Paul Satkowiak v. Danielle McClain

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 24-1600
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0518n.06

No. 24-1600

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 12, 2024 ) PAUL SATKOWIAK, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) DANIELLE MCCLAIN; KELLY THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) TUREK; SAM NOFFKE, in their official MICHIGAN ) and personal capacities. ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. ) )

Before: GRIFFIN, STRANCH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Paul Satkowiak brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Danielle McClain, Kelly Turek, and Sam Noffke—employees of the Michigan

Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (“EGLE”)—in their official and personal

capacities. Satkowiak alleges that the defendants seized water and soil samples from his property

without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court stayed the federal

action, finding that a corresponding civil action in state court brought by the EGLE against

Satkowiak compelled the district court’s abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

On appeal, Satkowiak contends that Younger abstention is not warranted because he cannot obtain

an adequate remedy in state court and because the defendants’ conduct was flagrantly

unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. No. 24-1600, Satkowiak v. McClain, et al.

I. BACKGROUND

Satkowiak owns a sixteen-acre property in Bay County, Michigan. EGLE has sued

Satkowiak in the Ingham County Circuit Court, seeking fines for alleged environmental harms

resulting in the erosion and sedimentation of wetlands purportedly located on the property. On

July 26, 2023, the state court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Satkowiak from, among

other things, depositing additional fill material in the wetlands, dredging materials from the

wetlands, and engaging in construction activity on the wetlands. The injunction authorized

recurring inspections of Satkowiak’s property but did not expressly authorize seizure of any

specific items located on the property.

Pursuant to the injunction, an inspection of Satkowiak’s property took place on

December 5, 2023. The inspection was performed by McClain, Turek, and Noffke. During the

inspection, the three inspectors took water and soil samples without Satkowiak’s consent.

On December 6, 2023, Satkowiak sued McClain, Turek, and Noffke in federal court,

asserting that the water and soil samples were seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Satkowiak sought a judgment declaring that the removal of the samples was unconstitutional, an

injunction ordering the return of the samples and requiring the destruction of any data derived from

the samples, and monetary damages. The defendants moved, in part, to dismiss the case pursuant

to the Younger abstention doctrine. On July 16, 2024, the district court granted in part the

defendants’ motion and stayed the case, finding that the ongoing state civil proceeding against

Satkowiak triggered Younger abstention. Satkowiak timely appealed.

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II. ANALYSIS

Orders of abstention are considered appealable final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Jones v. Coleman, 848 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2017). “We review de novo a district court’s

decision to abstain pursuant to” Younger. Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017).

The Younger abstention doctrine derives from the principle that federal courts should avoid

interfering with ongoing state criminal prosecutions, or state proceedings resembling criminal

prosecutions. Id. at 368-69. Specifically, Younger proscribes federal courts from intruding into a

(1) state criminal prosecution, (2) civil enforcement proceeding akin to a criminal prosecution, or

(3) civil proceeding “involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to

perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72, 78 (2013)

(quotation and ellipsis omitted).

If the proceeding falls into one of the three enumerated categories, a court may only apply

Younger where the state proceeding: (1) is currently pending, (2) involves an important state

interest, and (3) affords the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. See

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden St. Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Finally, even

if all three factors are satisfied, a plaintiff may assert that an exception to Younger applies, such as

(1) bad faith, (2) harassment, or (3) flagrant unconstitutionality of the statute or rule at issue. Doe,

860 F.3d at 371.

Here, the district court found that EGLE’s proceeding against Satkowiak was an action

initiated by the State “to sanction [Satkowiak] for . . . [a] wrongful act,” thereby constituting a civil

enforcement action akin to a criminal prosecution. Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 79. The court

further found that all three Middlesex factors were met because the state proceeding (1) was

ongoing, (2) implicated Michigan’s important state interest in protecting its environment, and

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(3) afforded Satkowiak adequate opportunity to assert his Fourth Amendment claim. See 457 U.S.

at 432. Finally, the district court rejected Satkowiak’s contention that the “flagrant

unconstitutionality” exception barred Younger’s application.

On appeal, Satkowiak challenges only two aspects of the district court’s decision. First, he

contends that the third Middlesex factor is not met because the underlying state proceeding does

not afford him adequate opportunity to assert his Fourth Amendment claim against EGLE.

Second, he argues that, even if all three Middlesex factors are satisfied, the flagrant

unconstitutionality of the defendants’ conduct forecloses Younger’s application. We address each

argument in turn.

A. Adequate Opportunity

A plaintiff must have an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional

challenges. Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff bears the burden

of showing that state law bars presentation of his constitutional claims. Id. Abstention is generally

appropriate unless state law bars the disposition of the constitutional claims. Id. Here, Satkowiak

contends that he lacks an adequate opportunity to assert his constitutional claim because a recent

Michigan case, Long Lake Township v. Maxon, categorically bars him from seeking the return of

the water and soil samples and the destruction and exclusion of any data derived from those

samples—his alleged Fourth Amendment remedies—in the state civil proceeding. 997 N.W.2d

250 (Mich. Ct. App. 2022), aff’d --- N.W.3d ---, No. 164948, 2024 WL 1960615 (Mich. May 3,

2024).

Maxon arose out of a local zoning and nuisance dispute between a municipality and a

homeowner. Id. at 252. As part of the proceeding, the township hired a private company to take

aerial photographs of the homeowner’s property. Id. The homeowner moved to suppress the aerial

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footage, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The

Michigan Court of Appeals, assuming that the aerial photographs were indeed obtained in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, evaluated whether application of the exclusionary rule was warranted.

Id. at 252-53. After weighing the costs and benefits of applying the rule to the proceeding at issue,

the state appellate court concluded that application of the exclusionary rule was unwarranted. Id.

at 258-59. In reaching this decision, the court cited the non-punitive nature of the proceeding, the

fact that the search was performed by a private party at the behest of a “lower-level bureaucrat,”

the difficulty of enforcing zoning laws without drone footage, and the fact that Maxon had a

“powerful” alternative remedy for the alleged violation—“a civil lawsuit sounding in

constitutional tort.” Id. at 258. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed. Maxon, 2024 WL

1960615, at *8.

Contrary to Satkowiak’s assertions, Maxon does not prohibit him from asserting a Fourth

Amendment claim and seeking the return of the soil and water samples and the destruction and

exclusion of any data derived from those samples. Maxon was a fact-specific case that did not

extend beyond the zoning context. 997 N.W.2d at 253 (“We are now asked to consider whether

the exclusionary rule applies in zoning cases such as the one at hand.”). At no point did the state

Court of Appeals or the state Supreme Court hold that the exclusionary rule can never apply to

civil proceedings. To the contrary, in affirming the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court

emphasized that “application of the exclusionary rule ‘involves weighing the costs and benefits in

each particular case.’” Maxon, 2024 WL 1960615, at *6 (emphases omitted) (quoting People v

Goldston, 682 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Mich. 2004)). Nor did Maxon hold, as Satkowiak contends, that

the only available remedy for individuals who state a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights

in civil proceedings is a new “civil lawsuit sounding in constitutional tort[.]” Appellant Br. 16

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(quoting Maxon, 997 N.W.2d at 257). Rather, this alternative avenue was one of multiple factors

the court considered in reaching its determination that the exclusionary rule was not warranted in

that specific case. Maxon, 997 N.W.2d at 258. The existence of a separate tort claim as an

alternative remedy is, therefore, not dispositive of the exclusionary rule inquiry.

In sum, we see nothing in Maxon, or Michigan law more broadly, that would proscribe the

state court from adjudicating Satkowiak’s Fourth Amendment claim and granting him the relief he

seeks. The district court thus correctly held that Satkowiak has an adequate opportunity to raise

his Fourth Amendment claim in state court.

B. Flagrant Unconstitutionality

A plaintiff may avoid Younger abstention by showing that an exception applies. Doe, 860

F.3d at 371. Here, the sole exception invoked by Satkowiak is the “flagrant unconstitutionality”

exception. The Supreme Court has held that the exception may apply in instances where a statute

or rule is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,

sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made

to apply it.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).

“Showing such flagrant unconstitutionality is a high bar.” Doe, 860 F.3d at 371.

On appeal, Satkowiak does not argue that any particular Michigan statute or regulation is

flagrantly unconstitutional. Nor does he argue that the injunction issued by the state court is

flagrantly unconstitutional. Rather, he points only to the defendants’ specific act of removing

water and soil samples from his property. Even if that specific act were unquestionably

unconstitutional, it is not clear that the unconstitutionality of that single act would suffice to

foreclose Younger abstention. Cf. Doe, 860 F.3d at 371 (noting that, for purposes of establishing

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the “flagrant unconstitutionality” exception, a plaintiff must show not only that a specific policy

“was applied in an unconstitutional manner,” but also that the policy is facially unconstitutional).

Regardless, on the record before us, we cannot say that the defendants’ conduct was

flagrantly unconstitutional. Satkowiak bases his Fourth Amendment claim entirely on the

defendants’ taking of water and soil samples from his sixteen-acre property. There is no

controlling Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit case law holding that the warrantless removal of soil

and water samples from private property, pursuant to an environmental investigation, violates the

Fourth Amendment in all circumstances. Satkowiak has not met his high burden of showing that

the defendants’ conduct in this case was “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional. Younger, 401

U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson, 313 U.S. at 402).

The district court, therefore, was correct in finding that the “flagrant unconstitutionality”

exception does not apply.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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