Paul-Austin v. McPherson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Paul-Austin v. McPherson

91 A.D.3d 924, 937 N.Y.2d 627

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 31, 2012

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 91 A.D.3d 924 (Paul-Austin v. McPherson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Paul-Austin v. McPherson, 91 A.D.3d 924, 937 N.Y.2d 627 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

[925]*925The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). Although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained certain injuries to the cervical region of her spine and her right shoulder as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]). In addition, although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained certain injuries to the lumbar region of her spine as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did not constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d at 795), and, in any event, were not caused by the subject accident (see Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]). Finally, although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that she did not sustain such an injury (cf. Geliga v Karibian, Inc., 56 AD3d 518, 519 [2008]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact because the opinion of her chiropractor, on which she relied, was not submitted in the form of an affidavit (see Vejselovski v McErlean, 87 AD3d 1062, 1063 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

[925]*925The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). Although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained certain injuries to the cervical region of her spine and her right shoulder as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]). In addition, although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained certain injuries to the lumbar region of her spine as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did not constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d at 795), and, in any event, were not caused by the subject accident (see Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]). Finally, although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that she did not sustain such an injury (cf. Geliga v Karibian, Inc., 56 AD3d 518, 519 [2008]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact because the opinion of her chiropractor, on which she relied, was not submitted in the form of an affidavit (see Vejselovski v McErlean, 87 AD3d 1062, 1063 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

91 A.D.3d 924, 937 N.Y.2d 627, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-austin-v-mcpherson-nyappdiv-2012.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack