Paula E. Fletcher and Perry Fletcher v. David H. Nielson, M.D. and David N. Nielson, M.D., P.A.
This text of Paula E. Fletcher and Perry Fletcher v. David H. Nielson, M.D. and David N. Nielson, M.D., P.A. (Paula E. Fletcher and Perry Fletcher v. David H. Nielson, M.D. and David N. Nielson, M.D., P.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-05-00008-CV
Paula E. FLETCHER and Perry Fletcher,
Appellants
v.
David H. NIELSON, M.D., and David H. Nielson, M.D., P.A.,
Appellees
From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-CI-14966
Honorable David Peeples, Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM
Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 16, 2005
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
The trial court signed a judgment on September 20, 2004. Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial on October 18, 2004. Therefore, the notice of appeal was due to be filed on December 20, 2004. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a). A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due on January 4, 2005. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. Appellants filed a motion for extension of time and a notice of appeal on January 5, 2005. Because it appeared this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal, on January 20, 2005, we ordered appellants to show cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On January 18, 2005, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for Want of Jurisdiction.
On January 29, 2005, appellants filed an Opposition to Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for Want of Jurisdiction and Response to This Court’s Show Cause Order, in which appellants stated that the motion for extension of time and notice of appeal were not timely filed because the due date was incorrectly calendered by counsel.
Although we acknowledge counsel’s bona fide attempt to timely perfect an appeal, “once the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Rule [26.3] has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction.” See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (construing the predecessor to Rule 26). Because the period for granting a motion for extension of time had passed before appellants filed their motion for extension of time, appellants have not invoked this court’s jurisdiction. Id. Therefore, appellants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal is DENIED. Appellees’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).
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