Paul Christopher Watkins v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

2021 Ark. App. 55

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: February 10, 2021
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 55 Elizabeth Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document DIVISION I 2023.06.22 12:54:44 -05'00' No. CV-20-563 2023.001.20174 Opinion Delivered: February 10, 2021 PAUL CHRISTOPHER WATKINS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GREENE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 28JV-19-43] V. HONORABLE BARBARA HALSEY, JUDGE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR AFFIRMED CHILD APPELLEES

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Paul Christopher Watkins appeals the July 1, 2020 order of the Greene County

Circuit Court terminating his parental rights to his daughter, A.W. (DOB: 3/3/19). On

appeal, Watkins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the statutory grounds

for termination. Watkins does not challenge the circuit court’s best-interest finding and

therefore waives any argument regarding this finding on appeal. For the following reasons,

we affirm the circuit court’s decision based on the aggravated-circumstances ground for

termination.

On March 19, 2019, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised

emergency custody of A.W. due to medical and environmental neglect. Specifically, A.W.

resided in a home with her parents, Watkins and Simplicity Fernaays, that was filled with trash, mice, and dog feces and that did not have furniture, heat, or running water.

Additionally, A.W. was born with several medical issues, including an imperforated anus,

and her parents demonstrated an incapacity to care for her multiple complex medical issues.

On March 20, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect

for A.W. In the style of the petition, DHS listed only Simplicity Fernaays as a parent of

A.W. Because Watkins was not married to Fernaays at the time of A.W.’s birth, DHS did

not include him in the style of the case and listed him only as the putative father in the

affidavit and body of the petition. On March 22, the circuit court entered an ex parte order

for emergency custody of A.W.

On March 28, the circuit court held a probable-cause hearing and found that

probable cause existed at the time of removal and continued to exist so that it was necessary

for the emergency order to remain in place. Additionally, the circuit court ordered the

parents to comply with the case plan and court orders, to obtain and maintain stable housing

with utilities, to allow DHS into their home for home visits, and to maintain contact with

DHS.

On April 22, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing. At the hearing, the circuit

court adjudicated A.W. dependent-neglected on the basis of environmental neglect, which

had since been remedied by the parents. Nevertheless, the circuit court found that A.W.

could not be returned to her parents because the parents required additional training from

Le Bonheur Children’s Hospital for A.W.’s special medical conditions, which included

issues related to A.W.’s imperforated anus. Additionally, the circuit court set a goal of

reunification for the case and ordered that Le Bonheur provide a “clearance letter” reflecting

2 the parents’ completion of medical training for A.W.’s complex medical issues. Further, the

circuit court ordered that future visits occur in the parents’ home unless there were

environmental concerns.

On September 24, DHS filed an amended petition for emergency custody and

dependency-neglect to reflect that Watkins had been added to the case style as a parent of

A.W. On September 27, the circuit court held a review hearing and included Watkins in

the case style as a parent of A.W. On the stipulation of the parties, the circuit court found

the parents in compliance with the case plan and court orders. But the circuit court also

found the parents still had ongoing issues with their personal hygiene, income, and ability

to care for A.W.’s special medical needs. The circuit court additionally noted that Le

Bonheur declined to issue the previously ordered “clearance letter,” and as a result, the

circuit court ordered DHS and the parents to seek this letter elsewhere. The circuit court

ordered that the goal of the case would remain reunification.

On March 3, 2020, DHS filed a petition to terminate Watkins’s and Fernaays’s

parental rights. On April 14, due to the COVID-pandemic, the circuit court entered an

order continuing the termination hearing to June 22, 2020. Additionally, the circuit court

noted that it had previously found Watkins to be a parent in this case and appointed him

parent counsel for the termination hearing. On June 22, the circuit court entered an order

terminating both Watkins’s and Fernaays’s parental rights on the grounds of “failure to

remedy” pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp.

2019); “subsequent factors” pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-

3 341(b)(3)(B)(vii); and “aggravated circumstances” pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–(B)(i). Watkins now appeals the termination order. 1

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Bunch v. Ark. Dep’t of

Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 374, 523 S.W.3d 913. At least one statutory ground must

exist, in addition to a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights;

these must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3).

Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a

firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Bunch, supra.

A heavy burden is placed on a party seeking termination because termination of

parental rights is an extreme remedy in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Id.

We will not reverse a termination order unless the circuit court’s findings were clearly

erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it,

the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made. Id.

A court may order termination of parental rights if it finds clear and convincing

evidence to support one or more statutory grounds listed in the Juvenile Code, Arkansas

Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B), and that termination is in the best interest of

the child, taking into consideration the likelihood of adoption and the potential harm to

the health and safety of the child that would be caused by returning him or her to the

custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). Proof of only one statutory

1 Simplicity Fernaays’s rights were also terminated, but she did not appeal the termination decision and therefore is not a party to this appeal.

4 ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. Contreras v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015

Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510.

As noted previously, Watkins challenges all three statutory grounds for termination

but declines to challenge the circuit court’s best-interest finding. See, e.g., Dye v. Ark. Dep’t

of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 10, at 9, 592 S.W.3d 254, 259 (“Miranda does not

challenge the circuit court’s best-interest factors—adoptability and potential harm; thus, this

court must affirm these findings”). As such, we affirm the best-interest findings, and we also

hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Watkins had subjected A.W. to

aggravated circumstances, meaning that there is little likelihood that services to the family

will result in successful reunification. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–

(B)(i). Because we conclude that DHS adequately proved aggravated circumstances, we need

not discuss the remaining grounds found by the circuit court.

A.W. was removed on March 19, 2019, and throughout the entirety of the case,

DHS offered multiple services to achieve the goal of reunification such as visitation, home

visits, transportation, parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, purchase of cleaning

supplies, and hands-on training to assist the parents with A.W.’s specific medical needs.

Despite all efforts, the evidence demonstrated that there was little likelihood that further

services would result in a successful reunification with Watkins.

Specifically, at the termination hearing, A.W.’s doctor, Dr. Vern Ann Shotts, testified

that A.W. is one of the most complex patients she had cared for in her forty-one years of

practice and that A.W. has the following medical conditions: an imperforated anus,

rectovaginal fistula, persistent cloaca, hydronephrosis, abnormal middle vertebrae, an

5 abnormal number of ribs, a chromosome variant abnormality, and heart problems. Dr.

Shotts also testified that A.W. was born with two vaginas with a rectum in between; that

A.W. had colostomy surgery; that A.W. would need to see medical specialists for the rest

of her life; and that all of A.W.’s medical conditions required daily monitoring as well as

proper caretaker hygiene and training. Dr. Shotts further testified that A.W.’s parents are

cognitively slow, failed to grasp the severity of A.W.’s medical conditions, and appeared

unable to care for A.W. during her doctor’s visits. Therefore, it was Dr. Shotts’s opinion

that neither parent would be able to properly care for A.W.

Jenny Sims, the DHS caseworker assigned to the case, and Christina Jankoviak, the

Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) worker assigned to the case, both testified at

the hearing and agreed with Dr. Shotts’s assessment of the parents’ capabilities. Specifically,

Sims and Jankoviak testified that despite an enormous amount of assistance throughout the

thirteen-month-long case, both parents continued to demonstrate the inability to assist with

A.W.’s complex medical needs as well as the inability to complete basic parenting tasks, such

as changing diapers, making bottles, changing outfits, and holding and bathing A.W.

Sims and Jankoviak also testified that throughout the case, the parents failed to

consistently provide a clean and safe living environment for A.W. and failed to maintain

appropriate personal hygiene—both of which were essential to ensuring the cleanliness of

A.W.’s stoma site. Sims testified that during one visit with A.W., she noticed the parents

feeding A.W. with a bottle that contained floating particles of tobacco. Additionally, both

Sims and Jankoviak testified that A.W. could not be reunited with the parents because they

6 had allowed Watkins’s sister to move in with them, and Watkins admitted that his sister had

sexually abused him as a child and has a history of drug abuse.

Chelsea Spencer, the parent educator assigned to the case, also testified at the

termination hearing. Spencer provided hands-on parenting-skills training to the parents.

Spencer testified that since August 6, 2019, she had twenty face-to-face visits and five Zoom

visits with the parents and that during these visits, she taught the parents skills such as

soothing and calming techniques, diaper changing, and feeding. Spencer further stated that

during her time as the parents’ educator, Watkins demonstrated improvement in parenting

skills. Nonetheless, like the other witnesses, Spencer stated Watkins’s improvements were

inconsistent and that she continued to have concerns with the parents’ long-term ability to

care for A.W.

On appeal, Watkins cites Yarborough v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 96 Ark.

App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006), and argues that the circuit court made a “mere

prediction” regarding whether further reunification services would result in a successful

reunification. Watkins contends that the circuit court’s finding was a “mere prediction”

because he testified that he was ready to have A.W. returned to his custody, which

demonstrates that reunification was possible. Watkins also claims that the circuit court’s

finding was a “mere prediction” because he was employed during the case, and he

introduced pictures that showed he remedied the environmental issues in his home. Watkins

further argues that it was unfair for the circuit court to consider the adverse witnesses’

testimony because some of the witnesses only observed Watkins’s parenting skills in an

“unnatural parenting environment” outside the family home.

7 We do not find Watkins’s arguments persuasive, and we agree with DHS’s position

that his appellate arguments are nothing more than a request for our court to reweigh the

evidence on appeal, which we will not do. Further, Watkins fails to cite any legal authority

to support these arguments. E.g., Peterson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 75,

at 14, 595 S.W.3d 38, 46 (“Rachel essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence, which

we will not do.”); Davis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 406, at 14, 587

S.W.3d 577, 585 (“Although Deana argues that the circuit court clearly erred because the

children were bonded to her and expressed a desire to go home, she cites no legal authority

to demonstrate that these facts, even if true, would support reversal.”).

As DHS argues, the state of Watkins’s home was actually the reason that the visits

occurred in an “unnatural parenting environment.” Specifically, at the adjudication hearing,

the circuit court ordered that visits occur in the parents’ home unless it was environmentally

unsound, and Sims testified that at almost every home visit, she observed roaches, urine

around the toilet seats, and sharp food cans strewn about the house. Thus, there is no merit

to Watkins’s argument that supervised visits in an “unnatural” setting caused him too much

stress to demonstrate his ability to care for his child’s medical needs.

Our court has affirmed termination under the aggravated-circumstances ground

when the parents have demonstrated an inability to care for their child’s special needs despite

complying with case-plan services. See Allen v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App.

136, at 16–19, 540 S.W.3d 742, 751–53. Such is the case here. Furthermore, both Spencer

and Sims testified that there were no other services they could provide to achieve

reunification with Watkins, and we have consistently held that such testimony supports an

8 aggravated-circumstances finding. See Reyes-Ramos v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark.

App. 46, at 11–12, 571 S.W.3d 32, 39 (affirming termination under the aggravated-

circumstances ground based, in part, on the caseworker’s testimony that there were no

further services that DHS could offer to reunify appellant with her children).

The circuit court’s finding that aggravated circumstances existed to support

terminating Watkins’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Tabitha McNulty, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Ellen K. Howard, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Kimberly Boling Bibb, attorney ad litem for minor child.