NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BERNARD J. PATTERSON; JOSHUA P. No. 24-7439 ADAMS; LINDA G. JORDAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others D.C. No. Similarly Situated, 3:23-cv-03858-TLT Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Trina L. Thompson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 20, 2026 San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Forrest.
Plaintiffs Bernard Patterson, Joshua Adams, and Linda Jordan, on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals, appeal the district court’s order granting
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the
district court’s decision de novo. Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 982
(9th Cir. 2017). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Wells Fargo violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) by obtaining Plaintiffs’ credit reports without a permissible
purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f).2 To allege a violation of § 1681b(f), a plaintiff
must allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that the defendant obtained the
plaintiff’s credit report without a permissible purpose. Nayab v. Cap. One Bank
(USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 495–96 (9th Cir. 2019). The defendant bears “the
burden of pleading it had an authorized purpose.” Id. at 495.
Here, Plaintiffs alleged that they had no existing business relationship with
Wells Fargo, that they did not apply for Wells Fargo bank accounts, and that Wells
Fargo opened bank accounts in their names. Plaintiffs further alleged that before
opening these accounts, Wells Fargo received Plaintiffs’ true and correct personal
1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. 2 Plaintiffs raise claims pursuant to both FCRA and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA). The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning FCRA apply with equal force to the CCRAA, a statute that is “substantially based on [FCRA].” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), with Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.19(a)(1)–(2).
2 24-7439 identification information (PII) from an identity verification service, and that for
some of Plaintiffs, this PII contradicted the PII Wells Fargo associated with the
unauthorized accounts.3 After opening the bank accounts in Plaintiffs’ names,
Wells Fargo obtained each of Plaintiffs’ credit reports. Plaintiffs’ allegations—
accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 981—give rise “to a reasonable inference that [Wells
Fargo] obtained [their] credit report[s] for a purpose not authorized by statute.”
Nayab, 942 F.3d at 499. The allegations “rule out many of the potential authorized
purposes for obtaining a credit report,” and “together with [Plaintiffs’] allegation
that [Wells Fargo], in fact, obtained [their] report[s], state a plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 496–97.
2. Plaintiffs’ allegations support an inference that Wells Fargo’s violation of
FCRA was willful. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). To allege a willful violation of the
“knowing” variety, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant “knowing[ly]
disregard[ed]” its FCRA obligations. See Moran v. Screening Pros, LLC, 25 F.4th
722, 728–29 (9th Cir. 2022).4 Here, the operative complaint supports the inference
3 The operative complaint alleges that Wells Fargo received true and correct PII for each plaintiff and that this PII contradicted the PII associated with the Patterson and Adams accounts. But the operative complaint does not explain what PII Wells Fargo associated with the account opened in Jordan’s name. 4 Plaintiffs expressly disclaim any reliance on the “reckless” variety of willful violations. Moran, 25 F.4th at 728.
3 24-7439 that Wells Fargo willfully violated FCRA by obtaining Plaintiffs’ credit reports
despite knowing that it had no colorable basis for doing so.
Wells Fargo insists, and the district court purported to find, that its actions
demonstrate it reasonably believed that Plaintiffs were its existing customers. But
even if the operative complaint compelled this inference, that alone would not
establish a permissible purpose. The statutory provision Wells Fargo relies upon,
§ 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i), permits access to a credit report where a user has a legitimate
business need “in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the
consumer.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the provision identified by the
district court, § 1681b(a)(3)(A), “can be relied upon by the party requesting a
credit report only if the consumer initiates the transaction.” Pintos v. Pac.
Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 675 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation
modified). The operative complaint does not suggest that Plaintiffs initiated any
transaction with Wells Fargo, even if Wells Fargo believed they were its legitimate
customers.
Moreover, as to plaintiffs Patterson and Adams, the operative complaint
alleges that Wells Fargo knew or had reason to know that they did not apply for the
accounts Wells Fargo opened in their names. According to the complaint, the
correct PII Wells Fargo received from an identity verification service contradicted
the PII associated with the accounts. The complaint explains that despite knowing
4 24-7439 that Patterson and Adams may not have opened the accounts, Wells Fargo went on
to obtain their credit reports in knowing disregard of FCRA.
3. Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that Wells Fargo negligently violated
FCRA because their allegations of actual damages are too conclusory. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff who shows that a
defendant “is negligent in failing to comply” with FCRA may recover only actual
damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BERNARD J. PATTERSON; JOSHUA P. No. 24-7439 ADAMS; LINDA G. JORDAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others D.C. No. Similarly Situated, 3:23-cv-03858-TLT Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Trina L. Thompson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 20, 2026 San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Forrest.
Plaintiffs Bernard Patterson, Joshua Adams, and Linda Jordan, on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals, appeal the district court’s order granting
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the
district court’s decision de novo. Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 982
(9th Cir. 2017). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Wells Fargo violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) by obtaining Plaintiffs’ credit reports without a permissible
purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f).2 To allege a violation of § 1681b(f), a plaintiff
must allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that the defendant obtained the
plaintiff’s credit report without a permissible purpose. Nayab v. Cap. One Bank
(USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 495–96 (9th Cir. 2019). The defendant bears “the
burden of pleading it had an authorized purpose.” Id. at 495.
Here, Plaintiffs alleged that they had no existing business relationship with
Wells Fargo, that they did not apply for Wells Fargo bank accounts, and that Wells
Fargo opened bank accounts in their names. Plaintiffs further alleged that before
opening these accounts, Wells Fargo received Plaintiffs’ true and correct personal
1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. 2 Plaintiffs raise claims pursuant to both FCRA and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA). The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning FCRA apply with equal force to the CCRAA, a statute that is “substantially based on [FCRA].” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), with Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.19(a)(1)–(2).
2 24-7439 identification information (PII) from an identity verification service, and that for
some of Plaintiffs, this PII contradicted the PII Wells Fargo associated with the
unauthorized accounts.3 After opening the bank accounts in Plaintiffs’ names,
Wells Fargo obtained each of Plaintiffs’ credit reports. Plaintiffs’ allegations—
accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 981—give rise “to a reasonable inference that [Wells
Fargo] obtained [their] credit report[s] for a purpose not authorized by statute.”
Nayab, 942 F.3d at 499. The allegations “rule out many of the potential authorized
purposes for obtaining a credit report,” and “together with [Plaintiffs’] allegation
that [Wells Fargo], in fact, obtained [their] report[s], state a plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 496–97.
2. Plaintiffs’ allegations support an inference that Wells Fargo’s violation of
FCRA was willful. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). To allege a willful violation of the
“knowing” variety, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant “knowing[ly]
disregard[ed]” its FCRA obligations. See Moran v. Screening Pros, LLC, 25 F.4th
722, 728–29 (9th Cir. 2022).4 Here, the operative complaint supports the inference
3 The operative complaint alleges that Wells Fargo received true and correct PII for each plaintiff and that this PII contradicted the PII associated with the Patterson and Adams accounts. But the operative complaint does not explain what PII Wells Fargo associated with the account opened in Jordan’s name. 4 Plaintiffs expressly disclaim any reliance on the “reckless” variety of willful violations. Moran, 25 F.4th at 728.
3 24-7439 that Wells Fargo willfully violated FCRA by obtaining Plaintiffs’ credit reports
despite knowing that it had no colorable basis for doing so.
Wells Fargo insists, and the district court purported to find, that its actions
demonstrate it reasonably believed that Plaintiffs were its existing customers. But
even if the operative complaint compelled this inference, that alone would not
establish a permissible purpose. The statutory provision Wells Fargo relies upon,
§ 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i), permits access to a credit report where a user has a legitimate
business need “in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the
consumer.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the provision identified by the
district court, § 1681b(a)(3)(A), “can be relied upon by the party requesting a
credit report only if the consumer initiates the transaction.” Pintos v. Pac.
Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 675 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation
modified). The operative complaint does not suggest that Plaintiffs initiated any
transaction with Wells Fargo, even if Wells Fargo believed they were its legitimate
customers.
Moreover, as to plaintiffs Patterson and Adams, the operative complaint
alleges that Wells Fargo knew or had reason to know that they did not apply for the
accounts Wells Fargo opened in their names. According to the complaint, the
correct PII Wells Fargo received from an identity verification service contradicted
the PII associated with the accounts. The complaint explains that despite knowing
4 24-7439 that Patterson and Adams may not have opened the accounts, Wells Fargo went on
to obtain their credit reports in knowing disregard of FCRA.
3. Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that Wells Fargo negligently violated
FCRA because their allegations of actual damages are too conclusory. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff who shows that a
defendant “is negligent in failing to comply” with FCRA may recover only actual
damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a). Here, the operative complaint asserts that
Plaintiffs suffered “reputational damage, distress and embarrassment, and concern
that improper inquiry and/or inaccurate reporting could recur.” It also avers that
Plaintiffs “experienced great stress, personal inconvenience, and expenses as a
consequence of Defendants’ actions.” But Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts
supporting these conclusory allegations and do not explain how Wells Fargo
caused these damages by obtaining their credit reports. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiffs contend that because they have adequately pleaded an injury for
purposes of standing, they have necessarily alleged actual damages. Although we
have recognized that a violation of § 1681b(f)(1) may establish injury-in-fact for
standing purposes, Nayab, 942 F.3d at 490–93, showing such an injury does not
obviate the need to allege actual damages as an element of the cause of action. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a).
5 24-7439 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.5
5 Each side shall bear its own costs.
6 24-7439 FILED MAY 18 2026 Patterson, et al. v. Wells Fargo & Co., et al., No. 24-7439 FORREST, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in
dismissing Plaintiff’s claim that Wells Fargo willfully violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act because Plaintiff’s allegations do not “tend to exclude the possibility”
that Wells Fargo’s challenged conduct was unintentional. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (citation modified); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).