Paul M. Poupart Versus State of Louisiana

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 25-CA-102
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

PAUL M. POUPART NO. 25-CA-102

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 856-442, DIVISION "O" HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 24, 2025

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Timothy S. Marcel

AFFIRMED SMC JGG TSM PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, PAUL M. POUPART In Proper Person

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA Elizabeth B. Murrill David J. Smith, Jr. Terrel T. Kent Jennifer W. Moroux CHEHARDY, C.J.

Plaintiff-appellant, Paul M. Poupart, appeals the trial court’s January 27,

2025 judgment, which sustained peremptory exceptions raising the objections of

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, no right of action, and no cause of

action, that were filed by defendant-appellee, the State of Louisiana, through Liz

Murrill in her official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana

(the “State”), and which dismissed Mr. Poupart’s declaratory judgment action,

wherein he alleged the multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, under which he

was adjudicated and sentenced as a fourth felony offender, was unconstitutional.1

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2011, following a jury trial, plaintiff-appellant, Paul M. Poupart,

proceeding pro se, was found guilty of public intimidation, and was sentenced to

imprisonment at hard labor for a term of five years. He was later adjudicated a

fourth felony offender, and on April 29, 2011, his original five-year sentence was

vacated, and he was re-sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1, to imprisonment at hard

labor for a term of twenty years, to be served without the benefit of probation or

suspension of sentence. Mr. Poupart’s sentence and conviction were upheld by

this Court on February 28, 2012, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied

writs. See State v. Poupart, 11-710 (La. App 5 Cir. 2/28/12), 88 So.3d 1132, writ

denied, 12-705 (La. 10/8/12), 98 So.3d 867. Mr. Poupart filed five applications for

post-conviction relief, as well as other legal actions, and, in 2017, the Supreme

Court declared that he had exhausted his right to obtain post-conviction relief in

state court. See State ex rel. Poupart v. State, 17-1237 (La. 9/15/17), 224 So.3d

960.

1 Additionally, the judgment declared as moot the State’s declinatory exceptions of prematurity and unauthorized use of a summary proceeding and the declinatory exceptions of insufficiency of service of process and insufficiency of citation.

25-CA-102 1 In 2022, apparently after “learning that [his] sentence was [purportedly]

unconstitutional,” Mr. Poupart filed a Request for Administrative Remedy

Procedure with the Department of Corrections, which was rejected on the basis that

“offenders may request administrative remedies for situations arising from

policies, conditions, or events within the institution only.” Mr. Poupart again

sought to challenge his conviction for public intimidation by filing a pleading

captioned “Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence” in the district court, arguing that

La. R.S. 15:529.1 had been repealed without a savings clause in July 1956, and

thus, his sentence was unconstitutional. Having determined that the caption of Mr.

Poupart’s pleading was not controlling, the district court construed his motion as,

in fact, yet another application for post-conviction relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 924,

which it concluded was procedurally time-barred under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, as it

was filed nearly ten years after Mr. Poupart’s conviction and sentence became

final.2 This Court and the Supreme Court subsequently denied writs. See State v.

Poupart, 22-464 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/22) (unpublished writ application), writ

denied, 23-278 (La. 6/7/23), 361 So.3d 983. Mr. Poupart filed a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which also denied relief. See

Poupart v. Louisiana, 144 S.Ct. 335, 217 L.Ed.2d 175 (2023), reh’g denied, 144

S.Ct. 534, 217 L.Ed.2d 282 (2023).

On June 9, 2022, while his criminal proceedings were still pending, Mr.

Poupart filed the instant declaratory judgment action, originally in the Nineteenth

Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, seeking to have La. R.S.

15:529.1, under which he was convicted and sentenced as a fourth felony offender,

2 The district court issued an order denying the motion, stating “Relief is barred by mandatory post- conviction rules including the fact that the request is successive, repetitive, and untimely, therefore, the request is time-barred and procedurally barred, and relief is not warranted under any legal theory.” Mr. Poupart also filed a motion to quash the multiple offender bill of information, again arguing La. R.S. 15:529.1 was not validly passed by the Legislature. Applying La. C.Cr.P. art. 535, the district court determined that such a motion should be filed prior to the commencement of trial and, as such, Mr. Poupart’s motion was clearly untimely.

25-CA-102 2 declared unconstitutional, once again arguing that the statute had been repealed

without a savings clause in 1956—the same arguments he urged in his ongoing

criminal proceedings in 2022. In effect, by way of this civil action, despite his

protestations to the contrary, Mr. Poupart is ultimately seeking to have his criminal

conviction and sentence as a multiple offender overturned by challenging the

constitutionality of La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Of significance, in his petition seeking declaratory relief, Mr. Poupart does

not name a defendant, and, upon information and belief, no party has ever been

properly served with citation and petition. In December 2023, however, the

Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) was

served with “notice” of Mr. Poupart’s filing. In response, DPSC filed an exception

of improper venue on the basis that Mr. Poupart’s petition for declaratory judgment

was related to his criminal conviction in Jefferson Parish. On February 12, 2024,

the trial court sustained DPSC’s exception and this suit was transferred to the

Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson.

Following the transfer, despite having not been properly served with the

petition, the State, through Liz Murrill in her official capacity as the Attorney

General for the State of Louisiana, filed numerous exceptions, including the

following: peremptory exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res

judicata, no right of action, and no cause of action; dilatory exceptions of

prematurity and unauthorized use of a summary proceeding; and declinatory

exceptions of insufficiency of service of process and insufficiency of citation. The

State’s exceptions came for hearing on January 9, 2025, and at the conclusion of

the hearing, the trial court orally ruled, sustaining the State’s peremptory

exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, no right of action,

and no cause of action, and declaring the remaining dilatory and declinatory

25-CA-102 3 exceptions as moot. A written judgment to this effect was signed on January 27,

2025, which judgment dismissed Mr. Poupart’s suit with prejudice at his cost.

This timely appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Poupart now appeals the trial court’s judgment sustaining the State’s

peremptory exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata, no right

of action, and no cause of action. We find no error in the trial court’s judgment.

The peremptory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by the

State alleged that Mr. Poupart’s bringing a declaratory judgment action is an

attempt to overturn his criminal conviction and sentence by challenging the

constitutionality of the multiple offender statute. Although framed as a civil action

for declaratory judgment, the State avers that Mr. Poupart’s petition effectively

seeks post-conviction relief, much like his previously filed motion to correct illegal

sentence. The State argues that the law is well-settled that a prisoner cannot file a

civil action to collaterally attack a criminal conviction or to bypass the procedural

requirements governing post-conviction relief. Also, the State posits that the trial

court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a separate civil suit to

undermine Mr. Poupart’s criminal conviction.

According to the State, even assuming Mr. Poupart’s assertion that he is not

seeking to overturn his conviction or sentence is true, Mr. Poupart has no right of

action to bring this action because he has no real and actual interest in the suit and,

thus, there is no actual, justiciable controversy for which he may seek declaratory

relief. Specifically, the State argues Mr. Poupart does not have a real and actual

interest in this suit because he is a state prisoner that has already been adjudicated a

fourth felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1, he has exhausted all appeals and

post-conviction relief, and his conviction and sentence have been final since 2012.

Consequently, resolution of the instant suit would have no effect whatsoever on

25-CA-102 4 Mr. Poupart and would be tantamount to a request for an advisory opinion as to the

constitutionality of the multiple offender statute. Further, the State avers that, in

his criminal proceedings, Mr. Poupart raised the question regarding the validity

and constitutionality of La. R.S. 15:529.1, which the district court rejected, so a

civil, declaratory judgment action is no longer appropriate. Put simply, once Mr.

Poupart’s conviction and sentence as a fourth felony offender became final and he

exhausted all possibility of post-conviction relief, the controversy ceased to exist

and Mr. Poupart has no right of action to pursue this civil action.

The State further argues that Mr. Poupart’s civil claim is barred by res

judicata because his declaratory judgment action is, in essence, a petition for post-

conviction relief on the same exact issue—the constitutionality of the statute—that

was raised in his criminal proceedings and was rejected, not only by the district

court, but also by this Court and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the State avers

that res judicata bars re-litigation of the constitutionality issue raised in Mr.

Poupart’s declaratory judgment action, which is the same issue that is the subject

of a final judgment issued by another court in Mr. Poupart’s criminal proceedings.

On appeal, Mr. Poupart argues that, because his declaratory judgment action

is civil in nature “and the availability of declaratory relief is governed by the

general civil jurisdiction of the courts,” who have “original jurisdiction” over such

matters, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over this civil proceeding.

La. C.C.P. art. 2.3 He also reasons that his civil claim seeking a declaration as to

the constitutionality of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is not barred by res judicata, because the

prior final judgments denying his post-conviction relief and his motion to correct

illegal sentence were criminal in nature and did not definitively resolve the

question of the constitutionality of the multiple offender statute, which question he

3 La. C.C.P. art. 2 provides: “Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and the authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.”

25-CA-102 5 contends is civil in nature. Alternatively, Mr. Poupart suggests the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to exercise its “equitable discretion to balance the

principle of res judicata with the interest of justice,” and to consider the

“exceptional circumstances” that “justify relief from [the] res judicata effect of the

judgment,” and should allow him to pursue this declaratory judgment action. Mr.

Poupart avers that he does have standing and a right of action to challenge an

invalid law used against him illegally and that his “due process rights” require that

he be allowed to pursue this declaratory judgment action. He further states that he

has a cause of action because he has been “injuriously affected” by the State’s

enforcement of the unconstitutional sentencing statute. Lastly, Mr. Poupart

contends that his due process rights were denied when the trial court dismissed his

entire suit with prejudice.

We agree with the trial court and the State and find (1) the trial court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Poupart’s declaratory judgment

action; (2) Mr. Poupart does not have a right of action in this matter; and (3) Mr.

Poupart’s claim is barred by res judicata.

Mr. Poupart has sought a declaratory judgment that the multiple offender

statute—a criminal statute—is unconstitutional. The trial court lacks jurisdiction

to grant Mr. Poupart the relief he purportedly seeks. First, an objection to the

constitutionality of a criminal statute may be urged only by the filing of a motion

to quash the indictment before commencement of the trial, not through a petition

for declaratory judgment in a civil court. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 535; Ricks v.

Louisiana Department of Justice, 23-549 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 83,

87. Additionally, although framed as a civil action for declaratory relief, Mr.

Poupart’s efforts to challenge the constitutionality of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is an

impermissible collateral attack on his final criminal conviction and sentence as a

multiple felony offender, which cannot be pursued through a civil proceeding. It is

25-CA-102 6 well-established in Louisiana that a prisoner may not use civil proceedings to

collaterally attack previous criminal convictions. Ricks, 378 So.3d at 87;

Straughter v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 17-384 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 11/1/17), 233 So.3d 89, 91, writ denied, 18-187 (La. 2/11/19), 263

So.3d 893.4

Second, even assuming as true Mr. Poupart’s contention that he is not

seeking to overturn his conviction or sentence, La. C.C.P. art. 681 provides that

“… an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest

which he asserts.” Louisiana courts have consistently held that declaratory relief is

available to decide a “justiciable” controversy, meaning a presently existing, actual

and substantial dispute, but the courts are not empowered to render advisory

opinions on moot or abstract issues of law. Hughes v. Connick, 96-152 (La. App. 5

Cir. 9/26/06), 942 So.2d 1076, 1079. These purposes apply to both civil and

criminal ordinances, and in the criminal context, these purposes are met only

where an individual falls within a class that is threatened with prosecution under an

allegedly unconstitutional statute, not after prosecution has begun. Id. Here, Mr.

Poupart has no real or actual interest in the multiple offender statute being declared

unconstitutional. He is not currently threatened with prosecution under the statute.

He has already been adjudicated and sentenced as a fourth felony offender under

La. R.S. 15:529.1 and his conviction and sentence are final. As such, any opinion

as to the constitutionality of the statute at this juncture would be merely an

advisory opinion, as the result would not affect Mr. Poupart personally. Thus, the

trial court properly sustained the State’s exception of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

4 Further, while an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, only the sentencing court itself or the appellate court having jurisdiction over the sentencing court have authority to do so. La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A); Ricks, 378 So.3d at 87.

25-CA-102 7 For similar reasons, we also agree with the trial court that Mr. Poupart does

not have a right of action to pursue this declaratory judgment action. Mr. Poupart

was adjudicated and sentenced as a fourth felony offender in 2011. Louisiana law

provides that declaratory judgment actions are only appropriate to test the validity

of criminal statutes before prosecution has commenced. As previously stated, Mr.

Poupart’s conviction and sentence have been final since 2012. In Shepherd v.

Shedler, 15-1750 (La. 1/27/16), 209 So.3d 752, 762, the Supreme Court iterated

the following applicable principles:

One of the predicate issues that must be decided by a court before considering a constitutional challenge is whether the party seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality has standing to bring the challenge. To have standing to bring a constitutional challenge, the party bringing the challenge must have rights in controversy. [Citations omitted.]

Mr. Poupart is not currently threatened with prosecution under the multiple

offender statute. As he has no real or actual, current interest in the constitutionality

of La. R.S. 15:529.1, we find that no justiciable controversy exists that would

provide him a right of action or standing to pursue this civil declaratory judgment

action.5

In addition, we find the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Poupart is

barred by res judicata from bringing this civil action to declare La. R.S. 15:529.1

unconstitutional, because his criminal conviction involving this statute has been

fully litigated in the criminal proceeding. La. R.S. 13:4231 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

5 We likewise find the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Poupart’s petition for declaratory judgment fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Although the caption of his petition indicates his claim is against the State of Louisiana, Mr. Poupart’s petition states no allegations against the State, or any other defendant, for that matter. Further, as previously indicated, his effort to challenge La. R.S. 15:529.1 is an impermissible collateral attack on his final criminal conviction that cannot be pursued through a civil proceeding; it must be brought in an application for post-conviction relief, not in a declaratory judgment action.

25-CA-102 8 (1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of the final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

During the criminal proceedings, including the post-conviction relief

applications, writs, and appeals, Mr. Poupart questioned the constitutionality of

the multiple offender statute under which he was adjudicated and sentenced,

and his claims were rejected.6 Mr. Poupart’s conviction and sentence under the

multiple offender statute as a fourth felony offender have been fully litigated in

the criminal proceeding and are now final. The parties—Mr. Poupart and the

State—are the same in both actions, the current cause of action existed at the

time of the prior final judgment, and it arises from the same underlying facts.

Consequently, he is now barred from relitigating this matter by claiming the

multiple offender statute is unconstitutional through this civil action. See

Hughes, supra.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment granting the State’s peremptory exceptions of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, no right of action, no cause of action, and res judicata.

AFFIRMED

6 Louisiana court have held that a constitutional challenge not raised during criminal proceedings cannot later be brought in a civil suit. See Hughes, 942 So.2d at 1080.

25-CA-102 9 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIRST DEPUTY CLERK SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY SEPTEMBER 24, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-CA-102 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE) DAVID J. SMITH, JR. (APPELLEE) ELIZABETH B. MURRILL (APPELLEE) GRANT L. WILLIS (APPELLEE) JENNIFER W. MOROUX (APPELLEE) OLIVIA G. BOUDREAUX (APPELLEE)

MAILED PAUL M. POUPART #357073 (APPELLANT) TERREL T. KENT (APPELLEE) ELAYN HUNT CORRECTIONAL CENTER POST OFFICE BOX 94005 6925 HIGHWAY 74 BATON ROUGE, LA 70804 ST. GABRIEL, LA 70776