Patterson v. Jipping

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 24-7644
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TOMMIE PATTERSON, No. 24-7644 D.C. Nos. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-00096-SLG v. 3:24-cv-00098-SLG

NICOLE JIPPING, Trustee, MEMORANDUM* Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 26, 2026**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Chapter 7 debtor Tommie Patterson appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order regarding the property of

Patterson’s bankruptcy estate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).

We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We do not consider the merits of the bankruptcy court’s determination that

Patterson’s interest in his late wife’s estate was property of Patterson’s bankruptcy

estate because Patterson did not address the grounds for the bankruptcy court’s

decision in his opening brief. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d

925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “we will not consider any claims that

were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7

F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that issues not supported by argument in pro

se appellant’s opening brief are deemed abandoned).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Patterson’s

motion for disqualification of the bankruptcy judge because Patterson failed to

establish any basis for relief. See United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450,

1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard of review and discussing standard

for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455).

We lack jurisdiction over the portion of the appeal challenging the

bankruptcy court’s order denying Patterson’s motion for removal of the trustee and

disqualification of trustee’s counsel because the bankruptcy court’s order was not

final, and this court lacks discretion to consider interlocutory appeals. See SS

Farms, LLC v. Sharp (In re SK Foods, L.P.), 676 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2012)

(providing that a bankruptcy court order is final if it “resolves and seriously affects

substantive rights and . . . finally determines the discrete issue to which it is

2 24-7644 addressed” and holding that bankruptcy court orders denying removal of a trustee

and disqualification of counsel are not final orders (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs (In re

City of Desert Hot Springs), 339 F.3d 782, 787-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that

“[i]t is within the discretion of the district court . . . to hear interlocutory appeals”

from bankruptcy courts but “courts of appeals only have jurisdiction to review the

‘final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees’ entered by . . . district courts”

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(d))).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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