1 Jul 06, 2026
2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 PATRICK R.,1 No. 1:26-cv-3017-EFS
8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE 9 v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, AND REMANDING FOR 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff Patrick R. claims he is unable to work due to severe 14 mental impairments and asks the Court to reverse the Administrative 15 Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Title 2 and Title 16 benefits. Plaintiff 16 17
18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 primarily contends that the ALJ erred in finding that he was not
2 disabled in the absence of substance use, asserting that his co- 3 occurring mental disorders are disabling even when he does not use 4 drugs. As is explained below, substantial evidence does not support the
5 ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s substance use was material to the 6 disability determination. This matter is remanded for further 7 proceedings.
8 I. Background 9 Plaintiff filed his Title 2 and 16 applications for benefits in May 10 2023, alleging disability beginning July 1, 2018.2
11 Plaintiff appeared for a hearing before ALJ Matthew Dawson in 12 August 2025, at which Plaintiff testified to the following.3 He worked 13 as a mechanic until 2018 when he was hospitalized for his mental
14 health.4 He worked as a mechanic again for approximately six months 15 16
17 2 Administrative Record (AR) 355–80. 18 3 See AR 45–69. 19 4 AR 52–53. 20 1 in 2019.5 He was incarcerated from 2019 to 2023.6 He had been
2 homeless since his release from prison in 2023.7 At the time of the 3 hearing, he was living in a behavioral health center and had been 4 staying there for a month because of mental health issues.8 He suffered
5 from drug addiction and had only a few periods of sobriety outside of 6 prison or treatment centers.9 He suffered from bipolar disorder and, 7 even when he was sober, experienced periods of mania followed by
8 crashes and depressive states.10 9 The ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.11 The 10 ALJ found that including Plaintiff’s substance use, the severity of his
12 5 AR 51–52. 13 6 AR 55–56. 14 7 AR 55. 15 8 AR 54. 16 9 AR 56–57. 17 10 AR 57–58. 18 11 AR 17–37. Per 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)–(g), 416.920(a)–(g), a five- 19 step evaluation determines whether a claimant is disabled. If there is 20 1 mental impairments met listing 12.03 for schizophrenia spectrum and
2 other psychotic disorders, but if he stopped the substance use, he could 3 perform substantial gainful activity.12 The substance use disorder, 4 therefore, was a contributing factor material to the determination of
5 disability.13 6 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were inconsistent 7 with the medical evidence and other evidence.14 As to the medical
8 opinions, the ALJ found: 9 • the prior administrative medical findings of Richard B., PhD, 10 partially persuasive.
11 12
13 medical evidence of drug or alcohol addiction, the ALJ must then 14 determine whether drug or alcohol use is a material factor contributing 15 to the disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 16 416.935; Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 12 AR 22, 35. 18 13 AR 36. 19 14 AR 30. 20 1 • the prior administrative medical findings of John G., PhD,
2 unpersuasive. 3 • the prior administrative medical findings of Stephen Gerrish, 4 MD, and Ian C., MD, overall persuasive.
5 • the examining opinions of Justin Stamschror, MD, and Linda 6 Wolcott, PhD, persuasive only to the extent they endorsed 7 disabling mental limitations when using substances.
8 • the treating opinions of Dennen Frazier, PA, and Beverly 9 Khodra, MD, unpersuasive.15 10 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found:
11 • Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through June 12 30, 2020. 13 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
14 activity since July 1, 2018, the alleged onset date. 15 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 16 severe impairments: schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type;
17 PTSD; panic disorder; anti-social personality disorder; 18
19 15 AR 32–34. 20 1 substance use disorders (cannabis, stimulants); and
2 degenerative disc disease. 3 • Step three: including Plaintiff’s substance use, the severity of 4 his impairments met listing 12.03, but if he stopped the
5 substance use, he did not have an impairment or combination 6 of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of 7 one of the listed impairments.
8 • RFC: if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, he had the RFC to: 9 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, 10 and crawl. He can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can tolerate frequent exposure to extreme 11 cold but no exposure to moving mechanical parts and high exposed places. He can understand, remember, and 12 carry out simple instructions. He can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting. He can make simple 13 work-related decisions and can tolerate occasional interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the general 14 public.
15 • Step four: Plaintiff did not have past relevant work. 16 • Step five: if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, considering his 17 RFC, age, education, and work history, Plaintiff could perform 18 19 20 1 work that existed in significant numbers in the national
2 economy, such as router, marker, and collator/operator.16 3 Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the 4 Appeals Council, which denied review.17 Plaintiff now appeals to
5 district court.18 6 II. Standard of Review 7 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by
8 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”19 and such error 9 impacted the nondisability determination.20 Substantial evidence is 10
11 16 AR 17, 20–36. See AR 62–63 (Vocational expert testified that a 12 hypothetical individual with the ALJ’s crafted RFC except for more 13 manipulative restrictions could perform those three jobs.). 14 17 AR 1–3. 15 18 ECF No. 1. 16 19 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 17 405(g). 18 20 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 19 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 20 1 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such
2 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 3 support a conclusion.”21 4 III. Analysis
5 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by finding that substance use was 6 material to the disability determination, improperly rejecting his 7 symptom testimony, and improperly evaluating the medical opinions.
8 9
10 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 11 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 12 21 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 13 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 14 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 15 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 16 detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion,” not simply the evidence 17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 The Commissioner argues the ALJ committed no consequential error
2 and substantial evidence supports his decision. 3 A. Substance Use: Plaintiff establishes consequential error. 4 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erroneously relied on selective, non-
5 representative evidence in finding that he was not disabled absent 6 substance use. Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored contradictory 7 evidence that even when he was not using drugs, he experienced
8 depression and bipolar symptoms that interfered with his ability to 9 work. The Court agrees. 10 1. Standard
11 If the ALJ finds that a claimant is disabled and there is medical 12 evidence of drug or alcohol addiction, then the ALJ must determine 13 whether drug or alcohol use is a material factor contributing to the
14 disability.22 If the remaining limitations without drug or alcohol use 15 would not be disabling, disability benefits are not awarded.23 The 16
17 22 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a). 18 23 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935; Sousa v. 19 Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 1 claimant has the burden of showing that his drug or alcohol use is not
2 a material contributing factor to disability.24 3 The Social Security Administration has provided the following 4 interpretation of its policies regarding claimants with co-occurring
5 mental disorders and drug addiction and alcoholism (“DAA”): 6 a. Many people with DAA have co-occurring mental disorders; that is, a mental disorder(s) diagnosed by an 7 acceptable medical source in addition to their DAA. We do not know of any research data that we can use to predict 8 reliably that any given claimant’s co-occurring mental disorder would improve, or the extent to which it would 9 improve, if the claimant were to stop using drugs or alcohol.
10 b. To support a finding that DAA is material, we must have evidence in the case record that establishes that a claimant 11 with a co-occurring mental disorder(s) would not be disabled in the absence of DAA. Unlike cases involving physical 12 impairments, we do not permit adjudicators to rely exclusively on medical expertise and the nature of a 13 claimant’s mental disorder.
14 c. We may purchase a [consultative exam] in a case involving a co-occurring mental disorder(s). We will 15 purchase [consultative exams] primarily to help establish whether a claimant who has no treating source records has 16 a mental disorder(s) in addition to DAA. . . .
17 d. We will find that DAA is not material to the determination of disability and allow the claim if the record 18
19 24 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2007). 20 1 is fully developed and the evidence does not establish that the claimant’s co-occurring mental disorder(s) would 2 improve to the point of nondisability in the absence of DAA.25 3 2. ALJ’s Findings 4 The ALJ found that “the longitudinal record documents that, 5 including his substance use, [Plaintiff] is markedly limited” in his 6 abilities to interact with others and adapt or manage oneself, “which is 7 evidenced by abnormal thoughts and behaviors, irritability, anger, 8 auditory and visual hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia.”26 But, 9 in the absence of substance use, his symptoms are 10 sufficiently controlled with medicinal and non-medicinal means such that he is capable of performing sustained 11 mental work activity in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (8 hours a day for 5 days a 12 week or an equivalent work schedule) within the confines of the assessed residual functional capacity.27 13 14
15 25 Social Security Ruling, SSR 13-2p; Titles II and XVI: Evaluating 16 Cases Involving Drug Addiction and Alcoholism (DAA), 78 FR 11939- 17 01, 11943–44. 18 26 AR 23. 19 27 AR 32. 20 1 The ALJ first considered evidence of Plaintiff’s functioning while
2 using substances.28 As the ALJ noted, in July 2018, Plaintiff presented 3 to the emergency department in a violent state, “extremely intoxicated 4 on something,” and had to be fully restrained.29 The doctor suspected
5 methamphetamine use and Plaintiff noted a long history of drug and 6 alcohol abuse.30 Plaintiff’s drug screen was negative for 7 methamphetamines but positive for THC and tricyclics.31 He was then
8 incarcerated from September 2019 to April 2023, during which he was 9 treated for opioid dependence, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 10 disorder, and depression.32
11 The ALJ next considered that following his release from prison in 12 2023, Plaintiff presented to the emergency department after reportedly 13 taking several drugs, complained of chronic pain, asked for opiates, and
15 28 AR 23–28. 16 29 AR 801–11. 17 30 AR 811. 18 31 AR 811. 19 32 See AR 598–702. 20 1 was uncooperative.33 Five days later, he was minimally responsive, his
2 drug screen was positive for multiple substances, and he reported 3 taking opiates.34 Throughout the year, he visited different emergency 4 departments and medical clinics, filled prescriptions at different
5 pharmacies, and complained of pain from suspicious injuries, which the 6 ALJ considered drug-seeking behavior.35 Plaintiff often presented in an 7 altered mental state, reported substance use, and had positive drug
8 screens.36 9 The ALJ next considered that Plaintiff began mental health 10 counseling in November 2023, reporting to his counselor that he used
11 methamphetamine and fentanyl at least weekly while navigating 12 homelessness.37 He requested certain prescription painkillers and 13
15 33 AR 23, 1115–19. 16 34 AR 1091. 17 35 AR 24, 1305, 1307–08, 1311, 1313, 1325–28, 1426, 1541, 1543. 18 36 See AR 1325–28. 19 37 AR 24, 1396–97, 1730. 20 1 stimulants.38 Following another incarceration in 2024, Plaintiff
2 complained of hallucinations and recent heavy methamphetamine and 3 fentanyl use, and he tested positive for fentanyl.39 He exhibited 4 withdrawal symptoms during a December 2024 to January 2025
5 incarceration, but was deemed appropriate for outpatient care with 6 sobriety.40 In May 2025, he was involuntarily placed in inpatient 7 mental health treatment when he reported hallucinations, substance
8 use, and suicidal ideations, and at the time he tested positive for 9 amphetamines and fentanyl.41 10 As to evidence from when Plaintiff was not using drugs, the ALJ
11 considered that Plaintiff visited a therapist in July 2018 who noted 12 that Plaintiff was engaged, denied suicidal ideation, and was only 13 slightly anxious.42 On follow-up the next month, he was taking
15 38 AR 1396–97, 1399, 1568–70, 1759, 1875. 16 39 AR 1734, 1738, 1746, 1763. 17 40 AR 1675, 1680–82. 18 41 AR 1877, 2320–21, 2650–52. 19 42 AR 31, 502. 20 1 medication that helped with trauma and flashbacks, and he presented
2 “much more calm” with “thought content . . . much less tangential than 3 at intake.”43 The ALJ continued: 4 Through mid-2019, treatment notes show that he reported doing well. A community support worker described him as 5 appropriate in his interactions with her as well as pleasant and reality based. He was continuing to take his 6 medications and was making all his scheduled appointments. In December 2018, he reported that his sleep 7 was good despite having a newborn baby at home, and he denied any mood swings. He expressed satisfaction with his 8 medication and requested that it be refilled . . . .44
9 The ALJ found that the prior administrative medical findings at 10 the initial level that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in interacting 11 with others was “only consistent with the record medical evidence of 12 substance use,” reasoning that “[n]owhere is this more apparent than 13 in treatment notes showing an outpatient level of care was adequate 14 without substance use, while inpatient care was required with 15 16
17 43 AR 497. 18 44 AR 32 (citing AR 552, 561–66, 569–78, 589 (treatment records from 19 prosecutorial diversion program)). 20 1 substance use.”45 Similarly, the ALJ discounted the prior
2 administrative medical findings of marked mental limitations at the 3 reconsideration level because they were present only with substance 4 use.46 The ALJ also found that the consultative examining
5 psychiatrists’ and treating providers’ opinions were based on Plaintiff’s 6 subjective reporting and consistent only with substance use.47 7 3. Analysis
8 On this record, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 9 finding that Plaintiff’s substance use was a contributing factor material 10 to disability. Without question, the record establishes that Plaintiff’s
11 drug use exacerbated his bipolar and schizoaffective symptoms, with 12 evidence of drug use heavily outweighing periods of sobriety. But in 13 finding that Plaintiff was not disabled when he was not using drugs,
14 the ALJ erroneously relied on only a few normal findings, ignored 15 16
17 45 AR 32 (citing AR 111–24). 18 46 AR 32–33 (citing AR 84–96, 111–24). 19 47 AR 33–34 (citing AR 1502–07, 1620–25, 1661–63, 1713–28). 20 1 contradictory treatment records, and lacked a sufficient foundation to
2 discount the mental health experts. 3 First, the ALJ only considered a few cherry-picked records from 4 2018 and 2019 as evidence of Plaintiff’s functioning absent substance
5 use.48 The two therapy records from 2018 considered by the ALJ 6 establish that Plaintiff’s mental status was once mostly normal, and 7 Plaintiff’s mood, trauma, and flashbacks improved with medication.49
8 The diversion program treatment records from 2018 and 2019 9 considered by the ALJ show that Plaintiff’s mood, thought processes, 10 and hallucinations improved with medication.50
12 48 See AR 31–32 (citing AR 497, 502, 552, 561–66, 569–78, 589); 13 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing 14 that treatment records must be viewed considering the overall 15 diagnostic record); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 16 1984) (disallowing the ALJ from cherry picking evidence to support a 17 conclusion that contradicts the overall diagnostic record). 18 49 AR 497, 502. 19 50 AR 552, 562–66, 569–76, 578, 589. 20 1 However, the overall diagnostic record from this period of sobriety
2 demonstrates that Plaintiff’s ability to work was still limited by severe 3 mental impairments. In July 2018, when he had not recently used 4 drugs, Plaintiff reported the following to a mental health therapist: he
5 had “raging” emotions; he was very irritable; he relied on his 6 prescribed Ativan to calm down; he had “past delusional thoughts and 7 perhaps some recent and past auditory hallucinations”; “Christ ha[d]
8 been talking to him . . . [Plaintiff could] hear him”; his mood was 9 “down”; and at times he was restless and moved so fast that people 10 could not understand what he was talking about.51 On exam around
11 this time, he had depressed mood, restricted and fatigued affect, slow 12 and poorly organized speech, lethargic behavior and motor activity, and 13 deficits in thought process and communication.52 In September 2018,
14 still having abstained from substances, he reported occasionally having 15 paranoid thoughts that people were “following him [and] trying to come 16
18 51 AR 502. 19 52 AR 580. 20 1 after him.”53 His bipolar disorder medication made him “fatigued . . .
2 and sedated,” rendering him unable to do daily activities or work, and 3 “when he was not on medication he was hyper doing things which []he 4 should not have done [and] felt manic and aggressive.”54 The ALJ did
5 not consider any of the foregoing evidence. 6 Second, the ALJ did not consider the evidence of Plaintiff’s 7 mental health during his incarceration from 2019 to 2023. His initial
8 mental health appraisal from the Department of Corrections described 9 reports of manic episodes, delusions, and agitation connected to his 10 bipolar 1 disorder diagnosis.55 He continued experiencing depression
11 and anxiety during incarceration, but his symptoms improved with 12 medication and coping strategies.56 He had a “resurgence of psychotic 13 symptoms” and increased anxiety, so his provider suggested changes to
14 15
16 53 AR 527. 17 54 AR 527–28, 557. 18 55 AR 700–01. 19 56 AR 655, 658, 662, 684, 691, 693. 20 1 his medication.57 At a later time, Plaintiff took a small amount of
2 methamphetamine and “spice” without any symptoms besides dilated 3 pupils.58 Then in August 2022, he reported auditory hallucinations 4 and/or “manic episodes in the absence of drug use.”59 Shortly before his
5 release, Plaintiff reported having no mental health symptoms except 6 for some anxiety and that he felt stable on his medication.60 7 Collectively, the treatment records from prison show schizoaffective
8 and bipolar impairments in the absence of drug use, improvement with 9 medication that caused side effects, and waxing and waning symptoms, 10 none of which the ALJ considered. Consistent with the foregoing
11 evidence of significant symptoms absent drug use, Plaintiff reported 12 the same symptoms to psychological examiners in January and 13 September 2024 and at the ALJ hearing.61
15 57 AR 658, 660. 16 58 AR 645, 651. 17 59 AR 627. 18 60 AR 602. 19 61 AR 57–58, 1502–06, 1620–24. 20 1 Third, the ALJ lacked a sufficient foundation to discount several
2 mental-health medical opinions as consistent only with substance use. 3 Dr. B. reviewed the medical records at the initial level and opined that 4 Plaintiff was markedly limited in his ability to interact with others,
5 moderately limited in his ability to maintain pace, and moderately 6 limited in adapting or managing oneself.62 The ALJ found these 7 opinions partially persuasive, explaining:
8 Although [Dr. B.] explained his findings, the marked limitation he endorses is only consistent with the record 9 medical evidence of substance use, while the moderate limitation he endorses in adapting or managing oneself is 10 only consistent with the record medical evidence in the absence of substance use. Nowhere is this more apparent 11 than in treatment notes showing an outpatient level of care was adequate without substance use, while inpatient care 12 was required with substance use.63
13 The ALJ’s reasoning is not supported by substantial evidence because, 14 as explained above, the ALJ relied on a non-representative fraction of 15 the medical evidence during periods of Plaintiff’s sobriety. Further, the 16 fact that Plaintiff received outpatient care during periods of sobriety 17
18 62 AR 117. 19 63 AR 32. 20 1 does not negate the evidence of limitations that continued to impact his
2 ability to work. 3 Similarly, the ALJ discounted Dr. G.’s prior administrative 4 medical finding that Plaintiff’s bipolar symptoms would cause other
5 limitations partly because Dr. G. “did not adequately consider the 6 effects of the claimant’s substance use, as the evidence of record shows 7 extreme symptoms and what amounts to an inability to live
8 independently during periods of substance use.”64 But Dr. G. 9 considered evidence throughout the record, including and not including 10 substance use,65 and the extremity of Plaintiff’s symptoms when using
11 drugs does not address how Plaintiff functioned when not using drugs. 12 Finally, the ALJ found the consultative psychiatric exam opinions 13 of Drs. Stamschror and Wolcott consistent only with substance use
14 partly because they relied heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective reporting of 15 his symptoms.66 A medical opinion that is based primarily on a 16
17 64 AR 32–33, 89–90, 94–95. 18 65 See AR 89–90. 19 66 AR 33–34. 20 1 claimant’s subjective reports may be considered unpersuasive as
2 inadequately supported.67 However, as explained, the ALJ improperly 3 disregarded evidence showing that Plaintiff experienced these same 4 symptoms during periods of sobriety. Consequently, discounting
5 Drs. Stamschror and Wolcott’s opinions as based on Plaintiff’s reports 6 relies only on a few cherry-picked findings that contradict the overall 7 record.
8 Remand is required for the ALJ to reevaluate the evidence from 9 when Plaintiff was not using drugs and reconsider the symptom 10 reports and medical opinions in light of this evidence.68 On remand, the
11 ALJ shall order an updated consultative examination performed by a 12
13 67 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1); Buck v. Berryhill, 14 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 15 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 16 68 See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) (“When the 17 ALJ denies benefits and the court finds error, the court ordinarily must 18 remand to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award 19 of benefits.”). 20 1 medical professional qualified in co-occurring mental disorders and
2 drug addiction.69 This examiner should be provided, at minimum, 3 copies of Plaintiff’s treatment records identified on pages 18–20 of this 4 order—namely, the mental health care records from 201870 and the
5 treatment records from his 2019–2023 incarceration71—and the prior 6 consultative examination reports72 to aid the examiner in opining 7 whether any observed or reported limitations are the product of
8 substance use or a co-occurring mental disorder. 9 B. Other Issues: The ALJ must reevaluate on remand. 10 Plaintiff separately challenges the ALJ’s rejection of the symptom
11 testimony and weighing of the medical opinions. The ALJ’s rejection of 12 Plaintiff’s mental-health symptom testimony and the mental-health 13 medical opinions relied in large part on the ALJ’s evaluation of the
14 evidence absent substance use. As explained, that evaluation is not 15
16 69 See SSR 13-2p, supra n.25. 17 70 AR 489–508, 513–97 (Exhibits 1F, 3F). 18 71 AR 598–702 (Exhibit 4F). 19 72 AR 1502–06, 1620–24 (Exhibits 13F, 21F). 20 1 supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ must reconsider this
2 evidence on remand, which will in turn impact the ALJ’s weighing of 3 the symptom testimony and the medical opinions. Likewise, the Court 4 need not address Plaintiff’s challenges regarding the physical-health
5 evidence, as remand for a new disability determination is required. 6 IV. Conclusion 7 Plaintiff establishes the ALJ erred. The ALJ is to develop the
8 record and reevaluate—with meaningful articulation and evidentiary 9 support—the sequential process. 10 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
11 1. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this 12 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social 13 Security for further proceedings pursuant to
14 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 15 2. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF 16 Nos. 6 and 8, enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, and
17 CLOSE the case. 18 // 19 //
20 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office 1s directed to file this
2 |lorder and provide copies to all counsel.
3 DATED this 6th day of July 2026.
' hed I flan 5 EDWARD F.SHEA Senior United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 26