Patrick N Dupree v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 22, 2024
DocketSF-315H-21-0036-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Patrick N Dupree v. Department of the Army (Patrick N Dupree v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patrick N Dupree v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PATRICK N. DUPREE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-315H-21-0036-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: August 22, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Patrick N. Dupree , Jolon, California, pro se.

Kristopher Motschenbacher and Bernard Lee Gotmer , Fort Hunter Liggett, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The appellant was appointed to a competitive service position on November 10, 2019. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 14-15. The Standard Form 50 (SF-50) executed upon the appellant’s hire notes that the “[a]ppointment is subject to completion of two year initial probationary period beginning 10-NOV-2019.” Id. at 14. The appellant was terminated approximately 11 months later, on October 19, 2020, allegedly because he “failed to demonstrate the professionalism necessary for continued employment,” including a “poor job attitude” and failing to comply with established leave-requesting procedures. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-10. The appellant filed an appeal challenging his termination during his probationary period. Id. at 3. On his appeal form, the appellant acknowledged that he had only 11 months of Government service and was serving a probationary period at the time of his termination. Id. at 1. The administrative judge issued an acknowledgment order notifying the appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction over his appeal and instructing him to meet his jurisdictional burden by filing evidence or argument within 15 days. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5. The 3

appellant did not file a response. The administrative judge subsequently issued an initial decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that he met the definition of an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant then filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which the Board has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An individual employed in a competitive service position may appeal an adverse action, such as a removal, to the Board only if he meets the definition of an “employee,” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a). Claiborne v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 118 M.S.P.R. 491, ¶ 6 (2012). At the time of the appellant's appointment to his competitive- service position in November 2019, an individual appointed to a permanent competitive-service position in the Department of Defense (DOD) was subject to a 2-year probationary period and only qualified as an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2016) and 10 U.S.C. § 1599e (2016) if he was not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment, or if he had completed 2 years of current continuous service. See Bryant v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. 2 We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege that he was an “employee” with a statutory right to appeal his termination because he was serving a probationary period and had only 11 months of current continuous service. ID at 4-5. The appellant does not dispute this finding on review. PFR File, Tab 1. 2 In December 2021, Congress repealed 10 U.S.C. § 1599e and the 2-year probationary period for such DOD appointments. Bryant, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. However, this repeal was made effective December 31, 2022, and only applied to individuals appointed on or after that date. 10 U.S.C. § 1599e note; Bryant, 2022 MSPB 1, ¶ 8. The repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 1599e does not affect the outcome of this appeal. 4

In his petition for review, the appellant disputes the merits of the underlying termination decision and submits a document entitled “Standard Operating Procedure,” as well as several character statements to counter the agency’s stated reasons for removing him. Id. at 3-18. Arguments and documents related to the merits of the underlying termination decision are not relevant to the question of whether the appellant meets the definition of “employee” that would confer Board jurisdiction over his appeal. The appellant also asserts that he was denied a fair opportunity to present witnesses, that he did not understand Board procedures, and that he “didn’t know [he] was representing [him]self.” Id. at 3-5. A party to an appeal may designate a representative of his choice by submitting a pleading to the administrative judge. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31. The appellant did not designate a representative in this appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 1.

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Patrick N Dupree v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patrick-n-dupree-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.