Paul Anthony Patrick Cox v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 4, 2024
• Docket: 05-23-00194-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed April 4, 2024

In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00194-CR

PAUL ANTHONY PATRICK COX, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F19-21092-Y

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Carlyle, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Carlyle Paul Anthony Patrick Cox appeals from his conviction for aggravated robbery.

We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

Rin Jeon testified that she worked behind the register at her parents’ donut

shop. On Easter morning in 2019, she noticed a man outside the shop who appeared

to be waiting for other customers to leave. As soon as the shop was empty, the man

entered and ordered donuts. Ms. Jeon turned around to fulfill the order, and when

she turned back, the man was pointing a gun at her and demanding money. Ms. Jeon

could not get the cash register to open. The robber raised his voice, which drew Ms. Jeon’s mother out from the kitchen. The robber knocked Ms. Jeon’s mother to the

floor and fired two shots—one that hit the floor and another that hit the wall behind

the register. Ms. Jeon’s father then came out from the kitchen.

Ms. Jeon tried to call 911, but the robber took her phone. Ms. Jeon never

managed to open the register, and the robber eventually left without taking any

money. As the robber left, Ms. Jeon and her father followed him outside and noticed

that he drove off in a dark Mustang. Another witness outside the donut shop reported

seeing a blue Mustang traveling south on Meadows Parkway after the robbery.

Surveillance footage taken from a house on Meadows Parkway captured footage of

a blue Mustang driving during the relevant timeframe, and police eventually

recovered Ms. Jeon’s cell phone at an intersection along Meadows Parkway a few

miles from the donut shop.

When police arrived at the scene, Ms. Jeon informed them that the robber was

a “very short” black man with a distinct voice and facial hair that looked like it had

been growing out for three or four days. Based on Ms. Jeon’s description, police

identified Mr. Cox as a potential suspect. They noticed that Mr. Cox had an

outstanding arrest warrant, so they decided to bring him in.

When they went to the apartment where they believed Mr. Cox resided,

Ladrina Medlin—the mother of one of Mr. Cox’s children—told officers that Mr.

Cox was not there. The officers surveilled the apartment, and within a few hours,

they spotted Mr. Cox leaving in a blue Mustang that belonged to Ms. Medlin. They

–2– pulled him over, took him into custody on the outstanding warrant, and continued

their investigation into the robbery.

As part of that investigation, they conducted a photo lineup with Ms. Jeon and

her parents. Ms. Jeon thought two of the men in the lineup could possibly be the

robber, and one of the men she identified was Mr. Cox. Ms. Jeon’s father more

definitively identified Mr. Cox, telling officers: “That’s absolutely him if he’s short.”

Police executed a search warrant on Ms. Medlin’s apartment and found a

backpack with a handgun and a bible inscribed with Mr. Cox’s name. A forensic

firearms examiner determined that the handgun matched two fired cartridge casings

recovered from the donut shop.

The grand jury indicted Mr. Cox for aggravated robbery, and Mr. Cox entered

a not-guilty plea. Following a trial, the jury convicted Mr. Cox and set his

punishment at sixty years’ confinement. The trial court sentenced Mr. Cox consistent

with the jury’s verdict, and Mr. Cox appeals.

Mr. Cox first contends the evidence does not sufficiently establish his identity

as the robber. We review evidentiary sufficiency under the familiar Jackson v.

Virginia1 standard, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to

determine whether the factfinder could rationally find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

1 443 U.S. 307 (1979). –3– At trial, Ms. Jeon identified Mr. Cox as the man who robbed her. And the jury

heard evidence of the photo lineup in which Ms. Jeon’s father definitively identified

Mr. Cox as the robber while Ms. Jeon identified Mr. Cox as one of two potential

suspects. The evidence at trial established that, immediately before his arrest, police

spotted Mr. Cox fleeing an apartment at which they later recovered a handgun linked

to the robbery in a backpack with another item bearing his name. The blue Mustang

Mr. Cox drove as he left the apartment matched the description of the car the robber

used to flee the donut shop and appeared to match the car captured on surveillance

footage in the vicinity of the donut shop during the relevant timeframe. This is ample

evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.

Cox was the robber.

Mr. Cox nevertheless contends there is insufficient evidence of identity

because there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence linking him to either the donut

shop or the gun, no video evidence showing him robbing the shop or driving the

Mustang that fled the scene, and no eyewitness testimony concerning specific

identifying characteristics such as his exact height, skin pigmentation, the shoes he

wore, or the manner in which he walked. Although such evidence may have further

established his identity as the robber, it was not necessary. See Earls v. State, 707

S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“Evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator

of an offense can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.”); Giles v. State,

No. 05-18-00865-CR, 2019 WL 6486257, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 3, 2019,

–4– pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that “physical evidence

is not required to establish identity”).

We likewise reject Mr. Cox’s arguments based on testimony from defense

witnesses that he contends establish doubt as to whether he drove a different car on

the day of the robbery or had thicker facial hair than Ms. Jeon described to police.

The “jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given

their testimony.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The

jury was free to reject Mr. Cox’s testimony about the thickness of his facial hair at

the time of the robbery. The jury was likewise free to reject testimony from another

woman with whom Mr. Cox had a child stating that she saw Mr. Cox driving a

Lincoln Town Car later in the day after the robbery. But even if the jury had credited

such testimony, it would not prevent a finding of identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The jury could rationally conclude both that Mr. Cox switched cars after the robbery

and that Ms. Jeon’s estimate as to how long Mr. Cox’s facial hair had been growing

was neither a critical factor in his identification nor an estimate that one would

expect Ms. Jeon to make with precision.

Mr. Cox next argues that by refusing to allow him to change his mind and

accept the State’s final pre-trial plea offer after the jury had already been sworn, the

trial court reversibly “erred by participating in the plea bargain process.” Mr. Cox

did not preserve this issue for our review by making a timely objection to the trial

court’s purportedly improper participation. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Hallmark v. State,

–5– 541 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329,

333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Cory L. Carlyle/ 230194f.u05 CORY L. CARLYLE Do Not Publish JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

–6– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

PAUL ANTHONY PATRICK COX, On Appeal from the Criminal District Appellant Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F19-21092-Y. No. 05-23-00194-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices Reichek and Miskel THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 4th day of April, 2024.

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