Paul E. Allen v. Commonwealth of Virginia

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedFebruary 3, 1998
Docket0584974
StatusUnpublished

This text of Paul E. Allen v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Paul E. Allen v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paul E. Allen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, (Va. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and Bumgardner Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

PAUL E. ALLEN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0584-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA FEBRUARY 3, 1998 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY Carleton Penn, Judge Designate Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Director Capital/Appellate Services (Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Paul E. Allen (appellant) appeals his conviction for

brandishing a firearm on the basis that the court improperly

instructed the jury on the burden of proof for his claim of

self-defense. Finding no error, we affirm.

The facts which are material to the issue on appeal follow.

Paul Sweeny (Paul) held a note on appellant's house and

foreclosed on the note when appellant fell substantially behind

in the payments. Paul gave appellant notice to vacate the house,

and went to inspect the house with his brother, Charles Sweeny

(Charles), and a friend, Dale Toler, on February 8, 1996. In the

course of trying to conduct the inspection of the house,

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. appellant pulled out a handgun and pointed the gun at Paul,

Charles and Toler, and the three fled in their vehicles.

Appellant was charged with brandishing a firearm in violation of

Code § 18.2-282.

Appellant advanced a defense of self-defense at trial. He

testified that before Paul and Toler arrived at the house,

Charles approached him with a knife-like object, told him, "I'm

your worst nightmare," and threatened to mutilate him. Appellant

testified that Paul and Toler arrived at the house in a vehicle

and that he told them to leave. Appellant stated that he grabbed

a plastic toy pistol from his car and scared Paul, Charles and

Toler away with it. Appellant stated that the incident left him

"terrified." The court instructed the jury to consider the instructions

as a whole. It also instructed the jury that they should return

a verdict of not guilty unless the Commonwealth proved each

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that, "There's

no burden on the Defendant to produce any evidence." The court

also instructed the jury on the law of self-defense: If you believe from the evidence that the Defendant was without fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty and that the Defendant reasonably feared under the circumstances as they appeared to him that he was in danger of harm, then the Defendant had the right to use such force as was reasonably necessary to protect himself from threatened harm. If you further believe that the Defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to protect himself from the threatened harm, then you shall find the

2 Defendant not guilty.

Appellant asked the court to provide the following

instruction to the jury: In relying on a plea of self-defense, there is no burden upon Mr. Allen to establish such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even by the greater weight of the evidence. If after having considered all the evidence, you entertain a reasonable doubt whether or not Mr. Allen acted in self-defense, you must find him not guilty.

The court refused to give the proffered instruction. The jury

returned a verdict of guilty. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to

instruct the jury that he bore no burden to prove self-defense by

a preponderance of the evidence. "A reviewing court's

responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is 'to see that the

law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all

issues which the evidence fairly raises.'" Darnell v.

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488, 370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988)

(quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856,

858 (1982)).

Where the evidence supports the theories of both the defense

and the Commonwealth, "the trial judge is required to give

requested instructions covering both theories." Diffendal v.

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 417, 422, 382 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1989)

(citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 114, 30 S.E. 452,

454 (1898)). In accordance with this well established principle,

the trial court properly instructed the jury on appellant's

3 theory of self-defense. In asserting a defense of self-defense,

a defendant has no burden to prove self-defense beyond a

reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence.

Hale v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 808, 814, 183 S.E. 180, 183 (1936).

Rather, a defendant merely "assumes the burden of introducing

evidence of justification or excuse that raises a reasonable

doubt in the minds of the jurors." McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219

Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978). As the court instructed the jury, the jury must "consider

the instructions as a whole and in the light of the evidence

applicable to the issues presented." Rollston v. Commonwealth,

11 Va. App. 535, 541, 399 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1991). Before

instructing the jury on the law of self-defense, the court

specifically instructed the jury that, "There's no burden on the

Defendant to produce any evidence." It also instructed the jury

on the presumption of innocence and the Commonwealth's burden to

prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the

precise principle of law requested by the defendant, it properly

refused to give a second instruction on the same principle. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 263, 275, 487 S.E.2d 857, 863

(1997) (citing Cirios v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 303-04,

373 S.E.2d 164, 170 (1988)); Diffendal, 8 Va. App. at 423, 382

S.E.2d at 27 (citing Agostini v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 658, 663,

116 S.E. 384, 385 (1923)). Therefore, we affirm appellant's

4 conviction.

Affirmed.

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Related

Gregory William Wilson v. Commonwealth
487 S.E.2d 857 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1997)
Diffendal v. Commonwealth
382 S.E.2d 24 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
McGhee v. Commonwealth
248 S.E.2d 808 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1978)
Rollston v. Commonwealth
399 S.E.2d 823 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1991)
Darnell v. Commonwealth
370 S.E.2d 717 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Cirios v. Commonwealth
373 S.E.2d 164 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Swisher v. Swisher & Craun
290 S.E.2d 856 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1982)
Jackson v. Commonwealth
30 S.E. 452 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1898)
Agostini v. Commonwealth
116 S.E. 384 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1923)
Hale v. Commonwealth
183 S.E. 180 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1936)

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