Patten v. Nagy

86 A.D.2d 890, 447 N.Y.S.2d 334, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15546
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedFebruary 22, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 86 A.D.2d 890 (Patten v. Nagy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patten v. Nagy, 86 A.D.2d 890, 447 N.Y.S.2d 334, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dufficy, J.), dated June 16,1980, as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Order reversed insofar as appealed from, with $50 costs and disbursements, and motion for summary judgment is denied. Leave is hereby granted to plaintiffs to amend the complaint, within 20 days after service upon them of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry, to plead an oral agreement, waiving the contingency date in the condition subsequent in the sixth paragraph of the “Rider to Contract of Sale” and extending the time in which to obtain a firm mortgage commitment. An oral waiver of a contingency date in a condition subsequent in a contract for the sale of real property is not barred by section 5-703 of the General Obligations Law, which only contemplates modifications of executory terms of performance (cf. Avendanio v Marcantonio, 75 AD2d 796; Loper v O’Rourke, 86 Mise 2d 441). Furthermore an agent, without written authority, may orally agree to waive a contingency date in a contract for the sale of real property, where the modification is not precluded by subdivision 2 of section 5-703 or subdivision 1 of section 15-301 of the General Obligations Law. Section 5-1111 only requires the agent’s authority to be in writing where the modification is required to be in writing. Questions of fact arise as to (1) whether an oral modification of the contract, waiving the contingency date and extending the time in which plaintiffs must obtain a firm mortgage commitment, was agreed to by defendant’s attorney and (2) whether defendant’s attorney was authorized to grant said modification, which preclude the granting of summary judgment. Additionally, we note plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege an oral agreement waiving the contingency date and extending the time in which to obtain a mortgage commitment. Since the aforesaid oral modification would not be barred under subdivision 2 of section 5-703 or subdivision 1 of section 15-301 of the General Obligations Law, leave to amend the complaint within 20 days of service on the plaintiffs of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry, is hereby granted. Damiani, J. P., Titone, Mangano and Weinstein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Goldin Real Estate, LLC v. Shukla
2024 NY Slip Op 02304 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2024)
Kistela v. Ahlers
22 A.D.3d 641 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Dellicarri v. Hirschfeld
210 A.D.2d 584 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
Kelly v. Hodges
811 P.2d 48 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1991)
State of NY v. Amro Realty Corp.
697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. New York, 1988)
Patten v. Nagy
99 A.D.2d 801 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 A.D.2d 890, 447 N.Y.S.2d 334, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patten-v-nagy-nyappdiv-1982.