UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
PAUL GRISHAM, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00046-JPH-MG ) ARAMARK, ) DANIEL BEDWELL, ) KOENING, ) MCKIM Mrs., ) PRICTCHER Sgt., ) B. BUTTLER, ) HOWARD Mrs., ) WILSON Mrs., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Paul Grisham is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash Valley"). He filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). I. Screening Standard When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). II. The Complaint The complaint lists eight defendants: Aramark; Aramark supervisors Daniel Bedwell, Mrs. Mckim, Mrs. Howard, and Mrs. Wilson; Aramark worker
Ms. Koening; correctional officer Sgt. Prictcher; and B. Buttler. Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), Mr. Grisham has identified the theories he wishes to use against the defendants as Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims. Where a pro se litigant has expressly stated the legal theory he wishes to pursue, a court is not required to analyze whether the allegations in the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory. See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App'x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the Court analyzes Mr. Grisham's claims only under the theories he has identified. The Court accepts Mr. Grisham's factual allegations as true at the pleading stage but not his legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true," but "we 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'") (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
The complaint alleges that Mr. Grisham worked in or near the Aramark "pots and pans area" in Wabash Valley. Dkt. 1 at 2. On January 19, 2024, between 11:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., he was working in the area and was approached by defendant Ms. Koening. She asked him to take a rolling pin that she had, and Mr. Grishman responded that it was not his. Ms. Koening disagreed and got angry, and a back-and-forth ensued. She threw the rolling pin at Mr. Grisham, striking him in the head. Additionally, water splashed all over him. Mr. Grisham informed Aramark supervisors Mckim, Bedwell, Howard, and
Wilson, who did not address the incident, but said that they would look into it. His grievances similarly yielded nothing. He also told Sgt. Pritctcher about the incident. Despite her behavior that day being captured on video, Ms. Koening continued to work for Aramark at Wabash Valley until she was terminated for an unrelated reason. III. Discussion of Claims Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the complaint certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted.
First, all claims against B. Buttler are dismissed. Mr. Grisham alleges no facts as to B. Buttler to state a plausible claim for relief. He or she is not referenced in the complaint beyond being listed among the defendants. "Individual liability under § 1983 … requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). "Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the
defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the [claims as to the defendant are] properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to be given to pro se complaints." Potter v. Clark, 487 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). The Court dismisses all claims against B. Buttler for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Second, all claims against Aramark are dismissed. Private corporations acting under color of state law—including those that contract with the state to provide essential services to prisoners—are treated as municipalities for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and can be sued when their actions violate the Constitution. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). A plaintiff must identify an action taken by the municipality and allege a causal link between the municipality's action and the deprivation of federal rights; this is known as a Monell claim. Dean, 18 F.4th at 235. "A municipality 'acts' through its written policies, widespread practices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker." Levy v. Marion Co. Sheriff, 940 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 2019). Mr. Grisham
fails to allege that any policy, practice, custom, or act of a final decision maker led to his Eighth Amendment rights being violated. The Court dismisses all claims against Aramark for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Third, all claims against Mr. Bedwell, Mrs. Mckim, Mrs. Howard, Mrs. Wilson, and Sgt. Prictcher are dismissed. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Bedwell, Mrs. Mckim, Mrs. Howard, and Mrs. Wilson engaged in
unconstitutional excessive force; they were supervisors of Ms. Koening. Section 1983 claims generally cannot proceed against individuals merely for their supervisory role of others. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
PAUL GRISHAM, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00046-JPH-MG ) ARAMARK, ) DANIEL BEDWELL, ) KOENING, ) MCKIM Mrs., ) PRICTCHER Sgt., ) B. BUTTLER, ) HOWARD Mrs., ) WILSON Mrs., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Paul Grisham is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash Valley"). He filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). I. Screening Standard When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). II. The Complaint The complaint lists eight defendants: Aramark; Aramark supervisors Daniel Bedwell, Mrs. Mckim, Mrs. Howard, and Mrs. Wilson; Aramark worker
Ms. Koening; correctional officer Sgt. Prictcher; and B. Buttler. Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), Mr. Grisham has identified the theories he wishes to use against the defendants as Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims. Where a pro se litigant has expressly stated the legal theory he wishes to pursue, a court is not required to analyze whether the allegations in the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory. See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App'x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the Court analyzes Mr. Grisham's claims only under the theories he has identified. The Court accepts Mr. Grisham's factual allegations as true at the pleading stage but not his legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true," but "we 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'") (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
The complaint alleges that Mr. Grisham worked in or near the Aramark "pots and pans area" in Wabash Valley. Dkt. 1 at 2. On January 19, 2024, between 11:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., he was working in the area and was approached by defendant Ms. Koening. She asked him to take a rolling pin that she had, and Mr. Grishman responded that it was not his. Ms. Koening disagreed and got angry, and a back-and-forth ensued. She threw the rolling pin at Mr. Grisham, striking him in the head. Additionally, water splashed all over him. Mr. Grisham informed Aramark supervisors Mckim, Bedwell, Howard, and
Wilson, who did not address the incident, but said that they would look into it. His grievances similarly yielded nothing. He also told Sgt. Pritctcher about the incident. Despite her behavior that day being captured on video, Ms. Koening continued to work for Aramark at Wabash Valley until she was terminated for an unrelated reason. III. Discussion of Claims Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the complaint certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted.
First, all claims against B. Buttler are dismissed. Mr. Grisham alleges no facts as to B. Buttler to state a plausible claim for relief. He or she is not referenced in the complaint beyond being listed among the defendants. "Individual liability under § 1983 … requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). "Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the
defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the [claims as to the defendant are] properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to be given to pro se complaints." Potter v. Clark, 487 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). The Court dismisses all claims against B. Buttler for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Second, all claims against Aramark are dismissed. Private corporations acting under color of state law—including those that contract with the state to provide essential services to prisoners—are treated as municipalities for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and can be sued when their actions violate the Constitution. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). A plaintiff must identify an action taken by the municipality and allege a causal link between the municipality's action and the deprivation of federal rights; this is known as a Monell claim. Dean, 18 F.4th at 235. "A municipality 'acts' through its written policies, widespread practices or customs, and the acts of a final decisionmaker." Levy v. Marion Co. Sheriff, 940 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 2019). Mr. Grisham
fails to allege that any policy, practice, custom, or act of a final decision maker led to his Eighth Amendment rights being violated. The Court dismisses all claims against Aramark for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Third, all claims against Mr. Bedwell, Mrs. Mckim, Mrs. Howard, Mrs. Wilson, and Sgt. Prictcher are dismissed. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Bedwell, Mrs. Mckim, Mrs. Howard, and Mrs. Wilson engaged in
unconstitutional excessive force; they were supervisors of Ms. Koening. Section 1983 claims generally cannot proceed against individuals merely for their supervisory role of others. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Rather, to be liable, a supervisor "must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye." Zentmyer v. Kendall Cnty., Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Mere "knowledge of a subordinate's misconduct is not enough for liability." Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Indeed, "inaction following receipt of a
complaint about someone else's conduct is [insufficient]." Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F. 3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, there are no allegations of repeated violent or aggressive behaviors by Ms. Koening after the incident was reported to the supervisors. The supervisors told Mr. Grisham that they would look into the incident, and there are no factual allegations that they facilitated, condoned, or turned a blind eye to Ms. Koening's behavior. Similarly, no allegation supports a reasonable inference that Sgt. Prictcher was personally involved in the alleged excessive
force. "A damages suit under § 1983 requires a defendant be personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). Mr. Grishman does not allege that Sgt. Prictcher and the Aramark supervisors were personally involved in, or even present for, the excessive force incident. The Court dismisses all claims against Daniel Bedwell, Mckim, Prictcher, Howard, and Wilson. Finally, all claims against Ms. Koening in her individual capacity shall
proceed. Mr. Grisham has alleged sufficient facts for an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. This is the sole claim that shall proceed. IV. Conclusion and Service of Process This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court, he shall have through November 10, 2025, in which to file a motion to reconsider the screening order.
The clerk is directed to terminate Aramark, Daniel Bedwell, Mckim, Prictcher, B. Buttler, Howard, and Wilson as defendants on the docket. The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendant Ms. Koening in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on January 22, 2025, and its updated signature page, dkts. [1], [18], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Order. Because Ms. Koening is identified as a former employee of Aramark, a copy
of this Order and the process documents shall be served on Aramark. Aramark is ordered to provide the full name and last known home address of Ms. Koening, if Ms. Koening does not waive service, if it has such information. This information shall be filed ex parte. Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED. Date: 10/21/2025 omnis Pati tanbove James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana
Distribution: PAUL GRISHAM 293953 WABASH VALLEY - CF Wabash Valley Correctional Facility 6908 S. Old US Hwy 41 CARLISLE, IN 47838 Aramark Correctional Services, LLC C/O CT Corporation System 334 North Senate Ave. Indianapolis, IN 46204 Courtesy Copy to: Christopher Cody Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, LLP 54 Monument Circle, Suite 400 Indianapolis, IN 46204