RENDERED: JUNE 5, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1406-MR
PAUL MITCHELL YORK AND RENADA SUE YORK APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAMES G. ADAMS, JR., SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00358
SHAWN D. HAMLET AND KATHRYN G. MECKE APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, A. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: Paul Mitchell York (“Grandfather”) and Renada York
(“Step-Grandmother”) (collectively “Grandparents”) appeal from the Marshall
Family Court’s August 12, 2024 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment dismissing their petition seeking de facto custodian status and custody of their grandchild, M.T.M.1 (“Child”). Grandparents principally argue that the
successor special judge lacked authority to revisit an earlier interlocutory ruling
entered by a prior special judge determining that they qualified as Child’s de facto
custodians. Alternatively, they contend the family court’s final judgment is not
supported by substantial evidence. Following careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
Child was born in 2015 to Shawn Hamlet (“Father”) and Kathryn
Mecke (“Mother”). Grandfather and Step-Grandmother are Child’s maternal
grandparents. Father is currently married to Katie Hamlet (“Stepmother”).
Collectively, we refer to Father and Stepmother as “Parents.”
On or about May 31, 2016, Father obtained permanent sole legal
custody of Child pursuant to an order entered in a separate action, Marshall
Family Court Case No. 15-CI-00338, styled Shawn Hamlet v. Kathryn Mecke and
the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.3 Although Father retained sole legal
1 Occasionally, in the record below, Child is referred to as M.T.H. We refer to Child as M.T.M., the designation used in the parties’ initial pleadings. 2 This matter has a lengthy procedural history involving multiple evidentiary hearings conducted over an extended period of time before two separately appointed special judges. The proceedings included testimony from numerous witnesses and the introduction of substantial documentary and photographic evidence. While we have carefully reviewed the entire record, for brevity’s sake we recount only those facts and procedural events necessary to place the issues before us in their proper factual and procedural context. 3 Mother was granted supervised visitation with Child, which she continues to exercise. While Mother was included in the proceedings below, she has not participated in this appeal. -2- custody thereafter, Child continued spending substantial time with Grandparents.
Initially, Child alternated between Father’s residence and Grandparents’ residence
with some regularity. Beginning in approximately late 2018, however, Child
began residing with Grandparents with increasing frequency. During the COVID-
19 pandemic, Child resided with Grandparents on what became an almost full-
time basis for an extended period.
On November 8, 2021, Grandparents filed a petition in the Marshall
Family Court seeking custody of Child and a determination that they qualified as
Child’s de facto custodians. Father denied the allegations and moved to dismiss
the petition, asserting Grandparents failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for
de facto custodian status.4 On May 9, 2022, the First Presiding Judge conducted
the first of multiple evidentiary hearings in the matter. At that hearing, the First
Presiding Judge expressly bifurcated the proceedings, limiting the initial hearing
to the issue of whether Grandparents qualified as Child’s de facto custodians and
reserving any custody and best-interest determinations for later proceedings.
Thereafter, on May 20, 2022, the First Presiding Judge entered an order
determining that Grandparents qualified as Child’s de facto custodians. Father
4 Grandparents’ petition was originally assigned to the Honorable Stephanie Perlow. Judge Perlow recused because she had previously served as guardian ad litem during prior litigation involving Child. The Honorable Jill Clark (“First Presiding Judge”) was thereafter appointed as special judge to preside over the action.
-3- subsequently filed a CR5 59.05 Motion to Alter, Vacate, or Amend. In an order
entered on July 5, 2022, the First Presiding Judge granted the motion in part and
denied it in part, ultimately stating in the order’s concluding paragraph: “this
Court finds the Petitioners are the de facto custodians of the minor child. The
Court finds the parties were not coparenting the child.”6 The First Presiding Judge
thereafter left the case prior to entry of a final judgment.
By August 2022, the case had been reassigned to the Honorable
James G. Adams, Jr., who was appointed to continue serving as special judge in
the matter (hereinafter “Successor Judge”). The Successor Judge thereafter
conducted additional evidentiary hearings on January 6, 2023, and April 14, 2023.
Following review of the evidence presented throughout the proceedings, the
Successor Judge entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on
August 12, 2024, dismissing Grandparents’ petition.
In doing so, the Successor Judge concluded that although Child had
resided with Grandparents for substantial periods of time, the evidence as a whole
did not establish that Grandparents satisfied the statutory requirements for de facto
custodian status under KRS7 403.270. Specifically, the Successor Judge
5 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 While the family court declined to alter its ultimate ruling, it granted the motion to the extent it corrected several typographical errors contained in the prior order. 7 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -4- determined that Father never abdicated his parental and custodial role, but instead
continued participating in decisions concerning Child’s upbringing alongside
Grandparents while also maintaining insurance coverage for Child, offering
financial assistance for Child’s education and care, and continuing to foster his
parental relationship with Child through visitation, outings, and other activities.
Grandparents thereafter filed a CR 59.05 motion, which the family court denied
by order entered October 31, 2024. This appeal followed. Additional facts
relevant to the parties’ arguments will be discussed as necessary below.
II. ANALYSIS
Grandparents’ primary argument on appeal is that the family court
erred when it reconsidered the First Presiding Judge’s interlocutory order
concluding that Grandparents qualified as Child’s de facto custodians.
Grandparents maintain the issue had already been conclusively resolved and that
nothing permitted the Successor Judge to revisit that determination. Father
responds that the First Presiding Judge’s order remained interlocutory throughout
the proceedings and that nothing prohibited the Successor Judge from
reconsidering the issue prior to entry of a final judgment.
Alternatively, Grandparents argue that even if the Successor Judge
possessed authority to revisit the issue, the family court nevertheless erred because
substantial evidence did not support its conclusion that Grandparents failed to
-5- qualify as Child’s primary caregivers and financial supporters for the requisite
statutory period. Father, however, maintains substantial evidence supported the
family court’s decision where the proof demonstrated that he continued
coparenting Child alongside Grandparents by maintaining medical insurance
coverage for Child, participating in major decisions concerning Child’s education
and medical care, and continuing to foster and maintain his parental relationship
with Child through visitation, outings, and other activities.
Each argument is addressed below in turn.
A. Successor Judge’s Authority to Revisit First Presiding Judge’s Prior Order
Grandparents do not challenge the family court’s general subject
matter jurisdiction over their petition. Rather, their argument concerns how the
family court exercised that authority and whether the Successor Judge was
permitted to revisit the First Presiding Judge’s prior interlocutory ruling regarding
de facto custodian status. See Commonwealth v. Eckerle, 470 S.W.3d 712, 720
(Ky. 2015). When a dispute concerns the propriety of a court’s exercise of
otherwise lawful jurisdiction in a particular case, it presents an issue of particular-
case jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Ky. 2013).
Questions concerning jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Commonwealth v. B.H.,
548 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. 2018).
-6- Grandparents correctly concede that traditional res judicata
principles do not apply because no final judgment had been entered prior to
dismissal of their petition. Nevertheless, they maintain that the Successor Judge
either lacked authority, or at minimum abused his discretion, by revisiting the First
Presiding Judge’s prior ruling determining that Grandparents qualified as Child’s
de facto custodians. According to Grandparents, the First Presiding Judge’s ruling
had become the “law of the case” and therefore could not later be reconsidered.
As this Court explained in Kincaid v. Johnson, True & Guarnieri,
LLP, 538 S.W.3d 901 (Ky. App. 2017):
“The law-of-the-case doctrine is ‘an iron rule, universally recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate court in the same cause is the law of the case for a subsequent trial or appeal however erroneous the opinion or decision may have been.’” Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Beglin, 432 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Ky. App. 2014) (quoting Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell’s Adm’r, 291 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Ky. 1956)). . . . The law- of-the-case doctrine is “a mechanism by which matters once litigated and finally determined remain final.” Id.
Id. at 916-17.
The law-of-the-case doctrine is predicated upon principles of finality
and generally concerns issues finally resolved during prior appellate proceedings
arising from the same litigation. Public Service Commission of Kentucky v.
Metropolitan Housing Coalition, 652 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Ky. App. 2022);
Armstrong v. Estate of Elmore, 647 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Ky. 2022). The order at -7- issue here, however, was not a final appellate determination. Rather, it was an
interlocutory family court order entered during an ongoing bifurcated custody
proceeding.
A final or appealable judgment is “a final order adjudicating all the
rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding, or a judgment made final under
Rule 54.02.” CR 54.01. Here, the First Presiding Judge’s order did not provide
Grandparents with the ultimate relief requested in their petition, namely custody
of Child. Thus, the order did not adjudicate all rights of all parties. Rather, the
order resolved only the preliminary issue of whether Grandparents qualified as de
facto custodians, an issue the First Presiding Judge expressly determined must be
addressed before the court could proceed to any custody and best-interest
determination.
CR 54.02 expressly provides that absent specific finality recitations,
“any order or other form of decision, however designated,” adjudicating fewer
than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties, “is
interlocutory and subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Here,
the First Presiding Judge expressly bifurcated the proceedings, limiting the initial
hearing to the issue of de facto custodian status while reserving all custody and
best-interest determinations for later proceedings. The May 20, 2022, order did
-8- not finally adjudicate the action, contain CR 54.02 finality language, or otherwise
terminate the litigation. Accordingly, it remained interlocutory and subject to
revision. Cherry v. Carroll, 507 S.W.3d 23, 27 (Ky. App. 2016) (“Determination
of a request for de facto custodian status does not strip ‘a party of a right in such a
manner as to remove from the court the power to return the parties to their original
condition.’”) (quoting Druen v. Miller, 357 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Ky. App. 2011).
Kentucky courts have long recognized that interlocutory rulings
remain subject to reconsideration prior to final judgment. See Bank of Danville v.
Farmers Nat. Bank of Danville, 602 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Ky. 1980) (“The . . . Order
was interlocutory and subject to change by the trial court at any time prior to the
final adjudication.”). Likewise, “[t]he trial court is charged with weighing the
evidence and evaluating credibility, at any time it reviews the evidence.”
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Bluegrass Powerboats, 424 S.W.3d 902, 910 (Ky.
2014) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that a
trial court retains authority to “correct its prior ruling, albeit late in the case[.]” Id.
at 911.
Here, the Successor Judge was tasked with entering the final custody
determination following additional evidentiary hearings conducted after
reassignment of the case. In doing so, the Successor Judge was permitted to
consider the entirety of the evidence presented throughout the proceedings,
-9- including evidence relevant to witness credibility, the nature of the parties’
caregiving arrangement, and the extent of Father’s continued involvement in
Child’s life. After considering the record as a whole, the Successor Judge
ultimately reached a different conclusion regarding de facto custodian status.
Under these circumstances, the family court acted within its authority in revisiting
the issue prior to entry of final judgment. Id.
B. Whether Substantial Evidence Supported the Successor Judge’s Decision
Grandparents next argue that even if the Successor Judge possessed
authority to revisit the interlocutory de facto custodian ruling, the family court
nevertheless erred because substantial evidence did not support its ultimate
conclusion that they failed to qualify as Child’s de facto custodians under KRS
403.270.
“Substantial evidence” is evidence of substance and relevant
consequence sufficient to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). Under CR 52.01, we defer to
the family court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to
the family court’s superior opportunity to evaluate witness credibility and weigh
conflicting testimony. Id.
A person may qualify as a “de facto custodian” when shown by
“clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and
-10- financial supporter of, a child” for the statutorily required period of time. KRS
403.270(1)(a). “[A] de facto custodian is never a natural parent, and instead is
someone who has limited rights based on parents’ failure to parent their child.”
Lemaster v. Stiltner, 718 S.W.3d 840, 856 (Ky. 2025). In providing de facto
custodians legal standing vis-à-vis parents, KRS 403.270 is intended to protect
individuals who have assumed the parental role “in the stead of a natural
parent[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, “if the
parent is not the primary caregiver, then someone else must be.”8 Id.
The burden imposed upon one seeking de facto custodian status is
substantial. “[P]arents have a basic human right to direct the upbringing of their
children, which is so fundamental that it warrants constitutional protection.”
Jones v. Jones, 510 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)). Kentucky courts have
consistently recognized the superior constitutional rights of natural parents
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Brumfield v. Stinson,
368 S.W.3d 116, 118 (Ky. App. 2012) (citing Moore, 110 S.W.3d 336).
Consequently, before a nonparent may be placed on equal footing with a
biological parent in a custody dispute, the court must first determine that the
8 Though the statute refers to “a person,” Kentucky courts have recognized that a married couple may qualify collectively as a single de facto custodian unit. Id. at 855. -11- biological parent abdicated the role of primary caregiver and financial supporter
for the requisite statutory period. Id. (citing London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351
(Ky. App. 2007)).
Put differently, “one must literally stand in the place of the natural
parent to qualify as a de facto custodian.” Brumfield, 368 S.W.3d at 118 (quoting
Consalvi v. Cawood, 63 S.W.3d 195, 198 (Ky. App. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. App. 2007)). Importantly, our
courts have repeatedly recognized that parenting a child alongside a biological
parent does not satisfy the de facto custodian standard. See Mullins v.
Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 573-74 (Ky. 2010). “A grandparent who co-parents
a child with the natural mother or father does not make the grandparent the
primary caregiver.” Chadwick v. Flora, 488 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Ky. App. 2016).
Thus, “even if a nonparent provides care and/or financial support for a child, if
such is in conjunction with a natural parent, the nonparent will not qualify as a de
facto custodian.” Brumfield, 368 S.W.3d at 118.
Here, the evidence concerning Child’s caregiving arrangement was
extensive and sharply disputed. Grandparents presented substantial testimony
establishing that Child resided with them for extended periods of time beginning
in approximately 2018 and throughout much of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Grandmother testified that she handled much of Child’s day-to-day care, including
-12- homeschooling, transportation to therapy and medical appointments,
extracurricular activities, and much of Child’s routine supervision and structure.
Grandparents further presented testimony indicating they bore many
of the financial costs associated with Child’s upbringing, including educational
expenses, co-pays, therapy expenses, clothing, food, and extracurricular activities.
Several witnesses additionally testified regarding Child’s close emotional bond
with Grandparents and his behavioral struggles surrounding visitation exchanges
with Parents.
However, the family court also heard substantial countervailing
evidence supporting Father’s position that he never relinquished or abandoned his
parental role. Father retained sole legal custody of Child throughout the relevant
period. The evidence demonstrated that Father maintained medical and dental
insurance coverage for Child and continued participating in major decisions
concerning Child’s education, therapy, and medical care. Grandmother herself
acknowledged that she routinely communicated with Father or Stepmother
concerning Child’s care and sought their approval or input regarding significant
decisions. Testimony further established that Parents remained involved in
Child’s life through visitation, outings, holidays, birthday celebrations, and other
activities. Father and Stepmother additionally testified that they offered financial
-13- assistance for Child’s schooling, clothing, and other expenses, but that such offers
were often declined by Grandparents.
The family court also heard testimony explaining that Child’s
extended residence with Grandparents intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic
because Stepmother worked in a hospital environment with repeated exposure to
infected patients, resulting in periods of quarantine and isolation within Parents’
household. Both Father and Stepmother testified that they viewed the
arrangement as temporary and cooperative in nature rather than an abdication of
Father’s parental responsibilities.
Ultimately, this case did not present a circumstance in which the
evidence compelled only one factual conclusion. Rather, the family court was
presented with conflicting testimony concerning whether Grandparents had
become Child’s primary caregivers and financial supporters within the meaning of
KRS 403.270, or whether the parties instead functioned in an ongoing cooperative
caregiving arrangement in which Father continued exercising his parental role
despite Child’s substantial periods of residence with Grandparents.
Our decision in Burgess v. Chase, 629 S.W.3d 826 (Ky. App. 2021),
is instructive. In Burgess, this Court reversed an award of de facto custodian
status where a grandmother had regularly cared for her grandchild for
approximately thirteen years, but the child’s natural mother continued exercising
-14- parenting time during school breaks and provided at least some financial support.
Although this Court acknowledged the grandmother’s substantial caregiving role
and generous financial support, we nevertheless concluded she did not stand in the
place of the child’s natural parent because the mother continued exercising
parental responsibilities and maintaining a parental relationship with the child. Id.
at 832 (“We agree with Samantha that despite Joyce’s generous provision of care
and financial support, under these facts Joyce was simply parenting Child
alongside Samantha due to Samantha’s continuing to exercise her parenting time
and to provide for and make decisions for Child during such parenting time. So, it
was error to accord Joyce de facto custodian status.”).
The Successor Judge, acting as factfinder, was entitled to weigh the
competing testimony, assess witness credibility, and resolve those factual disputes.
While the record unquestionably contains evidence favorable to Grandparents, the
existence of conflicting proof does not permit this Court to substitute its judgment
for that of the family court. Because substantial evidence supported the family
court’s determination that Grandparents failed to establish de facto custodian
status under KRS 403.270, we find no reversible error.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Marshall Family
Court.
-15- ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SHAWN D. HAMLET: Chris Hendricks Whitney E. Stringer Lisa A. DeRenard Murray, Kentucky Benton, Kentucky
-16-