PAULA CORDEIRO v. RICHARD TOBIN & Another.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 25-P-0227
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-227

PAULA CORDEIRO

vs.

RICHARD TOBIN & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Cordeiro, the plaintiff, filed this action against the

Tobins, the defendants, alleging breach of contract, unjust

enrichment, quantum meruit, conversion, breach of the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel

regarding an apartment built above the Tobins' garage that was

paid for by Cordeiro.2 After both parties collaborated on the

apartment's construction from 2014 to 2021, the Tobins informed

Cordeiro they did not wish to have her stay in the apartment,

and sent Cordeiro a "no trespass" order in November 2021. After

1 Donna Tobin.

2Paula Cordeiro and Donna Tobin are sisters who were close at the time of the arrangement. a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge ruled in Cordeiro's

favor on the unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims

and found for the defendants on all others. The Tobins appeal

only from so much of the judgment that entered on the promissory

estoppel finding. We affirm.3

Discussion.4 Promissory estoppel requires that a plaintiff

show "(1) a representation intended to induce reliance on the

part of a person to whom the representation is made; (2) an act

or omission by that person in reasonable reliance on the

representation; and (3) detriment as a consequence of the act or

omission" (citation omitted). Sullivan v. Chief Justice for

Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 27-28 (2006).

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 90(1) (1981) ("A

promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce

action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third

person and which does induce such action or forbearance is

3 Cordeiro's motion for submission on the briefs is allowed.

4 The defendants state in their brief that the parties agreed to waive the right to detailed findings of fact and acknowledge that this waiver subjects their appeal to the same standard of review as is applied to a judgment following a jury verdict. See K & K Dev., Inc. v. Andrews, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 338, 344 (2023). The judge did not make detailed findings, so we review to determine "whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the [prevailing party]" (quotation and citation omitted). Id.

2 binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the

promise"). "An essential element under the promissory estoppel

theory is that there be an unambiguous promise and that the

party to whom the promise was made reasonably relied on the

representation." Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v.

Varadian, 419 Mass. 841, 848 (1995). "Promissory estoppel is an

equitable doctrine that [i]n the absence of a contract in fact,

. . . implies a contract in law" (quotation and citation

omitted). Vacca v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 98 Mass. App.

Ct. 463, 472 (2020).

The Tobins assert that there was insufficient evidence to

support promissory estoppel because (1) the parties did not

reach an agreement on all the material terms necessary for a

contract and (2) Cordeiro's reliance on the promise was

unreasonable. Both arguments are unavailing.

Although a claim for breach of contract requires an

agreement on material terms to be enforceable, a claim for

promissory estoppel only requires a promise intended to induce

the other party's reliance. Sullivan, 448 Mass. at 27-28. Cf.

Situation Mgt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 430 Mass. 875, 878

(2000) ("[T]o create an enforceable contract, there must be

agreement between the parties on the material terms of that

contract"). The Tobins acknowledge that they and Cordeiro

agreed that Cordeiro would pay for the construction of the

3 apartment for her use. See Sullivan, supra (promissory estoppel

claim must show "(1) a representation intended to induce

reliance"). The Tobins also acknowledge that they suggested

Cordeiro build on their property after she failed to find an

affordable property that she could purchase and stay at when she

came to visit, that Richard Tobin assisted with the construction

and facilitated payments as directed by Cordeiro, and that

Cordeiro had the "final say" in the apartment's interior design.

Where the Tobins actively participated in helping Cordeiro

construct the apartment for Cordeiro's use, the promise that

Cordeiro would be able to use the apartment was unambiguous.

Cf. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 419 Mass. at 850

(promise could not support action in reliance where both parties

contemplated written agreement before bank would provide loan).

For the same reasons, the judge had ample evidence to support

the finding that Cordeiro reasonably relied on that promise.

See Sullivan, supra at 28 (claim for promissory estoppel must

show "(2) an act or omission by that person in reasonable

reliance on the representation"). Finally, Cordeiro relied to

her detriment where, as both parties stipulated, she spent

$243,942 on the construction. See id. (claim for promissory

estoppel must show "(3) detriment as a consequence of the

[claimant's] act or omission").

4 We therefore agree with the trial judge that justice

requires that Cordeiro be allowed to recover in promissory

estoppel. Cordeiro's request for attorney's fees and costs

incurred in connection with this appeal is allowed. The

plaintiff shall file a verified and itemized application for

fees and costs within fourteen days of the date of this

decision, and the defendants will have fourteen days thereafter

in which to file any opposition to the amounts requested. See

Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Desmond & Toone, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: November 20, 2025.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.