Patterson v. Labella

641 F. App'x 89

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 11, 2016
• Docket: 14-4051
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Stephen Patterson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that the defendants violated his civil rights by, inter alia, subjecting him to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and unlawful entry based on incidents that took place on October 10, 2009, October 24, 2009, and January 1, 2010. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a)).

On appeal, Patterson challenges only the dismissal of his false arrest, malicious prosecution, and unlawful entry claims relating to the October 10, 2009, October 24, 2009, and January 1, 2010 incidents. Accordingly, he has abandoned his other claims. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995).

Upon independent review, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Patterson’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims relating to all three incidents and his unlawful entry claim related to the January 1, 2010 incident, for essentially the reasons stated in the district court’s memorandum decision and order.

We also conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Patterson’s illegal search claim as to the October 24, 2009 incident on the ground that Patterson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a commercial establishment that he opened to the public. See Wash. Square Post No. 1212 Am. Legion v. Maduro, 907 F.2d 1288, 1291 (2d Cir.1990). In addition, the district court correctly concluded that the defendant police officers were entitled to qualified immunity. It was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their conduct was lawful in light of their knowledge of past incidents at Patterson’s premises, their observations of numerous minors entering and exiting the building, and their interviews with several of the minors who were loitering outside. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that a “qualified immunity defense is established if ... it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate [clearly established] law”); Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir.1998) (same).

We have considered all of Patterson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.