Paul Amoroso v. Sun Life Assurance Company
This text of Paul Amoroso v. Sun Life Assurance Company (Paul Amoroso v. Sun Life Assurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 13 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL AMOROSO, No. 21-35801
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05887-BHS
v. MEMORANDUM* SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2022** Seattle, Washington
Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Dr. Paul Amoroso challenges the district court’s denial of his long-term
disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Amoroso worked in a supervisory role as a Physician Executive at the
MultiCare Health System. He took partial leave under the Family & Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”) on December 14, 2018, because he perceived his mental
health conditions—“depression, anxiety, sleep disturbances, inability to maintain
focus or meet deadlines, and [inability] to provide vision and strategy for [his]
organization”—were affecting his work performance. He returned to work after
eighty days, on March 4, 2019, and worked full time about fifty more days before
he resigned. Both before taking FMLA leave, and after resigning, he told his
treating psychiatrist that his cognitive functioning difficulties impaired his work,
but his supervisor and others thought he performed adequately. After resigning, he
applied for disability benefits under Defendant-Appellee Sun Life Assurance
Company’s Long Term Disability Group Policy.
Under the Group Policy, eligible employees must complete an Elimination
Period of ninety consecutive days of Disability to qualify for disability benefits.1
Sun Life rejected Amoroso’s claim because, “[u]sing a disability onset date of
December 4, 2018, the earliest the 90 day elimination period would have been
satisfied on was March 14, 2019.” As noted, Amoroso returned to work full time
on March 4. Sun Life also determined that Amoroso “does not meet the definition
1 To satisfy the Elimination Period, Amoroso must have been Totally Disabled or Partially Disabled—and thus unable to perform one or more of the Material and Substantial Duties of his occupation—for ninety days.
2 of total disability and/or partial disability.” The consultant who conducted Sun
Life’s internal appellate review also found that Amoroso did not establish Total
Disability throughout the Elimination Period.
Upon de novo review under ERISA, the district court “evaluate[d] whether
the plan administrator correctly or incorrectly denied benefits.” Abatie v. Alta
Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). The district
court found it “undisputable that Amoroso was able to return to work 80 days
[after taking FMLA leave] and that he then worked full time until he voluntarily
resigned.” Thus, the district court found that “Amoroso ha[d] not met his burden
of proving that he was disabled for 90 consecutive days while he was insured, or
that he was unable to perform the material and substantial aspects of his position.”
Where, as here, a district court has reviewed de novo an ERISA plan
administrator’s decision, we review the district court’s factual findings only to
determine whether they are clearly erroneous. See Silver v. Exec. Car Leasing
Long-Term Disability Plan, 466 F.3d 727, 732–33 (9th Cir. 2006); Kearney v.
Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Under the Group Policy, disability income benefits become payable only if
the claimant “send[s] Proof . . . that [they] have become Disabled;” is “insured
under the Policy at the time [their] Disability commences; and [has] completed
[their] Elimination Period.” Because Amoroso did not meet the third requirement,
3 Sun Life did not have to pay him benefits. Having returned to work full time after
eighty days, Amoroso failed to complete the Elimination Period, and he offers no
evidence to the contrary. Thus, the district court did not err by finding Amoroso
did not meet his burden of proving that he was disabled for ninety consecutive
days.
AFFIRMED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Paul Amoroso v. Sun Life Assurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-amoroso-v-sun-life-assurance-company-ca9-2022.