FILED Dec 28 2020, 10:49 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Ann Marie Waldron Emily Edmundson Waldron Law, LLC Des Moines, Iowa Indianapolis, Indiana Michael E. Simmons Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana Deidra N. Haynes The Law Office of Deidra N. Haynes LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Paula Henderson, December 28, 2020 Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CT-1317 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court New Wineskin Ministries The Honorable Corporation, Heather Welch, Judge Appellee-Defendant Trial Court Cause No. 49D01-1801-CT-1943
Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 1 of 9 Case Summary [1] Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 lays out the duties owed by nonprofit religious
organizations to persons who enter their premises. As to those entering the
premises with permission, such organizations owe only two duties: (1) to warn
of hidden dangers and (2) to refrain from intentionally harming them. In
January 2017, Paula Henderson slipped and fell in the parking lot of New
Wineskin Ministries Corporation (“New Wineskin”). Henderson sued New
Wineskin for negligence. New Wineskin moved for summary judgment, which
the trial court granted, finding under Section 34-31-7-2 that New Wineskin is
not liable because Henderson’s fall was not caused by a hidden danger.
[2] Henderson now appeals, arguing the statute does not apply and, even if it did,
there is a genuine issue as to whether her fall resulted from a hidden danger.
We affirm, concluding “premises” as used in Section 34-31-7-2 includes parking
lots and the undisputed evidence shows the danger that caused Henderson’s
injury was not hidden.
Facts and Procedural History [3] On January 29, 2017, Henderson and her son, James, drove to New Wineskin
to attend the morning service. New Wineskin is a church in Indianapolis, and
Henderson had attended services there. While driving to New Wineskin,
Henderson saw “it was snowing” and there was “about 2 inches” of snow on
the ground. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 120, 121. Henderson was aware roads
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 2 of 9 and parking lots “might be slippery when it’s been snowing.” Id. at 121. New
Wineskin’s parking lot “hadn’t been treated” and was “covered” in snow and
ice. Id. at 122, 170. However, Henderson stated the parking lot did not “look
slippery” to her. Id. at 123. She parked in a handicapped parking spot directly in
front of the church doors. When Henderson stepped out of the car, James
warned her it was slippery. She then took two steps toward the front of the car
and fell, injuring her shoulder, back, and neck.
[4] In January 2018, Henderson filed a complaint, alleging New Wineskin’s
negligence caused her injuries. Two years later, New Wineskin moved for
summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
the breach of any statutory duty laid out in Section 34-31-7-2. Following a
hearing, the trial court granted New Wineskin’s motion, finding no breach
occurred under the statute because Henderson was aware of the snow and ice in
the parking lot before she fell.
[5] Henderson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [6] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial
court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Summary judgment is rarely
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 3 of 9 appropriate in negligence cases because such cases are particularly fact-sensitive
and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best
applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence. Kramer v. Catholic Charities of
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015). Nevertheless,
a grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the
appellant must demonstrate the trial court erred. Id.
A. Statutory Interpretation [7] Henderson first argues Section 34-31-7-2 does not apply because a parking lot is
not part of the “premises” as envisioned under the statute. Instead, she
contends the trial court should have applied traditional premises-liability law.
Section 34-31-7-2 provides, in part:
Except as provided in section 3 of this chapter,[1] a nonprofit religious organization has only the following duties concerning persons who enter premises owned, operated, or controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used primarily for worship services:
(1) If a person enters the premises with the actual or implied permission of the nonprofit religious organization, the nonprofit religious organization has a duty to:
(A) warn the person of a hidden danger on the premises if a representative of the nonprofit
1 Section 3 lists the duties nonprofit religious organizations owe to those “enter[ing] the premises for the purpose of receiving fee based childcare services[.]” Ind. Code § 34-31-7-3. It does not apply to the facts of this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 4 of 9 religious organization has actual knowledge of the hidden danger; and
(B) refrain from intentionally harming the person.
There are no Indiana cases interpreting Section 34-31-7-2 or defining the term
“premises” under it. Henderson argues the plain language of the statute
indicates it applies only to buildings, and points to the definition provided in
Indiana Code section 34-31-7-3—the next section in the chapter—which limits
“premises” to “a part of a building[.]” We disagree.
[8] Henderson’s argument requires us to interpret the meaning of “premises” as it is
written in Section 34-31-7-2. Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. Town of Darmstadt v. CWK Investments-Hilldale, LLC, 114
N.E.3d 11, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “[I]f a statute is unambiguous,
then we need not and cannot interpret it; rather, we must apply its plain and
clear meaning.” Vanderburgh Cnty. Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Democratic
Cent. Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). When construing a
statute, the legislature’s definition of a word binds us. Id. But if the legislature
has not defined a word, we give the word its common and ordinary meaning. Id.
[9] The legislature did not define “premises” in Section 34-31-7-2. Henderson
argues the language in Section 34-31-7-2—specifically the word “enters” and
the phrase “used primarily for worship services”—does not apply to a parking
lot and therefore the statute did not mean for parking lots to be considered part
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FILED Dec 28 2020, 10:49 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Ann Marie Waldron Emily Edmundson Waldron Law, LLC Des Moines, Iowa Indianapolis, Indiana Michael E. Simmons Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana Deidra N. Haynes The Law Office of Deidra N. Haynes LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Paula Henderson, December 28, 2020 Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CT-1317 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court New Wineskin Ministries The Honorable Corporation, Heather Welch, Judge Appellee-Defendant Trial Court Cause No. 49D01-1801-CT-1943
Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 1 of 9 Case Summary [1] Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 lays out the duties owed by nonprofit religious
organizations to persons who enter their premises. As to those entering the
premises with permission, such organizations owe only two duties: (1) to warn
of hidden dangers and (2) to refrain from intentionally harming them. In
January 2017, Paula Henderson slipped and fell in the parking lot of New
Wineskin Ministries Corporation (“New Wineskin”). Henderson sued New
Wineskin for negligence. New Wineskin moved for summary judgment, which
the trial court granted, finding under Section 34-31-7-2 that New Wineskin is
not liable because Henderson’s fall was not caused by a hidden danger.
[2] Henderson now appeals, arguing the statute does not apply and, even if it did,
there is a genuine issue as to whether her fall resulted from a hidden danger.
We affirm, concluding “premises” as used in Section 34-31-7-2 includes parking
lots and the undisputed evidence shows the danger that caused Henderson’s
injury was not hidden.
Facts and Procedural History [3] On January 29, 2017, Henderson and her son, James, drove to New Wineskin
to attend the morning service. New Wineskin is a church in Indianapolis, and
Henderson had attended services there. While driving to New Wineskin,
Henderson saw “it was snowing” and there was “about 2 inches” of snow on
the ground. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 120, 121. Henderson was aware roads
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 2 of 9 and parking lots “might be slippery when it’s been snowing.” Id. at 121. New
Wineskin’s parking lot “hadn’t been treated” and was “covered” in snow and
ice. Id. at 122, 170. However, Henderson stated the parking lot did not “look
slippery” to her. Id. at 123. She parked in a handicapped parking spot directly in
front of the church doors. When Henderson stepped out of the car, James
warned her it was slippery. She then took two steps toward the front of the car
and fell, injuring her shoulder, back, and neck.
[4] In January 2018, Henderson filed a complaint, alleging New Wineskin’s
negligence caused her injuries. Two years later, New Wineskin moved for
summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
the breach of any statutory duty laid out in Section 34-31-7-2. Following a
hearing, the trial court granted New Wineskin’s motion, finding no breach
occurred under the statute because Henderson was aware of the snow and ice in
the parking lot before she fell.
[5] Henderson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [6] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial
court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Summary judgment is rarely
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 3 of 9 appropriate in negligence cases because such cases are particularly fact-sensitive
and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best
applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence. Kramer v. Catholic Charities of
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015). Nevertheless,
a grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the
appellant must demonstrate the trial court erred. Id.
A. Statutory Interpretation [7] Henderson first argues Section 34-31-7-2 does not apply because a parking lot is
not part of the “premises” as envisioned under the statute. Instead, she
contends the trial court should have applied traditional premises-liability law.
Section 34-31-7-2 provides, in part:
Except as provided in section 3 of this chapter,[1] a nonprofit religious organization has only the following duties concerning persons who enter premises owned, operated, or controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used primarily for worship services:
(1) If a person enters the premises with the actual or implied permission of the nonprofit religious organization, the nonprofit religious organization has a duty to:
(A) warn the person of a hidden danger on the premises if a representative of the nonprofit
1 Section 3 lists the duties nonprofit religious organizations owe to those “enter[ing] the premises for the purpose of receiving fee based childcare services[.]” Ind. Code § 34-31-7-3. It does not apply to the facts of this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 4 of 9 religious organization has actual knowledge of the hidden danger; and
(B) refrain from intentionally harming the person.
There are no Indiana cases interpreting Section 34-31-7-2 or defining the term
“premises” under it. Henderson argues the plain language of the statute
indicates it applies only to buildings, and points to the definition provided in
Indiana Code section 34-31-7-3—the next section in the chapter—which limits
“premises” to “a part of a building[.]” We disagree.
[8] Henderson’s argument requires us to interpret the meaning of “premises” as it is
written in Section 34-31-7-2. Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. Town of Darmstadt v. CWK Investments-Hilldale, LLC, 114
N.E.3d 11, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “[I]f a statute is unambiguous,
then we need not and cannot interpret it; rather, we must apply its plain and
clear meaning.” Vanderburgh Cnty. Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Democratic
Cent. Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). When construing a
statute, the legislature’s definition of a word binds us. Id. But if the legislature
has not defined a word, we give the word its common and ordinary meaning. Id.
[9] The legislature did not define “premises” in Section 34-31-7-2. Henderson
argues the language in Section 34-31-7-2—specifically the word “enters” and
the phrase “used primarily for worship services”—does not apply to a parking
lot and therefore the statute did not mean for parking lots to be considered part
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 5 of 9 of the premises. But Henderson does not explain why one could not “enter” a
parking lot. And while it appears worship services were not conducted in the
parking lot, the premises as a whole were used primarily for worship services,
which is all that is required under the statute. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 78.
[10] Henderson further argues the definition of “premises” provided in Section 3
shows “the word ‘premises’ to mean a building.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. Section
3, which gives the duties owed by nonprofit religious organizations while
providing fee-based childcare services, provides: “As used in this section,
‘premises’ means a part of a building that is: (1) used primarily for worship
services; (2) owned, operated, or controlled by a nonprofit religious
organization; and (3) used for purposes of providing childcare services for
which a fee is charged.” Ind. Code § 34-31-7-3 (emphasis added). But the
legislature did not apply this definition to Section 2 or the statute as a whole
despite “know[ing] how to apply a statutory definition broadly.” Rainbow Realty
Group, Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019). Instead, this definition
appears only in Section 3 and specifies it applies to the term “premises” “as
used in this section[.]” I.C. § 34-31-7-3(a). As such, we infer the legislature did
not intend to apply this limited definition of “premises” outside Section 3. See
Rainbow Realty Group, 131 N.E.3d at 174 (declining to import the relevant
definition from elsewhere in the statute); Montgomery v. State, 878 N.E.2d 262,
266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (giving a term its “common and ordinary meaning”
despite it being defined in other sections of the Indiana Code).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 6 of 9 [11] We thus look to the ordinary meaning of “premises.” See Ind. Ins. Co. v.
Dreiman, 804 N.E.2d 815, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The term ‘premises’ is
unambiguous.”), trans. denied. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “premises” as a
“house or building, along with its grounds[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 1371 (10th
ed. 2019) (emphasis added). This definition follows our premises-liability
jurisprudence, as we have generally considered a parking lot to be included in
the term “premises.” See Certa v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations Inc., 102 N.E.3d 336,
341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding restaurant owed a duty to patron injured in
their parking lot under premises liability), trans. denied; Lutheran Hosp. of Ind.,
Inc. v. Blaser, 634 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (finding hospital used
“its premises, the parking lot, in such a way to affect the risk of injury of its
invitees”), reh’g denied.
[12] Because New Wineskin is a nonprofit religious organization whose premises
are used primarily for worship services and Henderson’s injury occurred on the
premises, the trial court did not err in applying Section 34-31-7-2.
B. Hidden Danger [13] Henderson also argues summary judgment was improper because a genuine
issue of material fact exists over whether she was injured by a hidden danger on
New Wineskin’s premises. As noted above, the statute limits the duties New
Wineskin owes to those who enter the premises with permission—to “(A) warn
the person of a hidden danger on the premises if a representative of the
nonprofit religious organization has actual knowledge of the hidden danger;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 7 of 9 and (B) refrain from intentionally harming the person.” I.C. § 34-31-7-2(1). The
only element in dispute here is whether Henderson was injured as the result of a
hidden danger.
[14] Henderson was injured after slipping on snow and ice. On the morning of her
fall, it had been snowing and there was at least two inches of snow on the
ground. Snow and ice “covered” the parking lot. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
170. The snow and ice were clearly visible, as was the fact the parking lot had
not yet been treated. And, as Henderson herself acknowledges, snow and ice
are generally known to make the ground slippery. Henderson argues “she did
not have a specific understanding of the slipperiness” or “an appreciation of the
risk” until after she stepped out of the car. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. But the extent
of the danger or Henderson’s appreciation of it is not at issue here. The only
question is whether there was a hidden danger. And the undisputed evidence
objectively clarifies the snow and ice were not a hidden danger.2
[15] Because Section 34-31-7-2 applies, and under that statute no duty was breached,
the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to New Wineskin.
[16] Affirmed.
2 Henderson analogizes her case to Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). But that case is distinguishable. There, the trial court held there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant should have anticipated the plaintiff would walk across the icy parking lot despite the obviousness of the danger. Because the plaintiff was an invitee, the defendant had a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, including the duty to make safe the premises when the defendant should have expected the invitee to fail to protect herself from danger. But here the legislature specifically limited the duty New Wineskin owed Henderson, and thus the traditional duties owed to invitees are not at issue.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 8 of 9 Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-1317 | December 28, 2020 Page 9 of 9