UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
PAUL VLADIMIROVICH TIMCHUK, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-25-0144-I-1
v.
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: August 17, 2026 Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Paul Vladimirovich Timchuk , El Dorado Hills, California, pro se.
Roderick Eves , Esquire, and Bobbi Mihal , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.
Richard G. Saliba , Esquire, Plano, Texas, for the agency.
BEFORE
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 2 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
The appellant asserts that, in finding that the agency proved its charge of improper conduct, the administrative judge improperly relied on uncorroborated statements, did not sufficiently analyze hearsay statements, and made deficient/incorrect credibility determinations. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 12-13, 15-16, Tab 6 at 10, 13; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 19, 40. 3 We have considered all of the appellant’s assertions in this regard but find them unpersuasive. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (indicating that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on
2 Because we deny the appellant’s petition for review on the merits, we need not make a finding regarding the timeliness of his petition for review. 3 The appellant also references, but does not identify, “obstructive objections” made by the agency. PFR File, Tab 2 at 12. To the extent he is challenging evidentiary rulings made by the administrative judge during the hearing, a different outcome is not warranted. See Sanders v. Social Security Administration, 114 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 10 (2010) (explaining that in order to obtain reversal of an initial decision on the ground that the administrative judge abused her discretion in excluding evidence, the petitioning party must show that relevant evidence, which could have affected the outcome, was disallowed); see also Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992) (indicating that a petition for review must contain sufficient specificity to enable the Board to ascertain whether there is a serious evidentiary challenge).
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observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing); see also Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (indicating that the Board will not disturb an administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility).
The appellant asserts that the administrative judge should have applied “equitable estoppel to bar enforcement of charges based on conduct previously authorized and condoned by [an agency manager’s] verbal directives.” PFR File, Tab 2 at 14, 21-22, Tab 6 at 10-11. In essence, the appellant reasserts an argument made before the administrative judge, i.e., that a now-deceased agency manager permitted him to use his SmartPay Travel Card (Travel Card) for the unauthorized transactions underlying the agency’s charge. IAF, Tab 4 at 40-41, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID) at 8-10. The administrative judge considered this claim but found it unavailing. ID at 8-10. We discern no basis to disturb her explained finding, which was implicitly based, in part, on credibility determinations. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301; see also Davison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶9 (2011) (indicating that mere disagreement with an administrative judge’s explained findings is not a basis to grant a petition for review).
Relatedly, the appellant reasserts that he was prejudiced by the agency’s delay in challenging the charges that he made on his Travel Card. PFR File, Tab 2 at 13, 25-26. He avers that the agency’s improper delay precluded him from presenting the testimony of the now -deceased agency manager who allegedly authorized him to make certain charges. Id. at 25. For the reasons set forth in the initial decision, ID at 11, we find this assertion unpersuasive. Moreover, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s reasoned conclusion that the record evidence contradicts the appellant’s claim that he believed the subject charges were permissible. ID at 9-10; see Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106.
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The appellant argues that the penalty of removal was improper under the circumstances and that the administrative judge’s penalty analysis was deficient. PFR File, Tab 2 at 13, 18-20, Tab 6 at 11. He asserts, among other things, that the administrative judge accepted a “superficial” analysis by the deciding official that, among other things, did not take into consideration that the appellant was unrepresented. 4 PFR File, Tab 2 at 18. When the agency’s charge is sustained, the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the relevant factors and exercised discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11 (2010); Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). In making this determination, the Board must give due weight to the agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace management’s responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been properly exercised. Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11; Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. The Board will modify an agency-imposed penalty only when it finds that the agency did not weigh the relevant factors or the penalty clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11. Here, we find that the administrative judge applied the proper legal standard and reasonably concluded that the agency’s selected penalty of removal was not unwarranted under the circumstances and was within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness. ID at 13-14; see Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11. To this end, the administrative judge recounted the deciding official’s testimony regarding her consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors,
4 The appellant also references “[a]gency-created financial hardship” as a mitigating factor. PFR File, Tab 2 at 18-19. This claim is unclear and, therefore, unavailing. See Keefer v. Department of Agriculture, 92 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 18 n.2 (2002) (stating that an appellant is required to articulate his claims with “reasonable clarity and precision”). To the extent that the appellant is arguing that the agency’s improper handling of his leave requests in either March 2024 or June 2024 is the reason that he did not pay the balance of his Travel Card between November 20, 2023, and March 19, 2024, we are unpersuaded. PFR File, Tab 2 at 11-12, 18-19; IAF, Tab 4 at 40.
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considerations that are also reflected in the agency’s decision letter. ID at 14; IAF, Tab 4 at 23-26; see Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06. Thus, we discern no basis to disturb the initial decision. See Allen v. U.S. Postal Service, 466 F.3d 1065, 1071-72 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming the appellant’s removal for sustained misconduct involving a Government-issued credit card).
Relatedly, the appellant argues that the administrative judge overlooked evidence regarding two other agency employees who received lesser penalties for similar conduct. PFR File, Tab 2 at 14, 20-21. The appellant avers that information regarding these employees can be located in the record at “Agency File, Tab 6 at 14” and “Agency File, Tab 7 at 22.” Id. at 20. These citations, however, are inaccurate. See Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(2) (stating that a petitioner who alleges that the administrative judge made erroneous findings of material fact must explain why the challenged factual determination is incorrect and identify specific evidence in the record that demonstrates the error). In any event, the conduct of these comparators, as described by the appellant, is different and does not involve the cancellation of a credit card. PFR File, Tab 2 at 20; IAF, Tab 4 at 40-41; see Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 13-14 (indicating that the universe of potential comparators will vary from case to case, but should be limited to those employees whose misconduct and/or other circumstances closely resemble those of the appellant and that the relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated employees who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently). Thus, the appellant’s assertion is unpersuasive.
To the extent that the appellant raises claims of equal employment opportunity (EEO) retaliation, non-EEO retaliation, discrimination, due process
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violations, 5 harmful procedural error, or any other affirmative defense, a different outcome is not warranted. PFR File, Tab 2 at 11, 13-14, 16-18, 20, 22-24, Tab 6 at 11-12. In an order memorializing the parties’ prehearing conference, the administrative judge summarized the appellant’s claims and found that he had not sufficiently identified any cognizable affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 16 at 2-3 & n.1. She explained that, during the conference, she had provided the appellant with an additional opportunity to clarify what affirmative defenses he was raising and the basis for them; however, the appellant instead requested additional time to consider such claims. Id. at 2-3. The administrative judge informed the appellant that, because the deadline to identify affirmative defenses had already passed, no affirmative defenses would be considered in conjunction with his appeal. IAF, Tab 7 at 3, Tab 16 at 3; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.24(b) (stating that an appellant may not raise an affirmative defense for the first time after the prehearing conference, except for good cause shown) . The appellant did not object to the administrative judge’s order despite being provided an opportunity to do so. IAF, Tab 16 at 7, Tab 17-1, Hearing Recording. Accordingly, to the extent that he raises the aforementioned affirmative defenses on review, we decline to consider the same. See Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18 (setting forth a list of nonexhaustive factors for consideration in determining whether an appellant will be deemed to have waived an affirmative defense).
We have considered all of the appellant’s remaining assertions, including his contention that the agency violated the Privacy Act by improperly handling his financial records, PFR File, Tab 2 at 24-25, Tab 6 at 12-13; however, we find that they do not compel a different outcome, see Calhoon v. Department of the
5 To the extent that the appellant asserts that he never received notice of his proposed removal, PFR File, Tab 2 at 22-24, such an assertion is contradicted by the record evidence, e.g., IAF, Tab 4 at 29-37. The appellant has not identified any due process violations.
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Treasury, 90 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 15 (2001) (explaining that the Board does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Privacy Act claims).
The appellant submits several documents on review, including documents regarding his leave, documents pertaining to disputes regarding leave and other issues, and medical documents. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-48, Tab 2 at 29-87. The Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on review absent a showing that the document and the information contained in the document were unavailable before the record closed despite due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). In any event, these documents are not material to the outcome of this matter. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (stating that the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision).
The appellant has filed three outstanding motions seeking to supplement the record. 6 PFR File, Tabs 7, 10, 13. None of these motions, however, identify any evidence that is both new and material to the outcome of this matter; accordingly, we deny these motions. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4).
Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.
6 On February 25, 2026, the appellant filed a fourth motion seeking to supplement the record; he also requested that the Board vacate the initial decision and dismiss his appeal as moot because the agency had rescinded the removal action. PFR File, Tab 15. The Office of the Clerk of the Board granted the appellant’s request to supplement the record and ordered the agency to clarify the status of the appellant’s removal. PFR File, Tab 17. In response, the agency averred that the appellant’s removal had not been rescinded. PFR File, Tab 18. The appellant thereafter accepted the agency’s clarification that his removal had not been rescinded and acknowledged that the matter was not moot. PFR File, Tab 19. We therefore deny the appellant’s request to vacate the initial decision and dismiss the appeal as moot.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
7 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
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If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
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race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx . Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
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other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
8 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510.
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Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________ Gina K. Grippando Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.