Paul Pilger v. United States Department of Ed

Ninth Circuit

Paul Pilger v. United States Department of Ed

584 F. App'x 452

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 4, 2014

Docket12-17361

StatusUnpublished

This text of 584 F. App'x 452 (Paul Pilger v. United States Department of Ed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Paul Pilger v. United States Department of Ed, 584 F. App'x 452 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Paul William Pilger appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action challenging the Department of Education’s denial of his request to discharge his federally-guaranteed student loans. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir.2013). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Department of Education because Pilger failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Department’s decision to deny his request for a discharge was arbitrary or capricious. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and explaining the limited circumstances in which the court will vacate an agency’s decision).

Dismissal of Pilger’s claims against Affiliated Computer Services was proper because Pilger cannot assert a cause of action against Affiliated Computer Services under the Higher Education Act. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484-85 (9th Cir.1995) (the Higher Education Act provides an express right of action only in suits brought against the Secretary of Education).

We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Paul William Pilger appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action challenging the Department of Education’s denial of his request to discharge his federally-guaranteed student loans. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir.2013). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Department of Education because Pilger failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Department’s decision to deny his request for a discharge was arbitrary or capricious. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and explaining the limited circumstances in which the court will vacate an agency’s decision).

Dismissal of Pilger’s claims against Affiliated Computer Services was proper because Pilger cannot assert a cause of action against Affiliated Computer Services under the Higher Education Act. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484-85 (9th Cir.1995) (the Higher Education Act provides an express right of action only in suits brought against the Secretary of Education).

We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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