J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Appellants were named in an indictment charging two counts of robbery.
Gatlin was convicted of the first count
and acquitted of the second,
whereas Miller was acquitted of the first and convicted of the second. Thus all of the evidence concerning two robberies was before the jury which convicted each defendant of one robbery. We need not comment further on this joinder,
because the convictions must be reversed for a new trial because of police violations of the Fourth Amendment and Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We treat first the circumstances, surrounding the arrest of the defendant Gatlin. In considering the evidence on which the arrest was predicated, we limit ourselves to the testimony of the' arresting officer, since the answer to the-question of probable cause must in this, case be found in the evidence of which he was aware
at the time of the arrest.
At 2:00 A.M. on November 9,1962, the Old Hickory Barbecue Restaurant in. Southeast Washington was robbed. A police lookout, based on descriptions of three robbers given by the witnesses at the restaurant, was broadcast. Private Fallin, the arresting officer, testified that the lookout contained “a general description of three colored males.”
Forty-
five minutes after receiving the first lookout, Fallin testified, he received another call to respond to South Capitol and Howard Streets. There he found a
taxi driver and more police. The cab driver told Fallin that a suspicious-acting person had fled from his cab as he drove into the Esso station on that corner. Fallin proceeded to track with his dog behind the Esso station in what appeared to be an abandoned area. After searching almost an hour, however, the dog was injured and the tracking operation was discontinued.
On returning to his cruiser, Fallin testified, he met his partner. His partner told him that a man had just come out of the general area where he was searching and was at that time walking down the highway. Fallin, with his partner, then approached this man, who turned out to be Gatlin, and arrested him at approximately
3:40
A.M. He did not advise Gatlin of the reason for his arrest. On searching him Fallin found a toy pistol and approximately $50.00 in currency. Gatlin was taken to the rob'bery squad room at police headquarters where, after interrogation by several robbery squad officers for a period estimated by the officers to be from 15 minutes to one hour, he is said to have confessed, implicating appellant Miller, to the Old Hickory House robbery.
Gatlin was then taken with a group of police in four cars in search of Miller. After fruitless calls at the home of Miller’s employer and at Gatlin’s home, the officers, with Gatlin, approached the home of Miller’s girl friend. Eight officers surrounded the place. When they knocked on the front door, a woman inside said that the door was broken and directed the police to come to the back door. She then went to the back door and opened it. Whereupon the officers, after identifying themselves, walked in, one apparently with a gun in his hand. After a search of the premises, they found Miller in the attic. The time of Miller’s arrest is given as 6:50 A.M. Miller was taken to the robbery squad room at headquarters and, according to the police, within a few minutes he too confessed to the Old Hickory House robbery.
Lineups were then arranged, not only for the Old Hickory House robbery, but for the earlier robbery at Lee’s Grocery as well. Witnesses to both robberies were brought down to headquarters; one witness identified Gatlin as a participant in the Lee robbery and one identified Miller as a participant in the Old Hickory robbery. No other witnesses connected either appellant with either crime. At 1:22 P.M., Gatlin and Miller were brought before the United States Commissioner on a complaint charging them with the Old Hickory robbery.
After
the Commissioner’s hearing, at 1:55 P.M., for the first time they were booked at the police station for the Old Hickory robbery.
On trial the police testified as to the evidence obtained from Gatlin’s person at the time of his arrest, as well as to his alleged confession. Testimony as to Miller’s alleged confession was also introduced. Under examination by Government counsel some of the witnesses to the robberies described the lineups which took place at police headquarters on the morning of November 9th. The witness who identified Gatlin as a participant in the Lee robbery and the witness who identified Miller as a participant in the Old Hickory robbery were allowed to testify that they next saw appellants at a time which corresponded with the time the lineups were held.
I.
Gatlin’s arrest was without probable cause. It was an arrest for investigation.
The only evidence on which the
arrest was predicated was the fact that there was a robbery, that one of the robbers was a Negro wearing a trench coat, that a Negro man fled from a taxi, and that Gatlin, a Negro man, was observed walking down the street a mile and a half from the robbery wearing a trench coat. This is not the type of evidence which would justify deprivation of liberty. Apparently the jury was not impressed. It acquitted Gatlin of the Old Hickory robbery in spite of this evidence plus the police testimony to his alleged confession.
The manner in which Gatlin’s arrest was handled by the police clearly demonstrates that it was one for investigation. He was not told the crime for which he was arrested. He was not taken to a precinct station to be booked. He was not presented without unnecessary delay to a magistrate for a bearing on probable cause. Instead he was brought to the robbery squad room at police headquarters where a battery of police proceeded to interrogate him at length in spite of the fact that, according to their own testimony, he was under the influence of alcohol. No attempt is made to explain either the action of the police in arresting Gatlin or his detention in police custody until a confession was obtained and lineups were completed.
II.
Miller’s arrest was likewise without probable cause, being based solely on information obtained from an accomplice whose reliability is neither alleged nor established. The facts with reference to Miller are remarkably close to those in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
There two accomplices in
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J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Appellants were named in an indictment charging two counts of robbery.
Gatlin was convicted of the first count
and acquitted of the second,
whereas Miller was acquitted of the first and convicted of the second. Thus all of the evidence concerning two robberies was before the jury which convicted each defendant of one robbery. We need not comment further on this joinder,
because the convictions must be reversed for a new trial because of police violations of the Fourth Amendment and Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We treat first the circumstances, surrounding the arrest of the defendant Gatlin. In considering the evidence on which the arrest was predicated, we limit ourselves to the testimony of the' arresting officer, since the answer to the-question of probable cause must in this, case be found in the evidence of which he was aware
at the time of the arrest.
At 2:00 A.M. on November 9,1962, the Old Hickory Barbecue Restaurant in. Southeast Washington was robbed. A police lookout, based on descriptions of three robbers given by the witnesses at the restaurant, was broadcast. Private Fallin, the arresting officer, testified that the lookout contained “a general description of three colored males.”
Forty-
five minutes after receiving the first lookout, Fallin testified, he received another call to respond to South Capitol and Howard Streets. There he found a
taxi driver and more police. The cab driver told Fallin that a suspicious-acting person had fled from his cab as he drove into the Esso station on that corner. Fallin proceeded to track with his dog behind the Esso station in what appeared to be an abandoned area. After searching almost an hour, however, the dog was injured and the tracking operation was discontinued.
On returning to his cruiser, Fallin testified, he met his partner. His partner told him that a man had just come out of the general area where he was searching and was at that time walking down the highway. Fallin, with his partner, then approached this man, who turned out to be Gatlin, and arrested him at approximately
3:40
A.M. He did not advise Gatlin of the reason for his arrest. On searching him Fallin found a toy pistol and approximately $50.00 in currency. Gatlin was taken to the rob'bery squad room at police headquarters where, after interrogation by several robbery squad officers for a period estimated by the officers to be from 15 minutes to one hour, he is said to have confessed, implicating appellant Miller, to the Old Hickory House robbery.
Gatlin was then taken with a group of police in four cars in search of Miller. After fruitless calls at the home of Miller’s employer and at Gatlin’s home, the officers, with Gatlin, approached the home of Miller’s girl friend. Eight officers surrounded the place. When they knocked on the front door, a woman inside said that the door was broken and directed the police to come to the back door. She then went to the back door and opened it. Whereupon the officers, after identifying themselves, walked in, one apparently with a gun in his hand. After a search of the premises, they found Miller in the attic. The time of Miller’s arrest is given as 6:50 A.M. Miller was taken to the robbery squad room at headquarters and, according to the police, within a few minutes he too confessed to the Old Hickory House robbery.
Lineups were then arranged, not only for the Old Hickory House robbery, but for the earlier robbery at Lee’s Grocery as well. Witnesses to both robberies were brought down to headquarters; one witness identified Gatlin as a participant in the Lee robbery and one identified Miller as a participant in the Old Hickory robbery. No other witnesses connected either appellant with either crime. At 1:22 P.M., Gatlin and Miller were brought before the United States Commissioner on a complaint charging them with the Old Hickory robbery.
After
the Commissioner’s hearing, at 1:55 P.M., for the first time they were booked at the police station for the Old Hickory robbery.
On trial the police testified as to the evidence obtained from Gatlin’s person at the time of his arrest, as well as to his alleged confession. Testimony as to Miller’s alleged confession was also introduced. Under examination by Government counsel some of the witnesses to the robberies described the lineups which took place at police headquarters on the morning of November 9th. The witness who identified Gatlin as a participant in the Lee robbery and the witness who identified Miller as a participant in the Old Hickory robbery were allowed to testify that they next saw appellants at a time which corresponded with the time the lineups were held.
I.
Gatlin’s arrest was without probable cause. It was an arrest for investigation.
The only evidence on which the
arrest was predicated was the fact that there was a robbery, that one of the robbers was a Negro wearing a trench coat, that a Negro man fled from a taxi, and that Gatlin, a Negro man, was observed walking down the street a mile and a half from the robbery wearing a trench coat. This is not the type of evidence which would justify deprivation of liberty. Apparently the jury was not impressed. It acquitted Gatlin of the Old Hickory robbery in spite of this evidence plus the police testimony to his alleged confession.
The manner in which Gatlin’s arrest was handled by the police clearly demonstrates that it was one for investigation. He was not told the crime for which he was arrested. He was not taken to a precinct station to be booked. He was not presented without unnecessary delay to a magistrate for a bearing on probable cause. Instead he was brought to the robbery squad room at police headquarters where a battery of police proceeded to interrogate him at length in spite of the fact that, according to their own testimony, he was under the influence of alcohol. No attempt is made to explain either the action of the police in arresting Gatlin or his detention in police custody until a confession was obtained and lineups were completed.
II.
Miller’s arrest was likewise without probable cause, being based solely on information obtained from an accomplice whose reliability is neither alleged nor established. The facts with reference to Miller are remarkably close to those in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
There two accomplices in
volved a third in a common narcotic violation and brought the officers to the home of the third party where he was arrested. The Ninth Circuit declared the arrest illegal, being without probable cause. Wong Sun v. United States, 9 Cir., 288 F.2d 366, 370 (1961). The Supreme Court found “no occasion to disagree.” Wong Sun v. United States,
supra,
371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. In the same case the defendant, Toy, was likewise arrested on information obtained from an accomplice. With reference to Toy the Supreme Court not only declared the arrest illegal, but held that the confession made thereafter was a fruit
thereof and therefore not admissible in evidence. Id. at 484-487 of 371 U.S., at 415-417 of 83 S.Ct., 9 L.Ed.2d 441. Accord, Seals v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C., 325 F.2d 1006.
Here Miller’s confession, obtained .at police headquarters a few minutes after his illegal arrest, was inadmissible in evidence. Verbal evidence obtained from unlawful police action “is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more ■common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.” Wong Sun v. United States,
supra,
371 U.S. at 485, 83 S.Ct. at 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. Accord, Fahy v. Connecticut,
supra
Note 11. The Government’s attempt to distinguish Wong Sun on the ground that Miller’s confession was only an attenuated fruit of his illegal arrest is not persuasive. In
Wong Sun,
the illegal arrest alone made the post-arrest admissions while still in custody poisonous fruit. 371 U.S. at 484-488, 83 S.Ct. at 415-417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.
Here the police, after making the illegal arrest, compounded that illegality by failing timely to book him on any charge, by failing to take him without unnecessary delay to a committing magistrate for instructions as to his rights, and by proceeding to interrogate him in the robbery squad room at police headquarters.
The evidence found on Gatlin at the time of his illegal arrest, and Miller’s confession, taken as a fruit of his illegal arrest, were improperly admitted in evidence to prove the offenses of which they stand convicted. Since the convictions must be set aside, it will be unnecessary to dwell upon the Rule 5(a) violations and the illegal search for Miller. The police activity in this case with respect to unnecessary delay under Rule 5(a) and illegal search of a home, however, should not go unnoticed. In the hope of preventing repetition of such activity, and consequent reversal of convictions in other cases, we can only repeat again from Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1359, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957):
“The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined. The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on ‘probable cause.’ The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may
be promptly determined. The arrested person may, of course, be ‘booked’ by the police. But he is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt.”
With reference to the entry of the home in search for Miller, we find our own case, Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 65-66, 190 F.2d 649, 650-651 (1951), instructive:
“Searches and seizures made without a proper warrant are generally to be regarded as unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. True, the obtaining of the warrant may on occasion be waived by the individual; he may give his consent to the search and seizure. But such a waiver or consent must be proved by clear and positive testimony, and " it must be established that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 813, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654; United States v. Kelih, D.C. S.D.Ill.1921, 272 F. 484. The Government must show a consent that is ‘unequivocal and specific’ (Karwicki v. United States, 4 Cir., 55 F.2d 225, 226), ‘freely and intelligently given.’ Kovach v. United States, 6 Cir., 53 F.2d 639. Thus ‘invitations’ to enter one’s house, extended to armed officers of the law who demand entrance, are usually to be considered as invitations secured ' by force. * * * ” (Footnote omitted.)
Moreover, the fact that the search is made without warrant does not eliminate the necessity of compliance with 18 U.S. C. § 3109. Before entering to search or make an arrest, an officer must announce his purpose as well as his authority. Wong Sun v. United States,
swpra,,
371 U.S. at 482, 83 S.Ct. at 414, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958). Here, admittedly, there was no announcement of purpose prior to entry. Even assuming probable cause for Miller’s arrest, this failure alone makes the arrest illegal.
Ibid.
In order to avoid another possible reversal here, it should be noted that, since the defendants were identified at a lineup after their illegal arrests and during a period of unnecessary delay, the teaching of Bynum v. United States,
supra
Note 12, is equally applicable to this case, notwithstanding that the Government brought this fact to the attention of the jury in two steps rather than one. See United States v. Payne, D.D.C., Criminal No. 972-60, February 9, 1961, affirmed, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 94, 97, 294 F.2d 723, 726 (1961).
Reversed.
WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge, dissents.