.E.2d 768, 203 Ga. 82, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 590 (Ga. 1947).

Opinions

1. No person shall be discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus "where he is imprisoned under lawful process issued from a court of competent jurisdiction, unless in cases where bail is allowed and proper bail is tendered," nor "in any other case where it appears that the detention is authorized by law." Code, § 50-116 (1, 6).

2. On the trial of an application for habeas corpus for the release of one charged with crime, the only question to be determined is the legality of the detention. It is not the function of the writ of habeas corpus "to determine the guilt or innocence of one accused of crime." Stephens v. Henderson, 120 Ga. 218, 220 (47 S.E. 498). See also State v. Asselin, T. U. P. Charlton, 184 (Ga. Rep. Ann. 66); Young v. Fain, 121 Ga. 737 (49 S.E. 731); Weatherly v. Beavers, 139 Ga. 122 (76 S.E. 853); Peebles v. Mangum, 142 Ga. 699, 701 (83 S.E. 522); Sanders v. Paschal, 186 Ga. 837 (199 S.E. 153).

3. It appeared in this case that the applicant for the writ was arrested on May 19, 1947, under two warrants, one for a misdemeanor, and one for a felony as described in the Code, § 5-9914 (failure to pay for agricultural products, cattle, hogs and other products purchased on cash sale): *Page 83 that on May 20, an application for the writ of habeas corpus was presented to the judge of the superior court of the county to which the warrants were returnable; and that at a hearing on May 24, the judge passed an order releasing the applicant from custody. To this judgment the respondent sheriff excepted. Under the rulings made above, the applicant could not properly be released from custody under either of such warrants merely upon evidence relating to guilt or innocence.

4. An arresting officer has no authority to accept bond from one arrested under a warrant for a felony, as described in the Code, § 5-9914, but should return the party arrested to the county in which the crime was alleged to have been committed, for examination before a judicial officer of that county and the fixing of bail by such officer in case of commitment. Code, §§ 27-209, 27-401, 27-407, 27-418, 27-901, 27-902; Lamb v. Dillard, 94 Ga. 206 (21 S.E. 463); Weatherly v. Beavers, 139 Ga. 122 (supra); Burrow v. Southern Railway Co., 139 Ga. 733 (78 S.E. 125).

(a) As to the felony warrant, it appears that the applicant did not seek a commitment trial or the fixing of bond by any judicial officer, but sought absolute release and discharge on the ground that his detention was unlawful.

(b) While sheriffs and constables are authorized in misdemeanor cases to accept bail in such reasonable amounts as may be fair and just, provided the sureties "tendered and offered are approved by a sheriff of any county" (Code, § 27-902), the evidence did not show that any sureties were tendered or offered even as to the misdemeanor warrant. Furthermore, the mere failure or refusal of such an officer to accept bail would not authorize release without bail, where the detention is otherwise lawful.

5. Nor was the detention of the applicant shown to be unlawful by the additional fact that he had been arrested under a previous warrant and discharged therefrom on habeas corpus, it appearing that such previous warrant was issued for an offense different from that stated in either the misdemeanor or the felony warrant under which he was last arrested. For this reason, regardless of other questions, such previous discharge did not render the detention of the applicant under either of the last-mentioned warrants unlawful.

(a) The present case is distinguished by its facts from Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598, Simmons v. Georgia Iron Coal Co., 117 Ga. 305 (43 S.E. 780, 61 L.R.A. 739), and Day v. Smith, 172 Ga. 467 (157 S.E. 639), and nothing was held in either of those cases contrary to any of the rulings made in the instant case.

6. Under the preceding rulings as applied to the pleadings and the evidence, the judge erred in releasing and discharging the applicant. In this view, it is unnecessary to pass on the assignment of error complaining of a ruling admitting in evidence a certified copy of the previous habeas corpus proceedings, since the result would be the same, with or without this evidence.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Head, J., who dissents, and Wyatt, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. *Page 84 The exception is to an order releasing and discharging the applicant in a habeas corpus proceeding. Three criminal warrants were referred to in the evidence, all having been sworn out by H. T. Troup Jr. against W. R. Sexton, and issued by G. G. Meeks, a justice of the peace of Irwin County Georgia: (1) Warrant dated March 13, 1947, for cheating and swindling, based on a check for $1350; (2) warrant dated May 15, 1947, for the "offense of cheating and swindling, uttering a worthless check on Citizens Bank of Americus, Georgia, on the 3rd day of August, 1946;" (3) warrant dated May 15, 1947, for the "offense of a felony as described in the Code, section 5-9914 on or about 13th day of November, 1946." Only the two last-mentioned warrants are directly involved in the instant case, the applicant *Page 87 having been previously released from arrest under the warrant first mentioned.

The Code section referred to in the felony warrant provides: "Any person engaged, either on his own account or for others, in the business of buying cotton, corn, rice, crude turpentine, spirits of turpentine, rosin, pitch, tar, cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, horses, pecans, peaches, apples, watermelons, cantaloupes, and mules, or other products or chattels sold by planters and commission merchants on cash sale, who shall buy such articles on sale from a planter or commission merchant for cash, and shall fail or refuse to pay for, and shall make way with or dispose of the same before he shall have paid therefor, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one year, nor more than five years." Code, § 5-9914, as amended by Ga. L. 1941, p. 337.

The present case comes to this court solely by a certified bill of exceptions, in which the following facts appear: On May 20, 1947, W. R. Sexton, through his attorney, presented to Honorable R. Eve, Judge of the Superior Court of Irwin County, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, naming as respondent Tillman Paulk, Sheriff of Irwin County. The petition alleged: 3. The cause or pretense of restraint is under a certain warrant of arrest issued in Irwin County by a justice of the peace. 4. Said restraint of W. R.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
45 S.E.2d 768, 203 Ga. 82, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 590, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paulk-v-sexton-ga-1947.