Patrick L. Patton v. State of Arkansas

2019 Ark. App. 440

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: October 2, 2019
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 440 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.07.29 09:43:56 DIVISION IV -05'00' No. CR-19-268 Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered: October 2, 2019

PATRICK L. PATTON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BRADLEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 06CR-18-42]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE SAM POPE, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant Patrick Patton appeals from the December 5, 2018 Bradley County Circuit

Court order convicting him of criminal mischief in the first degree, a Class C felony. The

jury sentenced Patton to a term of ninety-six months in the Arkansas Department of

Correction, and he was ordered to pay $17,000 in restitution. Patton’s sole point on appeal

is that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay, in the form of an invoice,

to prove the amount of actual damages. We affirm.

The evidence at trial established the following. Patton was taken to the Bradley

County Medical Center Emergency Room when he sustained an injury earlier in the night

while he was being arrested. Patton testified he was dropped on his face, which knocked

out three of his teeth and required six stitches. When a deputy went to the hospital to

execute an arrest warrant, Patton sat up, punched the wall, ripped down a whiteboard,

grabbed a computer and threw it down, and then started punching out a glass cabinet. Cathy Hall, an employee health nurse and in-service director at the Bradley County

Medical Center, testified that the computer Patton damaged was a piece of specialized tele-

medicine equipment that could not be replaced by a regular laptop or desktop computer.

Hall explained that the device was part of the “Arkansas Saves” program funded by the

University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). Hall testified that she had overseen

the program at the medical center for roughly ten years and that UAMS pays part of her

salary because of it. Hall explained this program was originally established through grants,

but now the medical center pays UAMS for the equipment yearly. Hall further explained

that the billing for this program does not go through the medical center’s typical financial

process because the medical center is billed strictly through UAMS.

To prove the amount of damage caused, the State introduced an invoice into

evidence through Hall. The invoice was transmitted by UAMS, and Hall submitted it to

the medical center. Hall testified she was authorized to submit it to the medical center by

the hospital administrator. The invoice represented the actual replacement cost of

$15,746.97 paid by the medical center to replace the tele-medicine device and a document

identifying the glass cabinet costing $1,304. Patton objected to the admission of the invoice,

arguing that the invoice was hearsay, but the court overruled his objection.

On appeal, Patton does not expressly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence;

rather, he challenges the circuit court’s finding that the State’s proof of damages was not

inadmissible hearsay.

The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the

circuit court, and we will not reverse a circuit court’s decision regarding the admission of

2 evidence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Sitzmann v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 78, at 3–

4, 569 S.W.3d 913, 916. Specifically, we have stated that an appellate court will not reverse

a circuit court’s ruling on a hearsay objection unless the appellant can demonstrate an abuse

of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error

in the circuit court’s decision but requires that the circuit court act improvidently,

thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. Additionally, this court will not reverse an

evidentiary ruling absent a showing of prejudice. Id.

A person commits the offense of criminal mischief in the first degree if he or she

purposely and without legal justification destroys or causes damage to any property of

another. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203 (Repl. 2013). It is a Class C felony if the amount of

actual damages is more than five thousand dollars. Id. To prove the amount of damages, the

State introduced an invoice through Hall. Patton argues this invoice is hearsay and that

without this invoice, the State failed to establish the amount of actual damages necessary to

support his conviction. We disagree.

Rule 803(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides an exception to the hearsay

rule for the admission of business records. That exception has seven requirements: (1) a

record or other compilation, (2) of acts or events, (3) made at or near the time the act or

event occurred, (4) by a person with knowledge, or from information transmitted by a

person with knowledge, (5) kept in the course of regularly conducted business, (6) which

has a regular practice of recording such information, (7) all as known by the testimony of

the custodian or other qualified witness. Ark. R. Evid. 803.

3 We hold that Hall’s testimony was sufficient to lay the foundation for the

introduction of the invoice under the business-records exception as proof of the damage

caused. Here, the invoice was a record of the actual amount of damages incurred. The

invoice was created about two months after Patton destroyed the equipment. Hall had

knowledge of the replacement cost because UAMS submitted a bill yearly to the hospital

for the equipment and she had knowledge of the process involved in paying for the

program’s equipment. Hall was qualified to testify because she worked on behalf of both

UAMS and the medical center for ten years. Lastly, the hospital administrator authorized

her to submit invoices from UAMS to the medical center.

We do not have any testimony regarding how the invoice was prepared, and it

appears that Hall did not personally prepare the invoice, but these facts do not prevent the

admission of the record into evidence. We have held in laying a foundation for admission

of business records at trial, the sponsor witness need not have actual knowledge of the actual

creation of the document itself, as such personal knowledge of its creation goes to the weight

rather than the admissibility of the evidence. See Metzgar v. Rodgers, 83 Ark. App. 354, 376,

128 S.W.3d 5, 19 (2003). Hall testified that she had been working on behalf of UAMS and

the medical center for ten years and is familiar with the normal billing and operations. We

are satisfied that she is a knowledgeable and qualified witness.

On appeal, Patton does not address the business-records exception to the hearsay

rule. Rather he relies on Eichelberger v. State, 323 Ark. 551, 916 S.W.2d 109 (1996), to

suggest that all invoices are inadmissible hearsay. In Eichelberger, property was damaged,

including a windshield. The victim of the damaged windshield was allowed to prove his

4 damages with an invoice from a windshield-repair company that was sent to the victim’s

insurance company. That invoice was merely an estimate that reflected what the glass

company would charge the insurance company to replace the broken window. Here, the

testimony established that the medical center actually paid the amount of damages reflected

on the invoice. Further, the invoice was introduced through a qualified and knowledgeable

witness (Hall), whereas in Eichelberger the witness was only the victim and had no knowledge

about how the invoice was transmitted and the process of billing between the repair

company and the insurance company.

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the invoice to establish the amount of damages and restitution owed.

Affirmed.

GRUBER, C.J., and HIXSON, J., agree.

Potts Law Office, by: Gary W. Potts, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.