Paul D.S. Edwards v. Juan Martinez, Inc., et al.; Sergion Brandon Tamez, et al. v. Paul D.S. Edwards

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

4 PAUL D.S. EDWARDS, Case No. 2:20-cv-00570-ART-MDC

5 Plaintiff, v. ORDER 6 JUAN MARTINEZ, INC., et al., 7 Defendants. 8

9 SERGION BRANDON TAMEZ, et al.,

10 Counter Claimants, v. 11 PAUL D.S. EDWARDS, 12 Counter Defendant. 13 14 This case involves claims brought by Plaintiff Paul D.S. Edwards against 15 Defendants, a real estate company and related individuals, involving unsolicited 16 telemarketing calls. Before the Court are the parties’ respective motions in limine: 17 Defendants and Counterclaimants Juan Martinez, Inc. d/b/a Century 21 18 Americana (“Century 21”) and Sergio Tamez’s (collectively the “Century 21 19 Defendants”) omnibus motion in limine (ECF No. 207), and Plaintiff/Counter- 20 Defendant Paul D.S. Edwards’s motion in limine. (ECF No. 206.) Also before the 21 Court is Mr. Edwards’s oral motion for a bench trial. (ECF No. 213.) For the 22 reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Century 21 23 Defendants’ Omnibus Motion in Limine and Mr. Edwards’s Motion in Limine and 24 denies Mr. Edward’s oral Motion to Waive Jury Trial. 25 26 27 28 1 I. DISCUSSION 2 A. Remaining Claims 3 Decisions from this Court have narrowed the claims remaining for trial to 4 the following: (1) violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA); (2) 5 violation of NRS 598.0918, which prohibits repeated solicitation that is 6 “annoying, abusive or harassing.” (ECF No. 179 at 1–2.) Mr. Edwards additionally 7 seeks to prove violations of NRS 599B.300 and 598.0977, which provide for the 8 collection of damages predicated on “deceptive trade practice[s]” and “unlawful 9 solicitation by telephone.” (Id.) 10 Century 21 Defendants also have a remaining counterclaim. The Court 11 previously granted summary judgment on Century 21 Defendants’ wiretapping 12 counterclaim under NRS 200.620. (ECF No. 104 at 11–12.) Only damages remain 13 to be decided at trial. 14 The Court previously held that, to prevail on his 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) claim, 15 Mr. Edwards must prove that the Century 21 Defendants called him using an 16 automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice without 17 his prior consent. (ECF No. 104 at 3–4.) At oral argument, Century 21 Defendants 18 contended that the recent Supreme Court case, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 19 U.S. 395 (2021) establishes that their dialing system does not qualify as an 20 “automatic telephone dialing system” under the TCPA. Mr. Edwards agreed that 21 Century 21 Defendants did not use an automatic dialing system and has not 22 alleged the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice. Thus, while Mr. Edwards has 23 conceded that he cannot prove the elements required for a 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) 24 claim, he may proceed on his claim under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 25 26 27 28 1 B. Century 21 Defendants’ Motion in Limine 2 1. Previous Settlement Offers/Agreements 3 Century 21 Defendants’ motion in limine seeks to exclude evidence of any 4 previous settlement offers or settlement agreements,1 arguing that such evidence 5 is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 408, because Mr. Edwards is attempting to 6 use it to establish liability. (ECF No. 207.) In response, Mr. Edwards contends 7 that using the settlement documents to prove that Century 21 Defendants were 8 “aware of Plaintiff, the TCPA, and those Rules and Regulations associated with 9 the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act]” constitutes an exception to Fed R. Evid. 10 408. (ECF No. 211 at 6–8.) While Mr. Edwards can present or elicit other evidence 11 showing that the Century 21 Defendants knew him and knowingly violated the 12 TCPA, he cannot rely on settlement documents to establish those facts. 13 Fed. R. Evid. 408 prohibits the use of settlement documents to “prove or 14 disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.” FED. R. EVID. 408. The Court, 15 however, “may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a 16 witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an 17 effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” Id. 18 Mr. Edwards has not demonstrated that his proposed use of the settlement 19 documents falls within a recognized exception to Fed. R. Evid. 408. Moreover, Mr. 20 Edwards conceded at oral argument that he seeks to use the settlement 21 documents to establish that Century 21 Defendants called him knowingly or 22 willfully, which goes to the validity of his claims. The Court thus finds that the 23 documents are being offered to prove the validity of a disputed claim, and grants 24 Century 21 Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of previous settlement offers 25 and agreements. 26

27 1 This includes a January 4, 2016, Settlement Demand Letter, a Settlement Agreement between Century 21 and Mr. Edwards, and a March 27, 2019, 28 Settlement Demand Letter. (ECF No. 207.) 1 2. Telephone Logs 2 Century 21 Defendants’ motion in limine next moves to exclude Mr. 3 Edwards’s Cox Communications telephone records and Verizon telephone log as 4 unauthenticated hearsay. (ECF No. 207 at 8–12, 19–22.) Mr. Edwards responds 5 that these records fall under the business records exception to hearsay, and he 6 can authenticate these records as a witness with knowledge. (ECF No. 211 at 9– 7 12, 23–25.) 8 Hearsay is a statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 9 asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Under 803(6), business records are admissible if: 10 (1) “the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted 11 by, someone with knowledge;” (2) “the record was kept in the course of a regularly 12 conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling;” and (3) 13 “making the record was a regular practice of that activity.” FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 14 To authenticate business records, the conditions set out in Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) 15 must be “shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, 16 or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12).” Id. 17 These call logs, which are habitually downloaded and kept by Mr. Edwards 18 over the last decade, as a regularly conducted activity, are a business record of 19 Mr. Edwards, and thus fall under the business records exception to hearsay. 20 (ECF No. 211 at 9–12, 23–25.) Because these records set forth the phone calls 21 that Mr. Edwards has received, he can adequately authenticate that the call logs 22 are made as business records by him. (Id.) However, Mr. Edwards has not 23 established that the call logs have been authenticated by Cox Communications 24 or Verizon, and so should not assert as much at trial. (Id.) The Court thus denies 25 Century 21 Defendants’ motion to exclude Mr. Edwards’s Cox Communication 26 and Verizon phone logs. 27 28 1 3. Automatic Telephone Dialing System, Service Agreement, 2 Former Website, and Telemarketing Scripts 3 Century Defendants’ motion in limine seeks to exclude several pieces of 4 evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, including: (1) testimony or evidence 5 that Mr. Tamez used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”); (2) the 6 service and use agreement between Juan Martinez and Redx, LLC. (“Service 7 Agreement”); (3) Juan Martinez’s former website; and (4) Century 21 Americana’s 8 Script Book (“Script Book”). 9 Fed. R. Evid. 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any 10 tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 11 evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. 12 EVID. 401. Fed. R. Evid. 403 states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence 13 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of 14 the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 15 delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 16 403. 17 Both parties concede that Mr. Edwards is not asserting an ATDS claim, 18 and Mr. Edwards contends that he is not seeking to introduce evidence of the 19 “technical or legal aspects of an ATDS, or the law associated with the use of an 20 ATDS.” (ECF Nos. 207 at 13; 211 at 215.) Instead, Mr. Edwards argues that he 21 wants to introduce information regarding autodialing to explain how the calls 22 were made. (ECF No. 207 at 15.) At oral argument, Century 21 Defendants did 23 not oppose Mr. Edwards discussing or asking foundational questions about 24 autodialing to explain the process of making the call. The Court thus finds that 25 Mr. Edwards’s evidence that Century 21 Defendants used an autodialer is 26 relevant and not prejudicial and denies Century 21 Defendants motion to exclude 27 evidence regarding autodialing. 28 Century 21 Defendants argue that the Service Agreement is not relevant 1 because it “does not establish whether Century 21 [D]efendants called Mr. 2 Edwards or not.” (ECF No. 207 at 23.) In response, Mr. Edwards argues that the 3 Service Agreement is manifestly relevant because it includes an agreement for 4 Century 21 Defendants to comply with state and federal laws. (ECF No. 211 at 5 26.) This agreement, according to Mr. Edwards, evidences their knowledge of the 6 TCPA and related rules and regulations. (Id.) The Court agrees and finds that the 7 Service Agreement is relevant. Century 21 Defendants also attempt to exclude 8 the Service Agreement under Fed. R. Evid. 403, but offer only a vague and 9 conclusory argument on that point. (ECF N0. 207 at 24.) The Court thus denies 10 Century 21 Defendants’ motion to exclude the Service Agreement. 11 Century 21 Defendants next move to preclude use of Juan Martinez’s 12 former website, which displays staff information for Century 21 Americana. (ECF 13 No. 207 at 24–25.) Mr. Edwards argues that the website demonstrates that 14 Century 21 Defendants had knowledge of the TCPA because it represents that 15 Elizabeth Martinez, co-owner and operation director of Century 21 Americana, 16 hosted weekly compliance training sessions. (ECF No. 211 at 27–28.) The Court 17 agrees that this information is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and thus denies 18 Century 21 Defendants’ motion to preclude use of the Juan Martinez’s former 19 website. 20 Century 21 Defendants last argue that use of Century 21 Americana’s 21 telemarketing script book (“Script Book”) must be precluded because the Script 22 Book cannot show that a violation of the TCPA claim occurred. (ECF No. 207 at 23 25–28.) Century 21 Defendants additionally argue for the Script Book’s exclusion 24 because it will “confuse the issues and mislead the jury by shifting the focus from 25 the actual elements of a TCPA violation to the internal training materials of the 26 Century 21 [D]efendants.” (Id. at 28.) Mr. Edwards responds that the Script Book 27 is relevant and probative for his state law claims. (ECF No. 211 at 28–29.) The 28 Court agrees, as NRS 598.0918(2) defines the various ways that a telephone 1 solicitation may constitute a deceptive trade practice, and the Script Book can 2 show whether Century 21 Defendants engaged in such deceptive trade practices. 3 See NRS 598.0918(2). Century 21 Defendants’ motion to preclude use of the 4 Script Book is therefore denied. 5 4. Opinions on TCPA 6 Century 21 Defendants next move to preclude Mr. Edwards from offering 7 an opinion on the TCPA, including what it allows or prohibits. (ECF No. 207 at 8 15–17.) In response, Mr. Edwards seems to argue that he is an expert witness, or 9 in the alternative, that he can offer opinions about the TCPA as a lay witness. 10 (ECF No. 211 at 16–19.) 11 Fed. R. Evid. 701 provides that: 12 [i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an 13 opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s 14 perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or 15 to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or 16 other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 17 FED. R. EVID. 701. 18 Because Mr. Edwards has not disclosed himself as an expert witness under 19 Fed. R. Evid. 702 as required by Fed. R. Civ. P 26(a)(2), he cannot present expert 20 opinions at trial through his own testimony. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2). Mr. Edwards 21 also is precluded from testifying about the TCPA as a lay witness under Fed. R. 22 Evid. 701 because such testimony would be based on specialized or technical 23 knowledge. 24 While the Court will not admit evidence or testimony regarding the meaning 25 of the TCPA, the parties are free to argue about how the TCPA applies to the facts, 26 which the jury will decide. Regarding the applicable law, the Court’s instructions 27 to the jury will control. The Court thus grants Century 21 Defendants’ motion to 28 exclude Mr. Edwards’s testimony regarding the TCPA but allows Mr. Edwards to 1 make arguments concerning the TCPA. 2 5. Article III Standing 3 Century 21 Defendants argue that Mr. Edwards should be precluded from 4 rearguing whether Century 21 Defendants have Article III standing for his 5 wiretapping counterclaim. (ECF No. 207 at 17–18.) In response, Mr. Edwards 6 again argues that Century 21 Defendants lack standing. (ECF No. 211 at 20–22.) 7 Having previously ruled on this issue, the Court declines to revisit it. (See ECF 8 Nos. 147, 179.) 9 “The law of the case doctrine generally prohibits a court from considering 10 an issue that has already been decided by that same court or a higher court in 11 the same case.” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2016). The doctrine 12 applies when the issue in question was “‘decided explicitly or by necessary 13 implication in [the] previous disposition.’” Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. 14 of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 15 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1982)). 16 Here, the issue of whether Century 21 Defendants have standing to pursue 17 the wiretapping counterclaim was previously adjudicated by this Court. (See ECF 18 Nos. 147, 179.) The Court found that Mr. Tamez experienced an injury that was 19 both concrete and particularized because Mr. Edwards’s surreptitious recording 20 of his phone call invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy. (ECF No. 147 at 21 8.) The Court is therefore foreclosed from re-considering the issue of Century 21 22 Defendants’ standing to bring a wiretapping claim under the law of the case 23 doctrine. Century 21 Defendants’ motion to preclude Mr. Edwards from rearguing 24 Article III standing is granted. 25 26 27 28 1 C. Paul D.S. Edwards’s Motion in Limine 2 1. Motions to Exclude and/or Preclude Evidence 3 a. Century 21 Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses 4 Request 12 seeks to preclude Century 21 Defendants from asserting any 5 affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 206 at 5–7.) In response, Century 21 Defendants 6 contend that affirmative defenses contained in the joint pretrial order may be 7 included at trial. (ECF No. 210 at 4–6.) 8 The Court agrees that Century 21 Defendants may present affirmative 9 defenses that are legitimately included in the joint pretrial order. See In re Hunt, 10 238 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a pretrial order amends the 11 pleadings); 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 871 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 12 an affirmative defense was not waived despite it being omitted from the pleadings, 13 because it was included in the pretrial order). Century 21 Defendants clearly 14 include the independent contractor doctrine and the Telemarketing Safe Harbor 15 Rule in the joint pretrial order. (ECF No. 202 at 19.) The Court thus denies Mr. 16 Edwards’s motion as to those affirmative defenses. 17 Century 21 Defendants, however, do not clearly identify any additional 18 affirmative defenses in the joint pretrial order, so the Court will grant Mr. 19 Edwards’s motion as to any other affirmative defenses. 20 b. Mr. Edwards’s Previous and Current Litigation, 21 Settlements, Claims, and Financial Condition 22 Requests 2–9 and 12–14 argue that evidence regarding Mr. Edward’s legal 23 activities outside of this case, his financial condition, and reasons for bringing 24 this lawsuit are irrelevant to the current litigation and prejudicial to Mr. Edwards. 25 (ECF No. 206 at 6–13, 15–17.) The Court agrees that such evidence has minimal 26 relevance to the instant litigation, and instead seems to revive Century 21 27 2 Mr. Edwards’s motion in limine numbers each request, and the Court will refer 28 to the requests by their assigned numbers. (Id.) 1 Defendants’ previously dismissed abuse of process counterclaim. (See ECF No. 2 179 at 3–5.) The Court also finds that any probative value of this evidence is 3 “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” as it would take the 4 focus away from the instant litigation. FED. R. EVID. 403. These requests, however, 5 are exceedingly broad. Because Mr. Edwards has not provided sufficient 6 specificity as to the evidence he seeks to deem inadmissible via these arguments, 7 the Court will defer ruling on this matter until specific evidence or testimony is 8 presented. 9 c. Damages Evidence 10 Request 10 contains a vague argument to preclude Century 21 Defendants 11 from presenting evidence, arguments, and testimony regarding “any amount of 12 statutory damages, actual damages, punitive damages, exemplary damages, and 13 settlement offers, and if Plaintiff suffered actual damages.” (ECF No. 206 at 13.) 14 Evidence of damages is relevant to this trial, as evidenced by the amended joint 15 pretrial order (ECF No. 202), so the Court denies this motion. Because evidence 16 of settlement offers, however, is prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. 408, the Court will 17 grant Mr. Edwards’s motion as to settlement offers. 18 d. Number of Telephone Calls 19 Mr. Edward’s eleventh request seeks to exclude statements or suggestions 20 that Mr. Tamez only made two calls to Mr. Edwards. (ECF No. 206 at 14.) In 21 response, Century 21 Defendants argue that the number of calls is “one of the 22 primary issues identified in the joint pretrial order” making it patently relevant 23 and admissible. (ECF No. 210 at 7–8.) The Court agrees and holds that because 24 Mr. Edwards has not made any argument as to how this evidence is inadmissible, 25 his motion to exclude such evidence is denied. 26 27 28 1 e. Evidence Not Based on Personal Knowledge 2 Mr. Edwards, in Request 27, seeks to generally preclude Century 21 3 Defendants, witnesses, and Century 21 Defendants’ attorneys from introducing 4 any evidence that is not based on a witness’s personal knowledge. (ECF No. 206 5 at 28.) Century 21 Defendants do not oppose this request and have confirmed 6 that they will not attempt to call any undisclosed witness, introduce undisclosed 7 evidence, or elicit testimony outside of Fed. R. Evid. 602’s personal knowledge 8 requirement. (ECF No. 210 at 4.) The Court thus grants Mr. Edwards’s motion on 9 this point. 10 2. Motions to Include Evidence 11 a. All Exhibits 12 Request 15 asserts that 57 exhibits should be admitted. (ECF No. 206 at 13 17–18.) This contention is accompanied by only a bare citation to Fed. R. Evid. 14 401. (Id.) Mr. Edwards does not specifically address any of the pieces of evidence 15 other than Exhibits 49–57. (Id.) As explained below, the Court denies Mr. 16 Edwards’s motion to include Exhibits 49–57. 17 As of the date of this order, the parties have shared their exhibits with each 18 other. (See ECF No. 205.) Provided that each exhibit is relevant, these exhibits 19 will be admitted for trial absent a specific objection regarding their admissibility. 20 b. NRS 200.620 and 200.650 21 Requests 15, 22, and 283 all pertain to Mr. Edwards’s argument that NRS 22 200.650, not NRS 200.620 is the law governing the wiretapping counterclaim. 23 (ECF No. 206 at 17–18, 23–24, 28–30.) The Nevada Supreme Court explicitly held 24 that NRS 200.620 prohibits the recording of telephone calls unless both parties 25 consent to the recording. Ditech Fin. LLC v. Buckles, 401 P.3d 215, 217 (Nev. 26 2017). NRS 200.650, on the other hand, prohibits “surreptitious intrusion upon 27 3 Two separate requests are numbered 27 in Mr. Edwards’s Motion in Limine, so 28 the Court refers to the second request as Request 28. (ECF No. 28.) 1 in-person, private conversations by means of any listening device.” Lane v. 2 Allstate Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940 (Nev. 1998). 3 Additionally, the Court already determined in its summary judgment order 4 that NRS 200.620 governs the wiretapping counterclaim, and that Mr. Edwards 5 violated the law “by secretly recording his telephone calls with [Mr.] Tamez.” (ECF 6 No. 104 at 11.) The Court thus denies Requests 22 and 28, finding that the law 7 of the case as to NRS 200.620 and 200.650 was previously established. The Court 8 also denies Mr. Edwards’s fifteenth request to the extent it attempts to introduce 9 Exhibits 49–57, which pertain to his NRS 200.620 and 200.650 arguments. 10 c. Calling Methods, Programs, and Training 11 Requests 16–19 move to introduce questions about the methods and 12 programs used to make the phone calls at issue, as well as the training of Century 13 21 Defendants and their Realtor/Realtor associates on the methods and 14 programs. (ECF No. 206 at 18–21.) Mr. Edwards has demonstrated that evidence 15 about these methods, programs, and training would be relevant, and therefore 16 admissible. (Id.) Mr. Edwards also moves to include questions about the Script 17 Book and the Service Agreement in Requests 20–21. (Id. at 21–23.) Above, the 18 Court found that the Script Book and Service Agreement are admissible. 19 Mr. Edwards, however, generally seeks to include questions about this 20 evidence. (Id. at 18–23.) The Court will defer ruling on whether these questions 21 are permissible until presented with specific questions or testimony. 22 d. Previous Interaction 23 Request 23 seeks to introduce evidence about a previous interaction, from 24 2015–16, between Mr. Edwards and Century 21 Defendants. (ECF No. 206 at 24.) 25 Century 21 Defendants argue that Mr. Edwards is attempting to “introduce 26 evidence concerning a previous settlement that Century 21 [Defendants] paid to 27 Mr. Edwards for an alleged prior TCPA violation” in a different case. (ECF No. 210 28 at 11–12.) Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 408, the Court will not admit “conduct or [] 1 statement[s] made during compromise negotiations about [a] claim.” FED. R. EVID. 2 408. However, because it is unclear whether the previous interaction involves a 3 settlement agreement or offer, the Court will defer ruling on this request at this 4 juncture. 5 e. Call Logs 6 In Requests 24–26, Mr. Edwards seeks to include his personal telephone 7 log, as well as telephone logs from Cox Communications and Verizon. (ECF No. 8 206 at 25–28.) As explained above, Mr. Edwards can introduce those logs as 9 evidence of his own records. The Court, however, will constrain Mr. Edwards from 10 asserting that these logs represent the business records of Cox Communications 11 or Verizon unless further authentication is presented. 12 II. Mr. Edwards’s Motion to Waive Jury Trial 13 By oral motion, Mr. Edwards seeks to withdraw his demand for a jury trial 14 and instead proceed with a bench trial. (ECF No. 213.) In the alternative, he 15 contends that Century 21 Defendants are not entitled to a jury trial for their 16 wiretapping counterclaim because they failed to properly demand one. (ECF No. 17 214.) Century 21 Defendants argue that once a proper demand for a jury trial is 18 made, it may only be withdrawn if all parties consent. (ECF No. 212.) 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 “has been interpreted as incorporating a right of 20 reasonable reliance on the jury demand of another party.” California Scents v. 21 Surco Prods., Inc., 406 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “Thus, 22 ‘once one party files such a [jury] demand other parties are entitled to rely on that 23 demand for the issues it covers, and need not file their own demands.’” Id. 24 (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1531 (9th Cir. 1995)). “A proper 25 demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d). When 26 counterclaims “embrace[] the same ‘issues’” as a complaint, a counterclaimant 27 can reasonably rely on the plaintiff’s jury demand and is “not required to make 28 its own jury demand.” California Scents, 406 F.3d at 1108. 1 Here, Century 21 Defendants do not consent to the withdrawal of the jury 2 || trial demand as to Mr. Edwards’s claims. (ECF No. 212.) Thus, it cannot be 3 || withdrawn. The Court therefore denies Mr. Edward’s motion for a bench trial on 4 || his claims. 5 When Century 21 Defendants filed the counterclaim, Mr. Edwards had an 6 || active, general jury demand. (See ECF No. 1-5.) Additionally, Century 21 7 || Defendants’ wiretapping counterclaim and Mr. Edwards’s TCPA and state law 8 || claims are based on the same phone calls. Because there is a “substantial factual 9 || overlap underpinning the parties’ respective claims,” the Court concludes that 10 || the claims and counterclaims are “directed .. . to the same issues.” California 11 || Scents, 406 F.3d at 1109. The Court thus finds that Century 21 Defendants’ 12 || reliance on Mr. Edwards’s jury demand, to preserve their own right to a jury trial 13 |} on the counterclaim, was reasonable. Century 21 Defendants are therefore 14 || entitled to a jury trial on the wiretapping counterclaim. 15 || II. CONCLUSION 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Century 21 Defendants’ Omnibus 17 || Motion in Limine (ECF No. 207) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in 18 || accordance with this order. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Edwards’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 20 || 206) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in accordance with this order. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Edwards’s Motion to Waive Jury Trial 22 || is DENIED. (ECF No. 213.) 23 24 DATED THIS 28th day of January 2026. 25 26 Aras jlosect en 27 ANNER.TRAUM 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE