NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-419
PAULA TAYLOR & another1
vs.
BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AFT MASSACHUSETTS, AFL-CIO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs, Paula Taylor and John Daley, both members
of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU or defendant), appeal from a
judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their complaint
seeking declaratory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1. We
affirm.
Background. Taking the plaintiffs' well-pleaded
allegations as true, at a February 9, 2022 monthly union
membership meeting a draft memorandum of agreement (MOA) between
the Boston Public Schools and the BTU was presented to the
attending membership for a vote. "The [February 2022] MOA,
among other things, divided the workforce into 'verified' and
'non-verified' employees depending upon which medical treatments
1 John Daley. they preferred," and further provided for the imposition of
unpaid leave for "'non-verified' employees based upon [certain]
contingencies." The February 2022 MOA also purported to reduce
compensation for employees "who used sick days as compensation
during unpaid leave." The union membership voted in favor of
the February 2022 MOA.
On February 14, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint
against the defendant alleging that the defendant conducted a
vote on the February 2022 MOA in violation of notice and voting
requirements of the union bylaws. Article X of the BTU's bylaws
provides that "[a]ny motion which alters or amends our
collective bargaining agreement shall require the same notice to
the membership as a constitutional amendment." Article X
further provides that proposed amendments to the bylaws "[s]hall
be announced to the membership in writing at least fifteen (15)
days in advance of the next meeting of the membership," and that
proposed amendments "shall become part of the Bylaws of the
[union] by two-thirds (2/3) vote of those present and voting in
favor."
The plaintiffs argue that the above-referenced provisions
of the February 2022 MOA "substantially altered the rights and
obligations of the members under the union's Collective
Bargaining Agreement [CBA]," thus triggering the Article X bylaw
provisions requiring fifteen days advance written notice and a
2 two-thirds supermajority vote. The plaintiffs claim that by
failing to give that required notice and failing to require a
supermajority vote, the defendant breached the bylaws and
proceeded on an unlawful basis without the authority of union
membership. Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek a declaration that
the defendant's actions violated the bylaws and are unlawful.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that, inter alia, paragraph 19 of the February 2022 MOA requires
the "approval of the Boston School Committee" (BSC) to become
effective, and the BSC has never voted on or approved the
February 2022 MOA. Consequently, the defendant argued, the
request for declaratory relief was not ripe for adjudication as
there was no actual controversy within the meaning of G. L.
c. 231A. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss and subsequently filed a motion to supplement the
pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (d), 365 Mass. 761
(1974). The motion to supplement sought, in essence, to amend
the complaint to include allegations regarding a subsequent
September 6, 2022 MOA that contained a requirement for union
members to "verify their vaccination status" and in some
circumstances submit to an unspecified "COVID-19 screening
test." The plaintiffs maintained that certain provisions of the
September 2022 MOA likewise altered or amended rights and
obligations in the CBA and were thus subject to the notice and
3 supermajority provisions of Article X of the bylaws and likewise
were unlawful. The defendant filed an opposition to the motion
to supplement arguing that the September 2022 MOA did not alter
the terms and conditions of employment for union members. On
January 31, 2023, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's
motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion to
supplement. This appeal ensued.
Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss
de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See
Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).
"[W]e look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint
and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief." Id., citing Iannacchino v. Ford
Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008).
With respect to declaratory judgment actions, G. L. c. 231A
"expressly requires that the pleadings set forth specifically
some actual controversy." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co.
v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 530-531 (1981),
citing G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 9. "Such proceedings are concerned
with the resolution of real, not hypothetical, controversies;
the declaration issued is intended to have an immediate impact
on the rights of the parties." Id. at 531, quoting
Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc.
4 v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292 (1977). "Conclusory
allegations as to official duties or potential future conflicts
will not do." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co., supra. With
these principles in mind, we address the plaintiffs' claims on
appeal.
As to the February 2022 MOA, there is no dispute that it
was never approved by the BSC and never went into effect. As a
result, these circumstances present a hypothetical controversy
where the declaration sought by the plaintiffs -- i.e., that the
MOA not in effect is nonetheless unlawful -- would not have an
"immediate impact" on the rights of the parties. Massachusetts
Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, 373 Mass. at 292.
Plaintiffs' argument would also fail because "[a] party has
standing pursuant to G. L. c. 231A where the defendant has
violated some duty owed to the plaintiff[s] . . . and where the
plaintiffs can allege an injury within the area of concern of
the statute or regulatory scheme" (quotations omitted). Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health,
469 Mass. 323, 328 (2014). Here, for the reasons stated above,
the plaintiffs do not allege a cognizable injury within the
meaning of c. 231A.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-419
PAULA TAYLOR & another1
vs.
BOSTON TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 66, AFT MASSACHUSETTS, AFL-CIO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs, Paula Taylor and John Daley, both members
of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU or defendant), appeal from a
judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their complaint
seeking declaratory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1. We
affirm.
Background. Taking the plaintiffs' well-pleaded
allegations as true, at a February 9, 2022 monthly union
membership meeting a draft memorandum of agreement (MOA) between
the Boston Public Schools and the BTU was presented to the
attending membership for a vote. "The [February 2022] MOA,
among other things, divided the workforce into 'verified' and
'non-verified' employees depending upon which medical treatments
1 John Daley. they preferred," and further provided for the imposition of
unpaid leave for "'non-verified' employees based upon [certain]
contingencies." The February 2022 MOA also purported to reduce
compensation for employees "who used sick days as compensation
during unpaid leave." The union membership voted in favor of
the February 2022 MOA.
On February 14, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint
against the defendant alleging that the defendant conducted a
vote on the February 2022 MOA in violation of notice and voting
requirements of the union bylaws. Article X of the BTU's bylaws
provides that "[a]ny motion which alters or amends our
collective bargaining agreement shall require the same notice to
the membership as a constitutional amendment." Article X
further provides that proposed amendments to the bylaws "[s]hall
be announced to the membership in writing at least fifteen (15)
days in advance of the next meeting of the membership," and that
proposed amendments "shall become part of the Bylaws of the
[union] by two-thirds (2/3) vote of those present and voting in
favor."
The plaintiffs argue that the above-referenced provisions
of the February 2022 MOA "substantially altered the rights and
obligations of the members under the union's Collective
Bargaining Agreement [CBA]," thus triggering the Article X bylaw
provisions requiring fifteen days advance written notice and a
2 two-thirds supermajority vote. The plaintiffs claim that by
failing to give that required notice and failing to require a
supermajority vote, the defendant breached the bylaws and
proceeded on an unlawful basis without the authority of union
membership. Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek a declaration that
the defendant's actions violated the bylaws and are unlawful.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that, inter alia, paragraph 19 of the February 2022 MOA requires
the "approval of the Boston School Committee" (BSC) to become
effective, and the BSC has never voted on or approved the
February 2022 MOA. Consequently, the defendant argued, the
request for declaratory relief was not ripe for adjudication as
there was no actual controversy within the meaning of G. L.
c. 231A. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss and subsequently filed a motion to supplement the
pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (d), 365 Mass. 761
(1974). The motion to supplement sought, in essence, to amend
the complaint to include allegations regarding a subsequent
September 6, 2022 MOA that contained a requirement for union
members to "verify their vaccination status" and in some
circumstances submit to an unspecified "COVID-19 screening
test." The plaintiffs maintained that certain provisions of the
September 2022 MOA likewise altered or amended rights and
obligations in the CBA and were thus subject to the notice and
3 supermajority provisions of Article X of the bylaws and likewise
were unlawful. The defendant filed an opposition to the motion
to supplement arguing that the September 2022 MOA did not alter
the terms and conditions of employment for union members. On
January 31, 2023, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's
motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion to
supplement. This appeal ensued.
Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss
de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See
Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).
"[W]e look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint
and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief." Id., citing Iannacchino v. Ford
Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008).
With respect to declaratory judgment actions, G. L. c. 231A
"expressly requires that the pleadings set forth specifically
some actual controversy." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co.
v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 530-531 (1981),
citing G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1, 9. "Such proceedings are concerned
with the resolution of real, not hypothetical, controversies;
the declaration issued is intended to have an immediate impact
on the rights of the parties." Id. at 531, quoting
Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc.
4 v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292 (1977). "Conclusory
allegations as to official duties or potential future conflicts
will not do." Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk Co., supra. With
these principles in mind, we address the plaintiffs' claims on
appeal.
As to the February 2022 MOA, there is no dispute that it
was never approved by the BSC and never went into effect. As a
result, these circumstances present a hypothetical controversy
where the declaration sought by the plaintiffs -- i.e., that the
MOA not in effect is nonetheless unlawful -- would not have an
"immediate impact" on the rights of the parties. Massachusetts
Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, 373 Mass. at 292.
Plaintiffs' argument would also fail because "[a] party has
standing pursuant to G. L. c. 231A where the defendant has
violated some duty owed to the plaintiff[s] . . . and where the
plaintiffs can allege an injury within the area of concern of
the statute or regulatory scheme" (quotations omitted). Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health,
469 Mass. 323, 328 (2014). Here, for the reasons stated above,
the plaintiffs do not allege a cognizable injury within the
meaning of c. 231A. "[U]ntil the defendant[] decide[s] upon
definite action with some finality, declaratory relief is
premature." McCaffrey v. School Comm. of Haverhill, 352 Mass.
516, 518-519 (1967). In addition, "[i]t is settled that G. L.
5 c. 231A does not provide an independent statutory basis for
standing." Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132,
135 (2000). A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must
"demonstrate not only the existence of an actual controversy but
also the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution"
(quotation omitted). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v.
Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 326 (2011). "To
have standing in any capacity, a [plaintiff] must show that the
challenged action has caused the [plaintiff] injury." Sudbury
v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 485 Mass. 774, 779 (2020).
Here, the plaintiffs have not been injured by the defendant's
alleged failure to abide by the notice and supermajority
provisions of the bylaws, because, again, the February 2022 MOA
never took effect. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was
properly allowed.
As to the September 2022 MOA, it appears that there is
nothing in the record before us that indicates that it went into
effect. Thus, for the reasons delineated above, the plaintiffs
fail to satisfy the actual controversy requirement of c. 231A.2
Even assuming, arguendo, that the September 2022 MOA did go into
2 There were representations by the parties at oral argument that the September 2022 MOA went into effect, but, of course, we are bound by the record before us. In any event, for the reasons discussed infra, the claim is also unavailing on the merits.
6 effect, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
motion to supplement the complaint to include allegations
regarding the September 2022 MOA. See Chang v. Winklevoss, 95
Mass. App. Ct. 202, 212 (2019) (denial of motion to amend
complaint reviewed for abuse of discretion). As the judge
found, the plaintiffs did not show how the September 2022 MOA
alters or changes any preexisting term or condition of
employment contained in the CBA, and thus "amending the
complaint would be futile" and would "not survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim." Id. On the record
before us, we cannot say that the judge made "a clear error of
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . .
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable
7 alternatives" (quotation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).3
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman, Hershfang & Hodgens, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: July 30, 2024.
3 We also note that the present litigation appears to be moot. See generally Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 582-583 (2022). The plaintiffs respond that the mootness doctrine should not apply because the present case is not about the coronavirus, but about essential issues of organizational governance. Although there is some force to the plaintiffs' claim, we are not persuaded to alter the result we reach for the reasons already discussed herein.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.