Paul Bush v. Robert Pommer

Ninth Circuit

Paul Bush v. Robert Pommer

684 F. App'x 673

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 23, 2017

Docket16-15019

StatusUnpublished

This text of 684 F. App'x 673 (Paul Bush v. Robert Pommer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Paul Bush v. Robert Pommer, 684 F. App'x 673 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Paul Bush appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a property dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bush’s trespass claim because Bush failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had possession of the land at issue. See MacNeil v. Perkins, 84 Ariz. 74, 324 P.2d 211, 216 (1958) (under Arizona law, “[a] trespasser is one who does an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner to the injury of the person or property of another” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Bush’s remaining claims because Bush failed to raise them in his opening brief. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1994) (matter not specifically and distinctly argued in opening brief is waived on review).

Bush’s requests for oral argument and to strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment from the record, set forth in his opening brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth' Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Paul Bush appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a property dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bush’s trespass claim because Bush failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had possession of the land at issue. See MacNeil v. Perkins, 84 Ariz. 74, 324 P.2d 211, 216 (1958) (under Arizona law, “[a] trespasser is one who does an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner to the injury of the person or property of another” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Bush’s remaining claims because Bush failed to raise them in his opening brief. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1994) (matter not specifically and distinctly argued in opening brief is waived on review).

Bush’s requests for oral argument and to strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment from the record, set forth in his opening brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth' Circuit Rule 36-3.

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684 F. App'x 673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-bush-v-robert-pommer-ca9-2017.

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