Paul Derwood Rutterbush v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Paul Derwood Rutterbush v. United States

377 F.2d 539, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6362

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 16, 1967

Docket21452

StatusPublished

This text of 377 F.2d 539 (Paul Derwood Rutterbush v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Paul Derwood Rutterbush v. United States, 377 F.2d 539, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6362 (9th Cir. 1967).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The thrust of Rutterbush’s appeal is that during the jury trial on a Dyer Act (18 U.S.C. § 2312) charge, prejudicial questions were asked by the trial judge.

The judge, with rather natural questions, did get into an area that had been stipulated out of the case. Counsel certainly could have approached the bench with his opponent and held a quiet colloquy with the judge. Also, a special instruction could have been requested. Neither was done.

Appellant suggests the judge became an advocate. The record contradicts this. The trial was eminently fair.

Counsel for appellant has done as best he could with very little to go on. He is not to be censured. Oft-times in criminal appeals counsel is required to attempt to jump over an eight foot high bar from a standing start.

The judgment is affirmed.

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