Paul Carter v. Rhonda Carter

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0996
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 17, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0996-MR

PAUL CARTER APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-00343

RHONDA CARTER APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Paul Carter (“Paul”) appeals from the McCracken Family

Court’s decision calculating his temporary maintenance arrearage and declining his

motion to order his ex-wife, Rhonda Carter (“Rhonda”), to reimburse him for

personal property items which Paul alleges he was unable to retrieve from the

former marital home. We affirm.

Rhonda did not submit an appellee brief and Paul’s brief does not

substantially comply with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”). Therefore, before we may relate the case’s underlying facts and procedural history

and attempt to analyze the issues, we must first resolve what sanctions should be

imposed upon the parties.

RAP 31(H)(3) provides that “[i]f the appellee’s brief has not been

filed within the time allowed, the court may: (a) accept the appellant’s statement

of the facts and issues as correct; (b) reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief

reasonably appears to sustain such action; or (c) regard the appellee’s failure as a

confession of error and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the

case.” We also have the discretion to decline to exercise any of those options. See,

e.g., F.E. v. E.B., 641 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Ky. App. 2022).1 We decline to exercise

any of the RAP 31(H)(3) options under these circumstances.

Likewise, we leniently decline to strike Paul’s brief despite its

substantial failure to comply with RAP briefing rules. In truncated form, Paul’s

brief contains the following deficiencies:

• Paul provides only one citation to the written record in his entire brief,

and none to the video record of proceedings. See RAP 32(A)(3)-(4)

(requiring the statement of the case and argument sections of an

1 F.E. was decided under the former version of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 76.12. However, the relevant portion of CR 76.12 was superseded by the functionally identical provisions of RAP 31(H) on January 1, 2023.

-2- appellant’s opening brief to each contain “ample” references to the

record);

• Paul provides only one citation to authority, and that is a citation to an

unpublished decision which is not set forth in the proper citation

format. See RAP 41(A) (explaining the limited circumstances in

which a party may cite unpublished authority, which is “disfavored”);

RAP 41(C)(1) (providing the proper format for citing to unpublished

opinions); RAP 32(A)(4) (requiring the argument section of an

appellant’s opening brief to contain “citations of authority pertinent to

each issue of law”);

• Paul’s index does not state where the items in his appendix may be

located in the record. See RAP 32(E)(1)(d) (providing that “[t]he first

item of the appendix shall be a listing or index of all documents

included in the appendix. The index shall set forth where each

document may be found in the record.”);

• Paul has not provided preservation statements for either of his

arguments. See RAP 32(A)(4) (providing that the argument section of

an appellant’s opening brief “shall contain at the beginning of the

argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether

-3- the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what

manner.”).

Frankly, “[w]e expect a greater degree of competency from appellate

advocates than has been shown in this case.” Hamburger v. Plemmons, 654

S.W.3d 99, 102 (Ky. App. 2022). A cursory Westlaw review showed that Paul’s

counsel has at least once before submitted a brief which lacked preservation

statements. Howard v. Walls, No. 2011-CA-001466-ME, 2012 WL 1886791, at *2

(Ky. App. May 25, 2012) (unpublished). We implore Paul’s counsel to scrutinize

RAP and the briefing aids available for free on our website, such as the basic

appellate handbook. See https://www.kycourts.gov/Courts/Court-of-

Appeals/Documents/P56BasicAppellatePracticeHandbook.pdf (last visited

September 17, 2025).

It is beyond reasonable doubt that Paul’s brief does not comply

substantially with RAP, and thus it would be proper for us to strike his brief and

dismiss this appeal. See RAP 10(B); RAP 31(H)(1). Nonetheless, we decline to

strike his brief or to dismiss this appeal.

Instead, we have elected to review the issues Paul raises in his

deficient brief for palpable error only due to his failure to provide preservation

statements. See Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021) (holding

that “[i]f a party fails to inform the appellate court of where in the record his issue

-4- is preserved, the appellate court can treat that issue as unpreserved.”). See also

J.P.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 689 S.W.3d 149 (Ky. App.

2024). Counsel should not expect us to afford such leniency again.

Under CR 61.02, “[a] palpable error which affects the substantial

rights of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even

though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be

granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”

An error is palpable only if it is so “shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable[,]”

Summe v. Gronotte, 357 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Ky. App. 2011) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted), that it “jumps off the page . . . and cries out for

relief.” Chavies v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 313, 323 (Ky. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Having set forth the limited nature of our review, we now relate the

essential facts and underlying procedural history of this appeal. Paul and Rhonda

had been married for decades when Rhonda filed a petition for dissolution in 2022.

Later that year, the McCracken Family Court issued an agreed order for temporary

maintenance requiring Paul to pay Rhonda $3,300.00 per month. Rhonda filed

multiple motions for contempt, alleging Paul had not made the required temporary

maintenance payments. In August 2023, the trial court issued a limited dissolution

-5- decree which dissolved the marriage but did not address pending issues such as

maintenance and property division.

The court held a final evidentiary hearing in October 2023 and issued

its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and supplemental decree of dissolution in

January 2024. The supplemental decree noted that the parties could not agree on

what items of personal property remained in the marital home and referenced

Rhonda’s assertion that Paul had already removed many personal property items

from that home. The supplemental decree contained a detailed list of the personal

property awarded to Paul and Rhonda, though the court held it would “not assign a

value to either party[’s personal property].”

The family court concluded Rhonda was not entitled to ongoing,

further maintenance. However, the court ordered Paul to pay “any outstanding

temporary maintenance” to Rhonda within thirty days without specifying the

arrearage.

Because of the parties’ ongoing disputes, the family court later issued

a docket order stating that Paul would go to the marital residence at a stated date

and time to retrieve his personal property, including the firearms listed as his

personal property in the supplemental decree. Paul later asserted he was unable to

retrieve all the personal property, particularly numerous firearms, so he asked the

family court to require Rhonda to pay him over $40,000.00 for the personal

-6- property he claims he was unable to retrieve. Also, the parties were unable to

agree on Paul’s temporary maintenance arrearage.

In April 2024, the family court held a hearing to determine the

temporary maintenance arrearage and to resolve the personal property issues. A

few months later, the court issued an order finding that Paul’s temporary

maintenance arrearage was slightly under $10,000.00 as of July 31, 2023. The

court then found that Paul had an additional temporary maintenance arrearage of

slightly under $10,000.00 which had accrued beginning on August 1, 2023. The

total arrearage calculated by the family court which it ordered Paul to pay Rhonda

thus was $19,619.76.

As to the personal property, the court declined to require Rhonda to

reimburse Paul. The court held that Paul’s current valuations were “significantly

higher” than he had listed in his earlier verified disclosure statement. The court

also noted that Paul had not provided evidence at the final hearing regarding the

valuation of the property in question, so the court had been unable to value the

personal property in the supplemental decree. Consequently, the court held that it

“has no basis to retroactively assign a value now.” Paul then filed this appeal.

Paul raises two issues. First, he contends the trial court erred by

denying his request to receive compensation for the personal property he alleges he

-7- has not been able to obtain. Second, he argues the trial court improperly calculated

his temporary maintenance arrearage.

In addition to not complying with RAP, Paul’s brief is fatally terse

and conclusory. Paul does not cite to the record or binding authority in either

argument. In sum, Paul’s cursory arguments are devoid of meaningful analysis

and so he is not entitled to appellate relief. See Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 32

(Ky. App. 2021) (holding that “a terse, conclusory assertion wholly

unaccompanied by meaningfully developed argument or citation to authority is

insufficient to merit appellate relief.”); Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186

S.W.3d 754, 759 (Ky. App. 2005) (alleged errors “may be deemed waived” if an

appellant fails to cite supporting authority and it is not an appellate court’s job to

research or make arguments on behalf of litigants).

As to the personal property, Paul states he provided the family court

with “a list of values that were associated with the items that were awarded to him

but that were not returned.” But he does not cite to where we may view that list in

the record, which we shall not search on Paul’s behalf. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Ky. 2019). In fact, Paul does not even specify

precisely which items awarded to him in the supplemental decree he was unable to

obtain. Instead, the statement of the case section of his brief only generically

-8- refers to “guns, tools and collectibles.” Paul also provides no specific evidentiary

support for his assertion that the property at issue is worth over $40,000.00.

The trial court held that it could not place a value on Paul’s allegedly

missing personal property because he did not present valuation evidence at the

final hearing. Paul has not provided specific citations to the record showing where

he did present such valuation evidence. Nor has he cited any legal authority to

show that the trial court’s conclusion is in error. Paul also has not cited to any

specific evidence of record or legal authority to show that the family court erred in

holding that many of the allegedly missing personal property items had only

“significant sentimental value . . . .”

We do not take lightly a party being unable to obtain property

awarded by a court order. However, a person claiming to be deprived of such

property must show specifically which items were unavailable and offer evidence

of the proper value to obtain relief on appeal. Paul has done neither.

Consequently, his cursory, lackluster personal property argument is insufficient to

entitle him to palpable error relief.

The same conclusion applies to Paul’s argument that the family court

improperly calculated his temporary maintenance arrearage. Paul cites to neither

the record nor legal authority to support his assertion that he “overpaid [Rhonda] a

total of $16,500.00 in maintenance” so “[t]he total amount owed to [Rhonda] for

-9- past due maintenance is $3,119.76.” Paul does not cite to any supportive evidence

in the record. We cannot blindly accept his argument about the amount of

temporary maintenance he owed or the amount thereof he paid. We decline to

conduct an exhaustive search of the record to see if there is evidentiary support for

Paul’s assertions. Roth, 567 S.W.3d at 595. Simply put, Paul’s fleeting, unclear

argument is insufficient to obtain appellate relief. Schell, 640 S.W.3d at 32.

Of course, we disapprove of any party being required to pay an

incorrect amount of maintenance. But a party raising such a claim must provide us

with specific factual and legal support for their assertions. Here, Paul has provided

neither. As a result, Paul has not shown a sufficient entitlement to palpable error

relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the McCracken Family Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Heather L. Jones Paducah, Kentucky

-10-