Paul Rottarr v. Kruk Cards Inc

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 22, 2022
Docket359135
StatusUnpublished

This text of Paul Rottarr v. Kruk Cards Inc (Paul Rottarr v. Kruk Cards Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paul Rottarr v. Kruk Cards Inc, (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PAUL ROTTARR, UNPUBLISHED December 22, 2022 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 359135 Oakland Circuit Court KRUK CARDS, INC., KRUK PROPERTIES, LLC, LC No. 2020-181060-NO and OAKLAND KRUK PROPERTIES, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this slip and fall case. We affirm.

On May 4, 2017, at about 8:30 p.m., plaintiff fell in defendants’ apartment complex as he was traversing down the stairway from his second-floor apartment. Plaintiff alleged that the stairway was defective because the steps were worn which, combined with the poor lighting and a loose railing, caused him to fall and sustain severe injuries. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging two claims: negligence for failure to maintain the property in reasonable repair causing a dangerous condition, and breach of a landlord’s statutory duty under MCL 554.139 to keep common areas fit for their intended use.

Subsequently, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff’s negligence claim must be dismissed because: there was no proof that plaintiff fell on that date or on the stairway; the claim was barred by the open and obvious doctrine; and defendant had no notice of the allegedly dangerous condition. Further, defendants argued, plaintiff’s statutory claim under MCL 554.139 must be dismissed because the stairway at issue was fit for its intended purpose. Defendants explained that plaintiff’s apartment was accessible by two outdoor stairways and he was moving into the apartment on the day he claimed he fell. Plaintiff testified that there were 16-17 steps leading to his apartment and he had climbed up and down them about twenty times that day while moving in. Plaintiff testified that at about 8:30 p.m., it was raining outside and he fell after his foot “hydroplaned” off a step near the bottom of the

-1- stairs. He got up, walked up the same stairs to lock his apartment, then walked back down the stairs and left to go visit his friend. Plaintiff did not seek any medical treatment for about a month. And he continued to live at the apartment for three years after this alleged fall without further incident. Moreover, defendants’ property manager testified that he had not received any complaints about the stairway before this alleged fall. Accordingly, defendants argued, plaintiff could not prove negligence—i.e., that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed of which defendants were aware—with regard to this open and obvious condition, and plaintiff could not prove that the stairway was not fit for its intended use because he used them repeatedly both before and after his alleged fall. In support of their motion, defendants attached exhibits which included the transcripts of plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of the property manager, Charles Sechler.

Plaintiff responded to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, arguing that there were multiple defects in this common-area stairway, including the worn-out stair treads that were missing nonskid strips, a loose railing, and poor lighting; thus, it was not fit for its intended use in violation of defendants’ statutory duty under MCL 554.139. Further, this stairway was effectively unavoidable as it was the means to access plaintiff’s second-floor unit, and thus, the open and obvious doctrine was inapplicable with respect to plaintiff’s negligence claim. And defendants, at minimum, had constructive notice of these dangerous problems. In support of his responsive brief, plaintiff attached exhibits which included pictures of the stairway, the transcripts of plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of the property manager, Charles Sechler.

Defendants filed a reply brief in support of their motion for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue whether his negligence claim was barred by the open and obvious doctrine. Further, plaintiff’s statutory claim must be dismissed because it was not supported by relevant admissible evidence. Defendants argued that plaintiff’s reliance on some photographs in support of his claims was misplaced because there was no evidentiary foundation for their admission into evidence. Further, plaintiff testified in his deposition that he “hydroplaned” on water that was on a step but it was raining that day and defendants had no notice of alleged “water build-up” on the steps that day. Defendants’ property manager, Charles Sechler, testified that he never had any complaints about this stairway or about the lighting and his testimony is uncontested—defendants had no notice. Moreover, as plaintiff testified, he used the stairway for years after this alleged fall without any problem. And to the extent that plaintiff is claiming a special exception to the open and obvious doctrine should apply under the circumstances of this case, such argument is without merit. Both plaintiff and Sechler testified that there were two stairways to access the second floor and, in any case, there was no substantial risk of death or severe injury from wet stairs on a rainy day. Finally, defendants argued, the stairway was fit for its intended use as evidenced by the fact that it was used by plaintiff both before and after he allegedly fell. In support of their reply, defendants attached as an exhibit a calendar record showing the times of sunset and twilight end for May 2017.

Following oral arguments on defendants’ motion, the trial court issued a written opinion and order granting defendants’ motion and dismissing this case. The court noted that plaintiff slipped and fell on wet stairs as he was moving into his second-floor apartment. The court held that plaintiff failed to “provide sufficient evidence to show that Defendants had actual or constructive notice of any defect on the stairs or that the stairs were unreasonably dangerous or unfit for their intended use.” This appeal followed.

-2- Plaintiff first argues that defendants breached their common-law duty to exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition by failing to ensure adequate lighting in the area of the stairway. We disagree.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Lakeview Commons v Empower Yourself, LLC, 290 Mich App 503, 506; 802 NW2d 712 (2010). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim and should be granted if, after consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue regarding any material fact exists. Id.

It is undisputed that plaintiff was an invitee on the premises. “[A] tenant is an invitee of the landlord.” Benton v Dart Props, Inc, 270 Mich App 437, 440; 715 NW2d 335 (2006). Generally, “a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). But invitors are not absolute insurers of the safety of their invitees. Quinlivan v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich 244, 261; 235 NW2d 732 (1975). And a premises owner has no duty to protect an invitee from an open and obvious danger unless there are special aspects of the condition that make it unreasonably dangerous. Lugo, 464 Mich at 517.

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Hoffner v. Lanctoe
821 N.W.2d 88 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2012)
Allison v. AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLP
751 N.W.2d 8 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2008)
Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.
629 N.W.2d 384 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2001)
Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
235 N.W.2d 732 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1975)
Benton v. Dart Properties Inc.
715 N.W.2d 335 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2006)
Hadden v. McDermitt Apartments, LLC
782 N.W.2d 800 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2010)
Lakeview Commons Ltd. Partnership v. Empower Yourself, LLC
802 N.W.2d 712 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Paul Rottarr v. Kruk Cards Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-rottarr-v-kruk-cards-inc-michctapp-2022.