UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Paul Gregory Doucet, by and through his guardians Denise Sutton and Amy Doucet
v. Civil No. 18-cv-627-JL Opinion No. 2018 DNH 201 FCA US LLC, f/k/a Chrysler Group LLC
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The defendant’s motion to dismiss this products-liability
action turns on whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or
is related to the defendant’s activities in New Hampshire so as
to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant on this
court. Plaintiff Paul Gregory Doucet brought this action in
Hillsborough Superior Court through his guardians, Denise Sutton
and Amy Doucet, alleging that he sustained injuries in a car
accident that occurred while he was a passenger in a 2004
Chrysler Sebring convertible. Defendant Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles US LLC (FCA) timely removed the action, see 28
U.S.C. § 1441, citing this court’s diversity jurisdiction, id.
§ 1332(a).
FCA moves to dismiss Doucet’s complaint, arguing that this
court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(2). After holding oral argument, the court grants that motion.1 Doucet’s claim arises from alleged defects in the 2004
Sebring, which FCA’s predecessor, Chrysler, LLC, originally sold
in Massachusetts. Though Chrysler, LLC, and subsequently FCA,
may have sold other vehicles--including other 2004 Sebrings--in
New Hampshire, Doucet has not carried his burden of
demonstrating that his claims are causally related to those
activities. The court therefore lacks personal jurisdiction
over FCA.
Applicable legal standard
“Personal jurisdiction implicates the power of a court over
a defendant . . . . [B]oth its source and its outer limits are
defined exclusively by the Constitution.” Foster–Miller, Inc.
v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 143–44 (1st Cir. 1995)
(citing Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)); U.S. Const. amend. V. “To
establish personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a plaintiff
must satisfy both the forum state’s long-arm statute and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” C.W. Downer & Co.
v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir.
2014). “New Hampshire’s long-arm statute reaches to the full
1 FCA also moves to dismiss Doucet’s negligence claim against it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because the court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over FCA, it need not--and therefore does not--address the merits of that claim.
2 extent that the Constitution allows.” Phillips Exeter Acad. v.
Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 287 (1st Cir. 1999). The
court thus proceeds directly to the usual constitutional due
process analysis.
To satisfy the requirements of due process, the defendants
must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum “such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotations
omitted). Consistent with these threshold requirements, “[a]
district court may exercise authority over a defendant by virtue
of either general or specific jurisdiction.” Mass. Sch. Of Law
at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n., 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.
1998).
The plaintiff invokes only this court’s specific
jurisdiction over the defendant.2 “[S]pecific jurisdiction is
confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he
2 As FCA demonstrated in its opening memorandum, see Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 4) at 8-9, the requirements for general jurisdiction over it are not satisfied here. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014). Doucet does not dispute this, nor allege general jurisdiction in this action. Cf. Plaintiff’s Obj. (doc. no. 7) at 5 & n. 6.
3 constitutional test for determining specific jurisdiction . . .
has three distinct components, namely, relatedness, purposeful
availment (sometimes called ‘minimum contacts’), and
reasonableness.” Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 80–81 (1st
Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“[D]ivining personal jurisdiction is ‘more an art than a
science,’” Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1388 (1st Cir.
1995) (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201,
206 (1st Cir. 1994)), and thus necessitates “an individualized
assessment and factual analysis of the precise mix of contacts
that characterize each case,” Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60
(1st Cir. 1994).
Doucet bears the burden of satisfying these three
components by “proffer[ing] evidence which, if credited, is
sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to
personal jurisdiction.” A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812
F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Phillips v. Prairie Eye
Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)). “To satisfy the prima
facie standard in a specific jurisdiction case, a plaintiff may
not rest on mere allegations but, rather, must submit competent
evidence showing sufficient dispute-related contacts between the
defendant and the forum.”3 Carreras v. PMG Collins, LLC, 660
3 The First Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes three methods of determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over the
4 F.3d 549, 552 (1st Cir. 2011). The court “view[s] this
evidence, together with any evidence proffered by the
defendant[s], in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff’s
favor,” albeit without “credit[ing] bald allegations or
unsupported conclusions.” Id. This approach informs the
following factual summary.
Background
Doucet was sitting in the front passenger seat of a 2004
Chrysler Sebring when it collided with another vehicle in
Hudson, New Hampshire, on May 24, 2015. A vertical support beam
on the passenger side deflected inwards, injuring Doucet.
The 2004 Sebring was designed and manufactured by Chrysler,
LLC, which sold it to a dealer in Rhode Island.4 That dealer
transferred it to another in Gloucester, Massachusetts, which
defendant: the prima facie method, the preponderance method, and the likelihood method. A Corp. v. All American Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 58 n.5 (1st Cir. 2016). The prima facie method is “the least taxing of these standards from a plaintiff’s standpoint, and the one most commonly employed in the early stages of litigation.” Rodriguez v. Fulelrton Tires Corp., 115 F.3d 81, 83-4 (1st Cir. 1997). Because the parties in the instant case agree that the prima facie standard is appropriate, see Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 4) at 7; Plaintiff’s Obj. (doc. no. 7) at 7, and neither party has requested an evidentiary hearing, the court will apply that standard. 4 Amended Delecke Decl. (doc. no. 16) ¶ 5.
5 leased it to a resident of Needham, Massachusetts.5 The 2004
Sebring then passed through the hands of two other Massachusetts
residents before being sold to a resident of Hudson, New
Hampshire, from whom Doucet purchased it in June 2013.6
Long after it sold the 2004 Sebring, Chrysler, LLC filed
for bankruptcy on April 30, 2009. See Dearden v. FCA US LLC (In
re Old Carco LLC), 582 B.R. 838, 841 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15,
2018). Its debtors agreed to sell substantially all of their
assets to a newly-formed entity, defendant FCA US LLC, under a
Master Transaction Agreement.7 Id. The Bankruptcy Court
approved the agreement. Id. Under the terms of that agreement
and amendments thereto--discussed more thoroughly infra--FCA
“acquired [Chrysler, LLC’s] assets free and clear of all claims
and interests, including claims based on successor liability,”
such that FCA “is only liable for the claims against [Chrysler,
LLC] to the extent they are Assumed Liabilities . . . .” In re
Old Carco LLC, 582 B.R. at 843-44.
Analysis
FCA moves to dismiss this action, arguing that this court
lacks specific personal jurisdiction over it directly or as a
5 Id. 6 Delecke Decl. (doc. no. 4-5) ¶¶ 6-9. 7 See Defendant’s Ex. 1 (doc. no. 4-1).
6 successor to Chrysler, LLC. As discussed supra, “the
constitutional test for determining specific jurisdiction . . .
has three distinct components, namely, relatedness, purposeful
availment . . . and reasonableness.” Adelson, 652 F.3d at 80–81
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The court
addresses these components in that order, see United States v.
Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 621 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting
Phillips Exeter Acad., 196 F.3d at 288), beginning with
relatedness. Concluding at the first element that Doucet’s
claims do not arise from and are not related to either FCA’s or
Chrysler, LLC’s conduct in New Hampshire, the court grants that
motion.
A. Personal jurisdiction over FCA
“In order for the extension of personal jurisdiction to
survive constitutional scrutiny, a claim must ‘arise out of, or
be related to, the defendant's in-forum activities.’”
Massachusetts Sch. Of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142
F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Ticketmaster–N.Y., 26 F.3d
at 206). Where, as here, the “plaintiff[’s] claims all sound in
tort,” the court “look[s] to whether the plaintiff has
established cause in fact (i.e., the injury would not have
occurred ‘but for’ the defendant's forum-state activity) and
legal cause (i.e., the defendant's in-state conduct gave birth
7 to the cause of action).” Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. v.
The Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Mass.
School of Law, 142 F.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Here, Doucet offers no allegation or evidence that
causally connects any action by FCA to his injury. It simply
cannot be said that Doucet’s injuries would not have occurred
“but for [FCA’s] forum-state activity.” Id.
“Questions of specific jurisdiction,” and particularly the
relatedness element, “are always tied to the particular claims
asserted.” Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196
F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999). Doucet claims that he was
injured in New Hampshire due to a defect in his 2004 Sebring
(Count 1) or due to Chrysler, LLC’s negligence in designing,
manufacturing, inspecting, or testing his 2004 Sebring
(Count 2). He has produced evidence that FCA is authorized to
do business in New Hampshire8 and that authorized Chrysler
dealerships exist in New Hampshire.9 This evidence suggests
contacts between FCA and New Hampshire that, in the court’s
view, arguably inform the “purposeful availment” component of
the applicable three-part test. See Phillips v. Prairie Eye
Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2008). But it does not
8 Plaintiff’s Ex. 1 (doc. no. 7-1). 9 Plaintiff’s Ex. 2 (doc. no. 7-2).
8 demonstrate that FCA’s contacts with the forum constituted the
legal cause or cause-in-fact of his injury. Doucet does not
allege or offer any evidence that FCA, which did not exist until
2009, designed, manufactured, inspected, or tested his 2004
Sebring in New Hampshire. Nor does he allege or offer evidence
to the effect that FCA had any contact with, or took any action
with respect to, his 2004 Sebring in New Hampshire.
Doucet does not dispute that the 2004 Sebring was already
in the hands of private owners before FCA even existed. It is,
therefore, difficult to see how any action by FCA--let alone any
action in New Hampshire--constituted the but-for or legal cause
of his injury. Accordingly, Doucet has failed to satisfy the
relatedness element of the personal-jurisdiction analysis. The
court’s “jurisdictional analysis need proceed no further. Since
the [plaintiff] has failed to satisfy the first prong of the
jurisdictional test, [his] argument for specific jurisdiction
must fail.” Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 625.
B. Personal jurisdiction over Chrysler, LLC
While FCA’s New Hampshire activities were indisputably not
causally related to the plaintiff’s injury, personal
jurisdiction may be conferred on a successor entity like FCA
under certain circumstances. The court thus turns to whether it
has personal jurisdiction over FCA as a successor to Chrysler,
9 LLC. In this case, FCA’s successor liability turns on whether
the predecessor’s in-state actions subjected it to the court’s
jurisdiction.
“In order to make a prima facie showing that this court has
personal jurisdiction over defendant [FCA] under the doctrine of
successor liability, plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the
court has personal jurisdiction over [Chrysler, LLC] and (2)
that [FCA] is liable as a successor to [Chrysler, LLC] under New
Hampshire law.” McClary v. Erie Engine & Mfg. Co., 856 F. Supp.
52, 57 (D.N.H. 1994) (citing Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip.
Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991)). Doucet has failed
to make out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over
Chrysler, LLC, because he has not demonstrated relatedness.10
The court therefore need not reach the question of whether FCA
is liable as a successor to Chrysler, LLC, though FCA focused
the bulk of its argument on that element.11
Chrysler, LLC originally sold the 2004 Sebring to a dealer
in Rhode Island, Smithfield Chrysler Jeep, Inc.12 That dealer
10At oral argument, FCA conceded the first element--that is, that this court would be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over Chrysler, LLC based on the facts of this case. The court declines to accept that concession, however, concluding that the law dictates the contrary. 11E.g., Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 4) at 2, 4, 11. 12 Amended Delecke Decl. (doc. no. 16) ¶ 5.
10 transferred the Sebring to Sudbay Chrysler Dodge, Inc., in
Gloucester, Massachusetts, which leased it to a resident of
Needham, Massachusetts.13 Sudbay then sold the car to a
Gloucester, Massachusetts resident.14 Only after two more
private transfers, including a 2010 sale to a different New
Hampshire resident, did Doucet purchase it in June 2013.15 In
short, the parties do not dispute that Chrysler, LLC, and any
authorized dealers,16 sold the 2004 Sebring in Massachusetts and
that the car only entered New Hampshire further down the stream
of commerce, after a series of private sales.
Though the Court of Appeals has not directly addressed the
issue, several courts in this Circuit have taken a fairly
expansive view of whether a products-liability claim relates to
or arises from the defendant’s forum activity. That is, they
have found the relatedness element satisfied where the defendant
sells the allegedly-defective product line in the forum state,
or causes it to be sold there, even if the defendant itself may
13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Delecke Decl. (doc. no. 4-5) ¶¶ 7-9. 16Construing the facts in Doucet’s favor, as the court is obliged to do, see Carreras, 660 F.3d at 552, the court assumes for purposes of this motion that sales through Chrysler, LLC’s authorized dealers are attributable to Chrysler, LLC, itself.
11 not have sold the individual item that injured the plaintiff in
that state.
For example, the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts found relatedness where a Lichtenstein-based
manufacturer’s contacts with Massachusetts related to the sale
and marketing of a line of products, one of which--ultimately
sold into Massachusetts by a distributor--injured the plaintiff.
Lewis v. Dimeo Const. Co., No. 14-CV-10492-IT, 2015 WL 3407605,
at *4 (D. Mass. May 27, 2015) (Talwani, K.). It similarly found
relatedness where a foreign defendant distributed a product-line
of saws exclusively through Home Depot, which had 45 stores in
the Commonwealth, and one of those saws injured the plaintiff
there. Micheli v. Techtronic Indus., Co, Ltd., No. CIV.A. 11-
10503, 2012 WL 6087383, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2013) (Hillman,
J.) (adopting report and recommendation). The same court has
likewise concluded that, where “[s]uch contacts as [the Japan-
based] defendant . . . made with Massachusetts had to do with
its own products” and one of those products injured the
plaintiff, “[t]here is no incongruity in the relationship
between [the defendant’s] alleged contacts and the alleged
tort.” Turpin v. Mori Seiki Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126 (D.
Mass. 1999) (Gorton, J.). Finally, focusing only on the
proximate-cause portion of the relatedness inquiry, the District
Court for the District of Maine “determine[ed] that an alleged
12 injury from the sale of a product in a forum targeted by the
manufacturer through its choice of distributors is sufficiently
foreseeable to satisfy the relatedness prong of the
jurisdictional inquiry.” Unicomp, Inc. v. Harcros Pigments,
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 24, 25–26 (D. Me. 1998).
Other courts in this circuit have taken a narrower view in
products-liability cases, concluding that the relatedness
element is not satisfied when the defendant did not sell the
actual product that injured the plaintiff in the forum state,
despite other in-forum activities.17 For example, Judge
McAuliffe concluded that the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over a Switzerland-based airplane manufacturer with respect to
design defect claims very similar to Doucet’s because the
defendant designed, manufactured, and sold its airplanes in
Europe. D’Jamoos v. Atlas Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d
167, 173-74 (D.N.H. 2009). The court exercised pendent
jurisdiction with respect to those claims only after finding
that it had personal jurisdiction over that defendant with
17The defendants do not argue that Chrysler LLC lacked any connection with New Hampshire. See Katz v. Spiniello Companies, 244 F. Supp. 3d 237, 245 (D. Mass. 2017) (no relatedness where defendant never manufactured, marketed, sold, or distributed allegedly-defective airplane part in the forum); West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10-CV-214-JL, 2011 WL 285682, at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 28, 2011) (no relatedless where defendant lacked any connection to the forum).
13 respect to another of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 174-75.
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found no relatedness where the defendant installed allegedly-
defective elements into a boat in North Carolina, did not
transfer the boat to Massachusetts, and had no involvement in
the sales that brought it to Massachusetts. Ace Am. Ins. Co. v.
Oyster Harbors Marine, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 295, 304 (D. Mass.
2018) (Burroughs, J.). It drew a similar conclusion where a
plaintiff purchased a boat from a dealer in Virginia and only
his actions--not the dealer’s--brought the boat into
Massachusetts, despite the presence of two other authorized
dealers in the Commonwealth. Killion v. Commonwealth Yachts,
421 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 (D. Mass. 2006) (Saylor, J.). Finally,
the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found no
relatedness where the luggage cart that injured the plaintiff in
Miami was sold in New Jersey, concluding that “[t]he fact that
[the defendant] sold similar products in Puerto Rico is not
sufficient to meet [the relatedness] test.” Terzano v. PFC, 986
F. Supp. 706, 711 (D.P.R. 1997).
This dichotomy of opinion appears to come down to how these
courts understand causation as expressed in the personal
jurisdiction precedents. The courts that take a more expansive
view focus solely on the proximate-cause-related foreseeability
element of the relatedness inquiry. E.g., Lewis v. Dimeo Const.
14 Co., 2015 WL 3407605, at *4; Turpin, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 126;
Micheli, 2012 WL 6087383, at *9; Unicomp, 994 F. Supp. at 25–26.
But in a case sounding in tort, the court must consider both
“whether the plaintiff has established cause in fact (i.e., the
injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant's forum-
state activity) and legal cause (i.e., the defendant's in-state
conduct gave birth to the cause of action).” Scottsdale, 887
F.3d at 20–21. Here, it is not proximate cause that precludes a
relatedness finding with respect to Doucet’s claims--it is lack
of but-for causation.
The most that may possibly be said for the relatedness of
Doucet’s claim here is that he was injured by a 2004 Chrysler
Sebring and that Chrysler (presumably) distributed 2004 Sebrings
in New Hampshire.18 He does not allege that Chrysler, LLC
designed, manufactured, inspected, or tested the 2004 Sebring
that injured him in New Hampshire. And, though Chrysler, LLC
may well have sold other potentially defective 2004 Sebrings in
New Hampshire, none of those cars caused Doucet’s injury.
Chrysler, LLC’s activities with respect to the car that
allegedly injured him--including its sale in Massachusetts--
occurred outside of this forum. This does not amount to the
cause-in-fact that the law requires: that “the injury would not
18 Plaintiff’s Supp. Mem. (doc. no. 18) at 3-4.
15 have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s forum-state activity.”
Scottsdale, 887 F.3d at 21. Thus, Doucet’s claims do not “arise
out of,” and are not “related to[ ] the defendant’s in-forum
activities.” Massachusetts Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 35
(emphasis added).
There is, perhaps, something unsatisfying or
counterintuitive about the proposition that a national
corporation can manufacture products distributed in all 50
states, and products literally made to travel between those
states, cannot be held accountable in any state where its
products cause injuries without showing more. Those concerns,
however, are better and more appropriately addressed in the
purposeful availament component of the analysis. For better or
worse, the relatedness element’s requirements of both cause in
fact and legal causation mean just that. See Scottsdale, 887
F.3d at 20-21.
Again, because Doucet has not satisfied the relatedness
element, he has not carried his burden of demonstrating specific
personal jurisdiction. The court therefore need not address the
purposeful availment and reasonableness factors, or determine
whether FCA is liable as a successor to Chrysler, LLC.
16 C. Motion for jurisdictional discovery
Because the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating
personal jurisdiction, “a diligent plaintiff who sues an out-of-
state corporation and who makes out a colorable case for the
existence of in personam jurisdiction may well be entitled to a
modicum of jurisdictional discovery” in response to a motion to
dismiss on that basis. Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 626. Doucet
has moved for permission to conduct such discovery.
Specifically, he seeks discovery into matters such as “the
number of vehicles sold by the Defendant in the State of New
Hampshire, revenues generated by the sale of vehicles in the
State of New Hampshire, dealership agreements illustrating
direct, and indirect, control by the Defendant over the
dealerships located in New Hampshire, [and] monies spent by
Defendant for marketing and advertising in the State of New
Hampshire.”19
19Mot. for Jurisdictional Discovery (doc. no. 6) ¶ 8. At oral argument, Doucet also asked for production of service bulletins, to demonstrate that this court may exercise personal jurisdiction over FCA for the same reason the court exercised personal jurisdiction over the Switzerland-based defendant in D’Jamoos, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 170-72. In that case, Judge McAuliffe concluded that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant with respect to the plaintiff’s claim that it “produced, sold, and otherwise distributed deficient maintenance manuals and specifications for the inspection and maintenance” of that model of airplane, and that the procedures therein caused the crash, because that defendant distributed those manuals in New Hampshire and its co-defendant
17 Such information may be relevant to the purposeful
availment element. That analysis accounts for whether the
defendant “purposefully availed itself of ‘the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the
benefits and protections of that state's laws and making the
defendant's involuntary presence before the state's courts
foreseeable.’” Phillips, 530 F.3d at 28 (quoting Daynard v.
Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42,
61 (1st Cir. 2002)). The Supreme Court has outlined, and the
First Circuit has adopted, a “stream of commerce plus” theory to
establish those minimum contacts. Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d
1381, 1393 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Asahi Metal Industr. Co. v.
Sup. ACt. of CA., Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
Under that theory, “[t]he placement of a product into the stream
of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 112. To establish those minimum contacts, then, the
plaintiff must demonstrate some additional conduct by the
defendant directed toward the forum state. Id. Such additional
conduct that indicates a party availed itself to the forum state
may include, for example, “advertising in the forum State,
used them to inspect and service the actual airplane that crashed. Id. at 70. Doucet has brought no such claim here.
18 establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers
in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State.” Id.
The court has, however, resolved the personal jurisdiction
question on relatedness grounds. And the facts relevant to that
analysis--specifically, Chrysler, LLC’s sale of the 2004 Sebring
that allegedly injured Doucet into Massachusetts and not New
Hampshire--are undisputed. The court, therefore, denies
Doucet’s motion for jurisdictional discovery.
Conclusion
Because Doucet’s claims neither arise from nor are related
to activities in New Hampshire by the defendant or Chrysler,
LLC, the court GRANTS the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.20 And because it resolves that motion
on undisputed facts, it DENIES Doucet’s motion for
jurisdictional discovery.21 The clerk shall enter judgment
accordingly and close the case.
20 Document no. 3. 21 Document no. 6.
19 SO ORDERED.
Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge
Dated: October 5, 2018
cc: J. Kevin King, Esq. John P. Fagan, Esq. Christopher J. Hurst, Esq. Peter M. Durney, Esq.