Patrick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. CV-00-554-JD 03/27/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Dorothy A. Patrick
v. Civil No. 00-554-JD Opinion No. 2002 DNH 067 Northwest Airlines, Inc.
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Dorothy Patrick, fell while she was changing
planes at Logan Airport, in Boston, Massachusetts. Patrick
brings three negligence claims against Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
alleging that Northwest breached its duties to maintain safe
public areas, to warn of hazards, and to provide medical
treatment to those injured. Northwest moves for summary judgment
on the grounds that it had no control over the area where Dorothy
Patrick fell and never received notice of a defective condition
in that area.
Background
Dorothy Patrick fell at the airport as she was returning
home after a trip to Nashville, Tennessee. Her trip was part of
a Nashville tour organized by Collette Travel Service, Inc. She
traveled by plane from Burlington, Vermont, through Logan Airport
in Boston, to Nashville, and returning from Memphis, Tennessee, through Logan and back to Burlington.1
On the return trip, Patrick landed at Terminal E at Logan
Airport on a Northwest flight. She then rode in an airport
shuttle bus from Terminal E to Terminal C where she went to the
gate to wait to board the flight to Burlington. The flight from
Boston to Burlington was operated by Business Express Airlines
under an arrangement with Northwest Airlines. Patrick fell and
was injured while walking from the gate to board the flight to
Burlington.
Patrick states in her affidavit that her itinerary, which is
attached to her affidavit, showed that all of her flights were
listed as Northwest Airlines flights and that no other airline
was listed. Her itinerary confirms her statement. She states
that her tickets, baggage tags, and claim stubs were issued by
Northwest Airlines. She also states that she believed she was
traveling on Northwest Airlines during the entire trip and that
the airline personnel did not indicate that they were not
employed by Northwest.
Northwest Airlines provides affidavits from Gordon
Humpherys, Northwest's Director of Customer Service at Logan, and
Daniel Hindes, Northwest's Regional Director of Airport Affairs.
1Although Patrick states in her affidavit that she flew home from Nashville, the copies of her ticket and itinerary she submitted show that she flew from Memphis.
2 Humpherys states that Patrick's flight from Logan to Burlington
was not a Northwest flight. He explains that when customers
purchase tickets through Northwest to fly to airports that
Northwest does not serve, such as Burlington, Northwest makes
arrangements for those customers to fly on another airline.
Humpherys states that Northwest leases the area in Terminal E
where Patrick disembarked and that Northwest employees work in
Terminals D and E only. He further states that Northwest had no
contact with Patrick after she left Terminal C and that Northwest
was never notified that a defective condition existed in the area
where Patrick says that she fell.
Hindes states that Northwest leases portions of Terminals D
and E from the Massachusetts Port Authority and does not lease
any other areas at Logan. He further states that when Patrick
took the shuttle bus to another terminal at Logan from Terminal
E, she left the area controlled by Northwest. He also states
that Northwest had no control over the area where Patrick fell.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
3 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A
material fact is one that "has the potential to change the
outcome of the suit under the governing law" and a factual
dispute is genuine if "the evidence about the fact is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving
party." Grant's Dairy--Me., LLC v. Comm'r of Me. Dep't of
Aqric., Food & Rural Res., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000).
A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment must present competent evidence of record that shows a
genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,
219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2000). All reasonable inferences and
all credibility issues are resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Varqas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st
Cir. 1999). The party with the burden of proof cannot rely on
speculation or conjecture and must present "more than a mere
scintilla of evidence in [his] favor." Invest Almaz v. Temple-
Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 76 (1st Cir. 2001). An
absence of evidence on a material issue weighs against the party
who would bear the burden of proof at trial on that issue. See
Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 310 (1st Cir. 2001) .
4 Discussion
Patrick alleges that Northwest "had a duty of care to the
business invitees that utilized the facilities at the Logan
International Airport under their direct control" to maintain
safe areas, to warn of any unsafe conditions, and to provide
appropriate medical care to anyone using the services or
facilities under Northwest's control. Northwest moves for
summary judgment on the grounds that the area where Patrick fell
was not under Northwest's control and that Northwest did not have
notice of any unsafe condition in that area. Patrick objects,
asserting that a dispute exists as to whether the area was under
Northwest's control and that Northwest is vicariously liable for
the negligence of others in causing her accident.
A. Control
Under Massachusetts law, liability for injury caused by the
condition of commercial premises depends upon the defendant's
control over the area.2 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Mass. Bay Transp.
A u t h ., 292 N.E.2d 863, 864-65 (Mass. 1973); Buck v. Clauson's Inn
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Patrick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. CV-00-554-JD 03/27/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Dorothy A. Patrick
v. Civil No. 00-554-JD Opinion No. 2002 DNH 067 Northwest Airlines, Inc.
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Dorothy Patrick, fell while she was changing
planes at Logan Airport, in Boston, Massachusetts. Patrick
brings three negligence claims against Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
alleging that Northwest breached its duties to maintain safe
public areas, to warn of hazards, and to provide medical
treatment to those injured. Northwest moves for summary judgment
on the grounds that it had no control over the area where Dorothy
Patrick fell and never received notice of a defective condition
in that area.
Background
Dorothy Patrick fell at the airport as she was returning
home after a trip to Nashville, Tennessee. Her trip was part of
a Nashville tour organized by Collette Travel Service, Inc. She
traveled by plane from Burlington, Vermont, through Logan Airport
in Boston, to Nashville, and returning from Memphis, Tennessee, through Logan and back to Burlington.1
On the return trip, Patrick landed at Terminal E at Logan
Airport on a Northwest flight. She then rode in an airport
shuttle bus from Terminal E to Terminal C where she went to the
gate to wait to board the flight to Burlington. The flight from
Boston to Burlington was operated by Business Express Airlines
under an arrangement with Northwest Airlines. Patrick fell and
was injured while walking from the gate to board the flight to
Burlington.
Patrick states in her affidavit that her itinerary, which is
attached to her affidavit, showed that all of her flights were
listed as Northwest Airlines flights and that no other airline
was listed. Her itinerary confirms her statement. She states
that her tickets, baggage tags, and claim stubs were issued by
Northwest Airlines. She also states that she believed she was
traveling on Northwest Airlines during the entire trip and that
the airline personnel did not indicate that they were not
employed by Northwest.
Northwest Airlines provides affidavits from Gordon
Humpherys, Northwest's Director of Customer Service at Logan, and
Daniel Hindes, Northwest's Regional Director of Airport Affairs.
1Although Patrick states in her affidavit that she flew home from Nashville, the copies of her ticket and itinerary she submitted show that she flew from Memphis.
2 Humpherys states that Patrick's flight from Logan to Burlington
was not a Northwest flight. He explains that when customers
purchase tickets through Northwest to fly to airports that
Northwest does not serve, such as Burlington, Northwest makes
arrangements for those customers to fly on another airline.
Humpherys states that Northwest leases the area in Terminal E
where Patrick disembarked and that Northwest employees work in
Terminals D and E only. He further states that Northwest had no
contact with Patrick after she left Terminal C and that Northwest
was never notified that a defective condition existed in the area
where Patrick says that she fell.
Hindes states that Northwest leases portions of Terminals D
and E from the Massachusetts Port Authority and does not lease
any other areas at Logan. He further states that when Patrick
took the shuttle bus to another terminal at Logan from Terminal
E, she left the area controlled by Northwest. He also states
that Northwest had no control over the area where Patrick fell.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
3 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A
material fact is one that "has the potential to change the
outcome of the suit under the governing law" and a factual
dispute is genuine if "the evidence about the fact is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving
party." Grant's Dairy--Me., LLC v. Comm'r of Me. Dep't of
Aqric., Food & Rural Res., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000).
A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment must present competent evidence of record that shows a
genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,
219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2000). All reasonable inferences and
all credibility issues are resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Varqas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st
Cir. 1999). The party with the burden of proof cannot rely on
speculation or conjecture and must present "more than a mere
scintilla of evidence in [his] favor." Invest Almaz v. Temple-
Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 76 (1st Cir. 2001). An
absence of evidence on a material issue weighs against the party
who would bear the burden of proof at trial on that issue. See
Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 310 (1st Cir. 2001) .
4 Discussion
Patrick alleges that Northwest "had a duty of care to the
business invitees that utilized the facilities at the Logan
International Airport under their direct control" to maintain
safe areas, to warn of any unsafe conditions, and to provide
appropriate medical care to anyone using the services or
facilities under Northwest's control. Northwest moves for
summary judgment on the grounds that the area where Patrick fell
was not under Northwest's control and that Northwest did not have
notice of any unsafe condition in that area. Patrick objects,
asserting that a dispute exists as to whether the area was under
Northwest's control and that Northwest is vicariously liable for
the negligence of others in causing her accident.
A. Control
Under Massachusetts law, liability for injury caused by the
condition of commercial premises depends upon the defendant's
control over the area.2 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Mass. Bay Transp.
A u t h ., 292 N.E.2d 863, 864-65 (Mass. 1973); Buck v. Clauson's Inn
at Coonamessett, Inc., 211 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Mass. 1965) (citing
Underhill v. Schactman, 151 N.E.2d 287 (1958)); see also Mounsev
v. Ellard, 297 N.3.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973). Patrick alleged that
2The parties agree that Massachusetts substantive law is to be applied in this case.
5 Northwest's duty derived from its direct control over the area
where she fell. Northwest asserts, based on the affidavits of
Humpherys and Hindes that it did not have control over the area
in Terminal C where Patrick fell.
Humpherys and Hindes establish that Northwest did not
operate in Terminal C or have control over that area. Patrick
contends that a disputed factual issue exists as to whether
Northwest exerted control over that area because she believed,
based on her itinerary and tickets, that Northwest operated the
gate and the flight to Burlington. Patrick's mistaken impression
as to which airline operated the gate where she fell does not
create a material factual issue in this case in light of the
undisputed affidavits of Humpherys and Hindes. See, e.g., invest
Almaz, 243 F.3d at 76.
B. Vicarious Liability
Alternatively, Patrick contends that Northwest is
vicariously liable for the negligence of Business Express
Airlines. In support of that theory, Patrick asserts that
Business Express was operating as Northwest's agent in providing
the flight from Logan to Burlington. Patrick's claims against
Northwest, as pled in her complaint, allege only direct
liability, based on Northwest's "direct control" over the area
6 where she fell. Regardless of the merit of Patrick's vicarious
liability theory, she cannot avoid summary judgment based on a
claim that is not pled in her complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a); see also Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550
(10th Cir. 1997).
As no material facts remain at issue. Northwest is entitled
to summary judgment.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for
summary judgment (document no. 55) is granted. The clerk of
court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge
March 27, 2002
cc: Thomas A. Rappa, Jr., Esquire Gregory Brown, Esquire