Paul v. Nauska

407 P.2d 179, 1965 Alas. LEXIS 134
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 4, 1965
DocketNo. 575
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 407 P.2d 179 (Paul v. Nauska) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paul v. Nauska, 407 P.2d 179, 1965 Alas. LEXIS 134 (Ala. 1965).

Opinion

DIMOND, Justice.

The Act of June 19, 1935, 49 Stat. 388, authorized the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska to sue the United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of just compensation for lands or other tribal or [180]*180community property rights taken from them by the United States or in respect to which the United States had failed or refused to protect their interests.

Following passage of the Act, the Indians concerned instituted an action in the Court of Claims based on their claims against the United States. That court gave judgment for the Indians on the issue of the liability of the United States and provided that the amount of recovery, the amount of offsets, if any, and the issue of voluntary abandonment or relinquishment were reserved for further proceedings.1

In 1963, after the Court of Claims had made its decision, appellant commenced this action for an injunction against the ap-pellees. The superior court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subj ect matter of the action. On appeal, we reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 On remand, the superior court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and denied appellant’s motion for a preliminary injunction. This appeal followed.

Section 7 of the Act of June 19, 1933 provided that each tribal community of the Tlingit and Haida Indians should prepare a roll of its tribal membership and submit such roll to a Tlingit and Haida central council for approval. Section 8 of the Act provided that the amount of any judgment in favor of the Indians should be apportioned to the different Tlingit and Haida communities listed in the roll of tribal membership provided for in Section 7 in direct proportion to the number of names on each roll.3

The 1935 Act did not state how the Tlingit and Haida central council should be established. Appellant’s complaint alleges that such a council had in fact been organized or was to be organized by a convention of delegates elected from the respective Tlingit and Haida tribal communities. Although the complaint is at best ambiguous and difficult to understand, it appears substantially to amount to an attack on the [181]*181formation of the central council so far as that body is composed of members representing or purporting to represent the Stikine Tribal Community of which appellant claims to be a member. Appellant claims that the election of appellees as delegates from the Stikine Tribal Community to a convention of the various Tlingit and Haida tribal communities was void because appellees were not in fact members of the Stikine Tribal Community; that appellant and those similarly situated would be irreparably injured by appellees’ representation of the Stikine Tribal Community at a convention of delegates of the various tribal communities to be held at Hoonah, Alaska in November 1964; and that ap-pellees should therefore be enjoined from representing the Stikine Tribal Community ■"in any wise and in particular at the Hoonah ■convention of November, 1964.”

It is not at all clear from the complaint how the alleged irreparable injury would occur or what it would consist of. It is suggested, but not clearly stated, that appellant’s injury would consist of his not having a voice in the selection of the central council, because the appellees, as delegates to the convention where the central council would be elected, did not legally represent appellant and the other members of the Sti-kine Tribal Community. And not having a voice in the selection of the central council, appellant would also have no voice in the preparation of the roll of Indian tribal communities that ultimately would be entitled to share in the distribution of tlie money judgment in favor of the Tlingit and Haida Indians as provided by Sections 7 and 8 of the Act of June 19, 1935.

Subsequent to the time this appeal was taken the Act of Tune 19, 1935 was amended by Congress. By the Act of '^.ugust 19, 1965,4 the Central Council of ^Tlingit ■ and Haida Indians, as it existed on August 19, 1965, is now recognized by Congress as a [182]*182body having existence, status and authority to act, without regard to the manner in which such Council came to be — whether by selection by representatives of the various tribal communities or otherwise. Such Central Council is authorized to submit to the Secretary of the Interior for his approval proposed rules prescribing the method of electing delegates to the Central Council. When such rules have been approved by the Secretary and delegates elected in accordance with those rules, the official Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians will have been formed, with the authority to exercise powers prescribed by Section 8 of the 1965 Act. It is clear from this recently enacted legislation that no significance may be attached to the fact that the existing, de facto Central Council may or ma$--not be composed in part of delegat^>'td/'the Hoonah convention of November-' 1964 who were not members of the Stikine Tribal Community.

In view of the 1965 amendment to the 1935 Act, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether appellant’s complaint states a claim for injunctive relief. Although enacted after the decision of the court below, the 1965 amendment must be given effect in deciding this appeal because the case involves relief by injunction which operates in the future.5 There would be no point in enjoining appellees from representing appellant and his class in the selection of a Central Council because the issue of whether appellees are qualified to so represent appellant and his class is now moot. The 1965 amendment prescribes the method of selecting the official Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians, and the question of whether the method to be chosen must and will afford the Stikine Tribal Community representation on the Council is not presented in this controversy. Since' the case is now moot, we believe it appropriate to affirm the decision below without considering the propriety of that decision.6

The order of the superior court denying appellant injunctive relief and dismissing his complaint against appellees is affirmed!

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Bluebook (online)
407 P.2d 179, 1965 Alas. LEXIS 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-v-nauska-alaska-1965.