Patterson v. Rynar

13 A.2d 295, 18 N.J. Misc. 312, 1940 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 45

This text of 13 A.2d 295 (Patterson v. Rynar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Department of Labor Workmen's Compensation Bureau primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patterson v. Rynar, 13 A.2d 295, 18 N.J. Misc. 312, 1940 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 45 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1940).

Opinion

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I find from the proofs that the respondent is a contractor engaged in the construction business. He had contracted to remove stucco from a building situate at Ho. 118 Fourth avenue, East Orange, Hew Jersey, and on April 28th, 1938, he and several workmen were so engaged. Patterson was one of the workmen on the job. It was Patterson’s duty to rip stucco from the side of the building by the use of a crowbar.

On that day—Apiri 28th, 1938'—at about eleven-thirty A. M., Patterson was engaged in the performance of this task and was standing in an alley about two or two and one-half feet wide, formed by the side of the building upon which he was working and the building next adjoining it, when a mass of stucco some distance above him, which apparently had [313]*313become loosened, fell from the side of the building on which he was working, striking Patterson about the stomach and crushing him against the wall directly in back of him.

As a result of the accident, Patterson sustained injuries to his back over his right kidney, over the lumbo-sacral area of his back and to his sacro-spinalis muscles situated anatomically in close proximity to the kidney area. After resting for awhile, Patterson continued to work as best he could— for about one-half hour—until noon, at which time, complaining that his pain was severe and that he felt sick, he applied to his foreman for leave to quit his job and go home. Permission was granted and Patterson left for home. On reaching home, Patterson immediately went to bed. lie remained in bed until April 30th, 1938—two days after the accident—complaining of acute pain in the back over the right kidney. In the evening of April 30th, 1938, the pain not having subsided, he was taken to the office of Dr. Benjamin Polow in Newark, New Jersey, by automobile. Plis condition was such that he had to be helped from his bed, supported under each arm by other persons, into the automobile in which he was removed to the doctor’s office. According to Dr. Polow, who testified for the respondent, when he first saw Patterson, he was suffering from severe abdominal pains, pain in the back, especially in the region of the right kidney and lower lumbar regions. Patterson told Dr. Polow that he had vomited at times and that his urine was reddish in tinge. Dr. Polow found his condition to be such that he ordered Patterson’s immediate hospitalization. Patterson went directly to the Newark Beth Israel Hospital from the doctor’s office. He was taken there in a car by his foreman, who had driven him to the doctor’s office.

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Patterson remained in the hospital until May 5th, 1938, when, according to the hospital record, he was “allowed to go home to bed.” His condition on leaving the hospital, as shown by the record of that institution in evidence, reads, “tenderness over right kidney region still present—still has pain over right sacro-spinalis muscles—bending and turning still accomplished with difficulty—to be seen at home.” He [314]*314was seen at home and received treatment from Dr. Polow for almost three months—until July 23d, 1938. Dr. Polow prescribed a belt for him to wear for support and estimated his disability on July 23d, 1938, to be “fifteen per cent, of the back.” At the time this estimate was given, Dr. Polow testified that Patterson “still had tenderness on pressure over right kidney region and over the right recto-spinae muscles.”

It is uncontradicted that after his accident Patterson did not return to work for the respondent, nor that he did not do any other hard, laborious work until his death. The respondent urges that he worked in a grocery store following his accident. One of the co-owners of the grocery store, a relative of the decedent, was produced before me and testified that Patterson never worked there. It appeared that Patterson lived with the co-owners and some times sat around the store when his condition of health permitted. He did no work. He received no wages, compensation or other returns for any work at the grocery store. The petitioner, it appears, did work there. She fully supports the co-owner’s version.

Patterson never recovered from the effects of his injury. He became broken down in his general health and went into a steady decline. He was never free from illness following the accident. On January 24th, 1939, he died in St. Michael’s Hospital, Newark, New Jersey, of an inflammatory condition of the kidneys and an enlarged heart. The cause of death as stipulated by the parties and established by the post-mortem examination, was chronic glomerulo-nephritis and hypertensive heart disease. I find from the testimony, that from April 28th, 1938, the date of his injury, until January 24th, 1939, the day of his death—a little less than nine months— that he grew progressively worse until he died. This despite hospitalization in Newark Beth Israel Hospital, active post-hospital treatment by Dr. Polow for almost three months, medical care and attention of Dr. John J. Williams, and hospitalization in St. Michael’s Hospital.

There was admitted in evidence without objection, a record of proceedings in the compensation bureau on August 9th, 1938, which has received my careful consideration. Prom the pleadings in that proceeding and the record, it appears that [315]*315Patterson made a claim for compensation arising out of his injuries on April 28th, 1938. This claim originated with a petition dated May 10th, 1938. Patterson was then still under Dr. Polow’s treatment. He continued to be treated by Dr. Polow until July 23d, 1938—more than two months later. That claim was compromised between the parties on August 9th, 1938. By the terms of the compromise, respondent stipulated that judgment be entered against him for disability, temporary and permanent, and for expenses of medical care and attention and certain other fees. The stipulated judgment provided that Patterson receive partial permanent disability for fifty weeks, which is equivalent to ten per cent, of total disability. This was in addition to temporary disability of twelve weeks. He died after he had collected about one-half of the partial permanent disability awarded to him.

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The respondent controverts petitioner’s right of recovery on the ground that Patterson’s death was not due to the accidental injuries sustained on April 28th, 1938; that those injuries neither caused nor accelerated Patterson’s death from the causes mentioned.

If petitioner’s right to recover depended upon proving that the injuries caused chronic glomerulo-nephritis and hypertensive heart disease, the diseases from which Patterson died, there would be substantial merit to respondent’s contention. By the greater weight of the medical testimony adduced, as evidenced by the opinions of the experts produced by the respondent, particularly Dr. W. Kenneth Wheeler, a qualified urologist, and Dr. Salvatore Bose, a recognized pathologist, I am satisfied that the primary cause of death—chronic glomerulo-nephritis and its frequent concomitant hypertension—are not due to trauma. Both of these doctors point with cogent reasoning to the fact that the post-mortem examination revealed a bilateral involvement of the capillary tubules or glomeruli of both kidneys. In other words, that both kidneys showed inflammation and pathology while the accident involved a local trauma to the right kidney alone. Based on these observations, they conclude that trauma did not cause the diseases which terminated in death.

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Bluebook (online)
13 A.2d 295, 18 N.J. Misc. 312, 1940 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patterson-v-rynar-njlaborcomp-1940.