Paul Regains v. City of Chicago

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: March 13, 2019
• Docket: 15-2444
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 15‐2444 PAUL REGAINS, Plaintiff‐Appellant, v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant‐Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.* PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐ tion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐ lice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was homeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers

* Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. 2 No. 15‐2444

who directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they listed on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐ turn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to report three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐ gains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had not been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐ gains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐ nois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a change of address. Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐ missed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under Illinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐ some v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Manual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The district court also found that the amended complaint lacked sufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that because Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐ stitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim was time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. I. Background In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person within three days of establishing a residence or a temporary domicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐ ers in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police No. 15‐2444 3

Department Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law required sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary domicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐ pality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a fixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS § 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute required a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually dangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every ninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if they did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐ quired to register under the statute was required to report once a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, had he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the ninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐ val. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to report more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐ dences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute constituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 ILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. 2006). By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐ fender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐ ing requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐ densome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐ spread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐ less shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing the sex offenders to return with documentation showing the shelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the effect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” which meant that they were not subject to the weekly 4 No. 15‐2444

reporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐ ing practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐ ber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐ ter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless sex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely would not be able to remain there. Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐ ties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers visited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐ trants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not locate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare an investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer who encountered the registrant that there was probable cause for arrest. Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers employed the steering practice when he attempted to register as a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him to a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐ structed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐ tion in July 2012. In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the shelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they prepared a report for failure to register at that address. The next day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐ ited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐ tigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that there was probable cause to arrest Regains. On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago police officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The prosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS No. 15‐2444 5

§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing his address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐ tember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐ raigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐ mained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐ enteen months—at which time the judge found him not guilty.1 Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court on December 3, 2014. II. Discussion We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing the complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We may affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long as the district court adequately addressed that ground and the non‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐ enteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the widespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐ wards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐ serts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due

1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17,

2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on July 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, id. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the report date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 or July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. 6 No. 15‐2444

process rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐ cious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his personal injury claim a specific label. The district court found that if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐ barred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was barred for other reasons. Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983— but we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury occurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must bring a personal injury action within two years after its accrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 (West 2003)). The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). Federal common law holds that a cause of action accrues when “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐ tion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under § 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 F.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all § 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐ mon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the plaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). No. 15‐2444 7

At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐ batable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐ barred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested and charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐ prisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen months while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded sounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule for false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the accrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false arrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐ tained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution “does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐ nated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 48 (1994). When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. He was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐ ber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual rule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐ tember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December 3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious prosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued on December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed his § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his claims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment realm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the malicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐ tion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐ 1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained 8 No. 15‐2444

without probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 Regains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐ able cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐ sistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐ prived of liberty without due process of law when he was held at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐ lant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ argument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that he was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐ clude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐ ber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, however, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐ missing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended complaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part that formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named only the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐ ers. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐ agraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex offenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when Regains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐ istered him at that shelter and required him to come back for

2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019

WL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: “Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐ rication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐ ceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has held) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of the tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐ low).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. 18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. No. 15‐2444 9

re‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐ ing Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed in custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐ graph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐ prived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to Regains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. Other than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐ poration, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐ scribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the shelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative alert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does not say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by the City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was charged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his acquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐ sponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege that police department officials with policy‐making authority knew about these practices and allowed them to continue. A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐ ing it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains could state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments at the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality such as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an official municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court stated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City could not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell question in his appellate briefs. 10 No. 15‐2444

Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must state a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months was the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or a “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐ gations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” will not suffice. Id. at 691. Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a “widespread practice within the police department of the City of Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force homeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so widespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐ age with the force of law even though it is not authorized by written law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, quoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐ legations; he never got the chance, because the district court dismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have had the opportunity to present such evidence. In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐ sons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, 2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐ mitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that the City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐ cess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 WL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated No. 15‐2444 11

that its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐ tiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the part of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. Viewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light most favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to raise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal Registration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official policy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex offenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs had proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may have engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the plaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of evidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does not present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was a policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration to sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐ istration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐ sional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐ lice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐ ior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; we affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming on the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a cognizable liberty interest). Another district court reached the same conclusion in a case involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐ cago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, 2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the Derfus court concluded: The fact that the City registered more offenders as not having a fixed residence or temporary domicile in two random time periods in 2014 12 No. 15‐2444

than in two random time periods in prior years does not suggest that the City had a policy of refusing to register offenders with that status. Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐ year period to register six offenders as “home‐ less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and that is commonly used to refer to a much broader segment of people than those deemed by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐ porary domicile. Id. at *4. These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could amend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐ tice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the Beley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that a practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐ stitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments and the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all officers followed the practice. He describes a schism between registering officers who followed the steering practice and those who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need to show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐ partment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to continue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude that allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐ terized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was his only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐ cluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐ ter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth No. 15‐2444 13

Amendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding that “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 U.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, whether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2019). III. Conclusion Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐ ther proceedings consistent with this decision.