NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2452-22
PATRICK KELLY and ROSALIND KELLY,
Plaintiffs-Respondents/ Cross-Appellants,
v.
HRISTO TANCEVSKI and ANICA TANCEVSKI,
Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents. _________________________
Submitted October 30, 2024 – Decided February 5, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk, Paganelli and Torregrossa- O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Sussex County, Docket No. C-000044-20.
Weiner Law Group LLP, attorneys for appellants/cross- respondents (Steven R. Tombalakian, of counsel and on the briefs). Gruber, Colabella, Liuzza, Thompson & Hiben attorneys for respondents/cross-appellants (Chris H. Colabella, of counsel and on the brief; Racquel G. Hiben, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
Defendants Hristo Tancevski and Anica Tancevski (Tancevskis) appeal
from a March 8, 2023 trial court order, entered following a bench trial, denying
their counterclaims for slander of title and a permanent easement over plaintiffs'
Patrick Kelly and Rosalind Kelly (Kellys) property. In addition, the Tancevskis
and Kellys both appeal the trial court's temporary easement remedy. Because
the trial court's factual findings are adequately supported by the credible
evidence in the record, and we conclude there was no error in the court's
application of the relevant legal principles, we affirm.
I.
This matter involves a property boundary dispute between neighbors, the
Kellys and Tancevskis. The Kellys filed a complaint against the Tancevskis
alleging the driveway from the Tancevskis' property encroached onto the Kellys'
property. The Kellys alleged the driveway encroachment caused a nuisance and
sought its removal. Along with filing the complaint, the Kellys' lawyer filed a
notice of lis pendens on the Tancevskis' property that stated there was a lawsuit,
A-2452-22 2 "the general object of which [wa]s: . . . [t]o remove the encroachment of [the
Tancevski]s' driveway upon the property of" the Kellys.
The Tancevskis filed an answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. Included within the affirmative defenses, the Tancevskis alleged
the Kellys were "barred from recovery" under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-6 and N.J.S.A.
2A:14-7 and that the Tancevskis "own[ed] absolutely, and [we]re entitled to the
title and possession of the real property upon which their driveway [wa]s
situated under the [d]octrine of [a]dverse [p]ossession."
In addition, the Tancevskis pleaded counterclaims. As relevant here, the
counterclaims included a claim that the Tancevskis held title to that portion of
the Kellys' property under the driveway encroachment, through adverse
possession. Also, the Tancevskis claimed slander of their title because of a pre-
litigation communication from the Kellys' attorney to the Tancevskis' contract
buyer concerning the driveway encroachment dispute.
The trial court conducted a two-day trial. The Kellys presented testimony
from their landscaper and Patrick. The Tancevskis offered the testimony of their
immediate predecessor in title and Hristo. In addition, the trial court admitted,
without objection, the Kellys' thirty-seven trial exhibits and the Tancevskis'
thirty-eight trial exhibits into evidence.
A-2452-22 3 In the trial court's nineteen-page written opinion, the judge found that all
witnesses were credible. Since the judge thoroughly detailed each attribute of
the witnesses' testimony that led to his credibility conclusions, there is no need
for us to repeat them here.
The Kellys purchased their property in 1986 and moved into the house in
December 1987. The Kellys' survey from the purchase "did not indicate any
encroachments on [their] property." In fact, the Kellys "were unaware of any
encroachments until 1995" when they were approached by one of the
Tancevskis' predecessors in title regarding "a proposed easement agreement."
The Tancevskis' predecessor advised that a "portion of the[ir] driveway
encroached" on the Kellys' property. Patrick testified that no easement
agreement was reached because he preferred a property line adjustment.
The predecessor sold the Tancevski property to another. Patrick discussed
the driveway encroachment with the new owner. He did "not make an issue of
the encroachment" or tell the new owner that they "could not use the area of the
driveway." Patrick suggested that the encroachment could be addressed "if
either of the parties sold their property or refinanced their property ."
In 1999, Patrick received a proposal from the new owner's attorney. The
new owner was in the process of selling the property and proposed "a property
A-2452-22 4 line adjustment to address the driveway encroachment." However, before he
could discuss the proposal with the new owner, the property was sold.
The new owner sold the property to the Tancevskis' immediate
predecessor in title. Patrick and this new owner had discussions about the
driveway encroachment. According to Patrick, the Kellys permitted the new
owner "to use the entire driveway but did not transfer or give up [their] legal
ownership right to the disputed area of the property."
In 2005, Patrick learned that the Tancevskis had purchased the property.
Patrick spoke to Hristo and the "conversation was similar to all of the prior
conversations with [prior] owners relat[ing] to the encroachment and entering
into a property line adjustment to resolve the encroachment issue."
Hristo recalled "that shortly after moving in he met [Patrick] and had a
conversation regarding the encroachment. [He] recalled that [Patrick] proposed
to make a property line adjustment if either of the parties sold or refinanced their
properties." However, Hristo "did not believe that the offer was fair."
In September 2019, Hristo and Patrick again discussed "a property line
adjustment." The Tancevskis were in the process of listing the property for sale.
Hristo rejected Patrick's offer because of concerns with the Tancevskis' septic
system. Instead of selling, the Tancevskis leased the property.
A-2452-22 5 In 2020, Hristo informed Patrick that the Tancevskis were again selling
the property. Patrick "raised the issue of the property line adjustment" but the
Tancevskis "refused to enter into any . . . agreement." The Kellys retained an
attorney to resolve the property line issue.
According to the judge's decision, on October 30, 2020, the Tancevskis
entered into a contract for the sale of their property. The Kellys' attorney "sent
correspondence to the realtors and attorneys regarding the dispute over the
driveway encroachment." "On November 13, 2020, the buyer's attorney advised
that they were pulling out of the deal because of the dispute over the driveway."
The Kellys' attorney filed the complaint on November 19, 2020, and a lis
pendens on the Tancevskis' property on November 25, 2020. Hristo testified
that he never asserted that he owned the driveway encroachment onto the Kellys'
property until the complaint was filed. In the spring of 2021, the Tancevskis
relisted the property for rent. They executed a lease with a tenant in June 2021.
In his testimony, Patrick "opined that if [the Tancevskis] stopped using
the area of the driveway that encroached on [the Kelly]s' property that there
would still be sufficient frontage for the driveway pursuant to the applicable
. . . ordinance." Patrick "testified that he did not obtain an expert report
A-2452-22 6 indicating that it was usable." Instead, Patrick "relied solely on his own
measurements and his understanding of the applicable ordinance."
In the written opinion, the judge concluded that: (1) the Kellys' claim for
nuisance must be dismissed because—having determined the nuisance was a
permanent one—the complaint was filed more than six years after they were
"first made aware of the encroachment in 1995";1 (2) the Tancevskis'
counterclaim for adverse possession must be dismissed because the Tancevskis
never took "the position that they were the owners of the disputed" driveway
encroachment until the Kellys filed the complaint, and the Tancevskis could not
establish that their use of the area was "hostile." To the contrary, Patrick
testified regarding repeated conversations through the years with multiple
owners of the Tancevskis' lot regarding adjusting the property line and that the
Kellys permitted the Tancevskis and their predecessors to continue using the
encroachment; and (3) the Tancevskis' counterclaim for slander of title resulting
from the Kellys' filing of the lis pendens must be dismissed because the
1 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1(a) provides, "[e]very action at law for trespass to real property, for any tortious injury to real . . . property . . . shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued."
A-2452-22 7 Tancevskis failed to establish damages: (a) the lis pendens was filed after the
contract for sale of the Tancevskis' property was canceled; (b) there was no
support for Hristo's testimony that the lis pendens was "responsible for any lost
rent"; and (c) "there [wa]s no support for an award of attorneys' fees related to
counsel's representation of the [Tancevskis] in this matter."
Despite finding that neither party established their causes of action, the
trial judge concluded "there [wa]s the potential that both parties' properties
would have marketability issues." Therefore, invoking his equitable authority,
the judge found "that [a] temporary easement [wa]s necessary to benefit both
properties." The judge imposed "[a] temporary easement permitting the
encroachment of the driveway onto [the Kelly]s' property . . . [requiring it] to
remain in place until the repair or replacement of the driveway at" the
Tancevskis' property. Thereafter, "[u]pon the repair or replacement of the
driveway the easement [would] terminate[], and the owner of [the Tancevski
property] is to construct the driveway so that it is in compliance with the
property line and does not encroach on" the Kellys' property.
II.
On appeal, the Tancevskis argue the trial court erred in declining to grant:
(1) a permanent easement over the Kellys' property and (2) legal remedies and
A-2452-22 8 compensation for the Kellys' "blatant misuse" of the lis pendens. As to the
remedy imposed, the Tancevskis argue for a permanent easement, not a
temporary easement, and claim the requirement to remove the driveway is
"unworkable." In the Kellys' cross-appeal, they argue the trial court erred in
failing to set a time frame in the temporary easement by which the Tancevskis
are to replace or repair the driveway.
In conducting our review, we apply a deferential standard to a "trial court's
determinations, premised on the testimony of witnesses and written evidence at
a bench trial." D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013). "Findings
by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate,
substantial and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co.,
65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Therefore, "our appellate function is a limited one: we
do not disturb the factual findings . . . of the trial judge unless we are convinced
that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."
Ibid. (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App.
Div. 1963)).
However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
A-2452-22 9 deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.
366, 378 (1995).
A.
The Tancevskis argue the trial judge erred by exclusively focusing on the
counterclaim for adverse possession and omitting the "claims and arguments
seeking a permanent easement to allow the driveway encroachment to remain as
located."
The Tancevskis contend the evidence confirmed that the Kellys' "efforts
to cause removal of the driveway encroachment well surpassed the twenty[-]year
limitations period as provided by the . . . ejectment statutes,[2] such that the only
legal or equitable remedy available, absent adverse possession, was the issuance
of a permanent easement to allow the driveway to remain where located."
However, the Tancevskis provide no legal basis for the acquisition of an
easement in this manner. "Easements may be created in one of the following
ways: by implication; by an express conveyance; or by prescription." Leach v.
2 N.J.S.A. 2A:14-6 provides, "[e]very person having any right or title of entry into real estate shall make such entry within [twenty] years next after the accrual of such right or title of entry, or be barred therefrom thereafter." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7 provides, "[e]very action at law for real estate shall be commenced within [twenty] years next after the right or title thereto, or cause of such action shall have accrued."
A-2452-22 10 Anderl, 218 N.J. Super. 18, 24 (App. Div. 1987). Here, there is no express
easement. Nor is there an easement by implication—created "where an owner
of land conveys to another an inner portion thereof, which is entirely surrounded
by lands owned by the conveyor" or where a "conveyee is found to have a right-
of-way across the retained land of the conveyor for ingress to, and egress from,
the landlocked parcel." Id. at 25 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"To establish an easement by prescription, a claimant must show a use
which is adverse or hostile, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, visible and
notorious . . . ." Mandia v. Applegate, 310 N.J. Super. 435, 443-44 (App. Div.
1998). "[T]he proponent of an easement by prescription must prove an adverse
use of land . . . for at least thirty years." Yellen v. Kassin, 416 N.J. Super. 113,
120 (App. Div. 2010). Thus, for the same reason the Tancevskis' claim for title
through adverse possession fails, the claim for an easement by prescription
fails—the use was not hostile.
Further, we reject the Tancevskis' suggestion that the Kellys "waited more
than [thirty-three] years to initiate efforts to eliminate the encroachment." The
Tancevskis' suggestion sets the earlier accrual date for the Kellys' cause of
action at the time of their acquisition or occupancy of the property.
A-2452-22 11 However, the judge found the Kellys "were first made aware of the
encroachment in 1995." The judge even considered "[g]iving [the Kellys] the
benefit of the doubt that they did not realize there may be a dispute over the
encroachment until . . . 1999" when the Tancevskis' immediate predecessor
purchased the property. We have no reason to disturb the judge's finding that
the Kellys' cause of action accrued in the later years. Thus, the Kellys' filing in
2020 was within the thirty-year time frame and precludes a prescriptive
easement.
Further, the Tancevskis incorrectly assert that after the expiration of the
twenty-year time frame provided in the "ejectment statutes," the Kellys would
be without a cause of action, and therefore, "the only legal and equitable remedy
available . . . was the issuance of a permanent easement to allow the driveway
to remain where located."
The Tancevskis' argument ignores N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 and the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in J & M Land Co. v. First Union National Bank ex
rel. Meyer, 166 N.J. 493 (2001).
N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 provides, "[a]ny person claiming the right of possession
of real property in the possession of another, or claiming title to such real
A-2452-22 12 property, shall be entitled to have his rights determined in an action in the
Superior Court."
In J & M, the Court "address[ed] what, if any, impact the twenty-year
statutes have on proceedings conducted under N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 after the
passage of twenty years." 166 N.J. at 520. The Court held:
a landowner can elect to pursue an action in the Superior Court claiming title to real property or claiming the right to possession in lieu of an ejectment action, Gretkowski v. Wojciechowski, 26 N.J. Super. 245, 247 (App. Div. 1953), even when the wrongful possessor has been in possession for twenty years or more. Stump [v. Whibco,] 314 N.J. Super. [560,] 565, 582 [(App. Div. 1998)]. We hold, therefore, that because N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 contains no specified time in which proceedings must be instituted thereunder, its practical effect is to super[s]ede those provisions in N.J.S.A. 14-6 and -7 that create repose for common-law ejectment actions after twenty years.
[Id. at 521.]
Therefore, the Kellys' failure to file a complaint within twenty years
would not have precluded the filing under N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1. See ibid. Thus,
the Tancevskis' argument, that they be granted a permanent easement almost as
an inevitable by-product of the Kellys' failure to file within twenty years, is
misplaced.
A-2452-22 13 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Tancevskis a permanent easement.
B.
The Tancevskis argue "[t]he trial court was wrong to not acknowledge not
only the blatant misuse of [the] lis pendens, but to not award any legal remedies
to [the Tancevskis] to compensate them for the needless damage [the Kellys]
caused."3 The Tancevskis rely on the trial court's finding that the lis pendens
was "impermissible" and contend "[a]s such, [the Kellys] slandered [their] title."
The Tancevskis assert that the lis pendens effectuated an "impermissible
clouding of title" that "prevented [them] from realizing the benefits of their
investment" and they "should have been awarded fair and reasonable
compensation for the financial damage inflicted upon them, including their
$18,000 in legal fees" incurred to the point the lis pendens was discharged.
3 In their counterclaim, the Tancevskis pled the Kellys' attorney's communication—before filing the complaint and the lis pendens—with their contract buyer caused the cancellation of the contract and tenant's non-renewal and resultant financial damages. The Tancevskis have not made this argument on appeal and it is deemed waived. See N.J. Dep't of Envt'l Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) ("An issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal.").
A-2452-22 14 In addition, the Tancevskis argue the "lis pendens was not part of a judicial
proceeding," and thus the Kellys are "depriv[ed] . . . of the privileges available
under the statute."
To establish the tort of slander of title, the Tancevskis are required to
establish the Kellys "falsely published an assertion concerning . . . title"; "which
caused special damages"; and that the Kellys "acted out of malice, which was
express or implied." Lone v. Brown, 199 N.J. Super. 420, 426 (App. Div. 1985).
To establish a false publication concerning title, the Tancevskis rely on
the Kellys' "impermissible" filing of the lis pendens. However, the Tancevskis
fail to address how the Kellys' assertion in the lis pendens was false. The lis
pendens merely stated that a lawsuit had been filed and the Kellys sought "to
remove the encroachment of [the Tancevskis'] driveway upon the property of"
the Kellys. There is nothing false in the lis pendens, it was simply deemed
impermissible because the Kellys' lawsuit was not filed "to enforce a lien upon
real estate or to affect the title to real estate or a lien or encumbrance" on the
Tancevskis' property.4 See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-6. Under these circumstances, the
Tancevskis failed to establish a false publication concerning the property.
4 During the course of the litigation a different judge determined the Kellys
A-2452-22 15 In considering special damages, we have noted that "[u]sually the
pecuniary loss is occasioned by the loss of a sale to a particular purchaser ."
Peters Well Drilling Co. v. Hanzula, 242 N.J. Super. 16, 27 (App. Div. 1990).
However, we have noted "the loss can also include damages incurred in the
clearing of the cloud on the title." Ibid.
As to damages, the trial court found the Tancevskis failed to sustain their
burden. The judge found the lis pendens was filed after the contract to sell was
canceled, so it could not have been the reason for the contract's cancellation.
Further, the trial court found there was no support for the Tancevskis' assertion
that they lost rental income because of the filing. Lastly, the judge found "there
[wa]s no support for an award of attorneys' fees related to counsel's
representation of the [Tancevskis] in this matter." Given our deference to the
failed to provide any evidence to the court at this juncture with a right to cloud title on the Tancevski[s'] property. There is nothing in the record to suggest [the Kellys] have any interest on the Tancevsk[is'] property, the allegations in the complaint only spe[a]k to an encroachment on their own property. [The Kellys] conflate this interest with legal title to real estate of another property. [The Kellys] do not have a valid claim on title such that the lis pendens can be maintained.
[(citing Fravega v. Sec. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 192 N.J. Super. 213, 217 (Ch. Div. 1983)).] A-2452-22 16 trial court, we conclude there is no reason to disturb the finding that the
Tancevskis failed to establish damages.
"Malice is defined as the intentional commission of a wrongful act without
just cause or excuse." Lone, 199 N.J. Super. at 426. "Where a defendant acts
in pursuance of a bona fide claim which he is asserting honestly, although
without right, as eventually appears from an adjudication by a court of
competent jurisdiction, such defendant will not be penalized in damages for
asserting such a bona fide claim in good faith." Rogers Carl Corp. v. Moran,
103 N.J. Super. 163, 168 (App. Div. 1968).
Here, as to malice, the Tancevskis suggest that the Kellys' filing of the lis
pendens was "abusive" and effectuated to "gin up litigation leverage." However,
the judge did not make that finding. Instead, the judge accepted Patrick's
testimony that there was no "demand for possession of [the Tancevski]s'
property in the complaint" and that he "did not discuss the filing of the lis
pendens with [his attorney] and [the attorney] filed it on his own." On this
record, we conclude there was no evidence the Kellys acted with malice.
Thus, we are convinced there was no error in the trial court's conclusion
that the Tancevskis failed to establish slander of title as a result of the Kellys'
filing of the lis pendens.
A-2452-22 17 For the sake of completeness, we address the Tancevskis': (1) assertion
that the Kellys' filing of the lis pendens is not protected by the litigation
privilege; and (2) invitation to "take this opportunity to update the law to both
prohibit and sanction any inappropriate use of lis pendens beyond the purposes
provided by statute" and when a "lis pendens [is] filed beyond the requirements
of N.J.S.A. 2A:15-6 [the filer is] not afforded any protections under the statute,
[and] represents a slander of title, and the party abusing the procedure should be
held responsible for compensating the impacted property owner."
In Lone, we held that the litigation privilege provided immunity for a
claim of slander of title for a party that properly filed a notice of lis pendens.
199 N.J. Super. at 426-27; see also Brown v. Brown, 470 N.J. Super. 457, 467
(App. Div. 2022) ("statements contained within a notice of lis pendens are
certainly protected by the litigation privilege.").
The doctrine of litigation immunity provides:
an absolute immunity exists in respect of statements, even those defamatory and malicious, made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, and having some relation thereto, [it] is a principle firmly established, and is responsive to the supervening public policy that persons in such circumstances be permitted to speak and write freely without the restraint of fear of an ensuing defamation action, this sense of freedom being indispensable to the due administration of justice.
A-2452-22 18 [Brown, 470 N.J. Super. at 464 (quoting Fenning v. S.G. Holding Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 110, 117 (App. Div. 1957)).]
"Whether a [party] is entitled to the [litigation] privilege is a question of
law." Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995). Given the facts here—no
falsity, malice, or damages—the Kellys enjoy the protection of immunity in the
filing of the lis pendens. In addition, we decline the invitation to make any
mistaken filing of a lis pendens a per se slander of title subjecting the filer to
sanctions.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the
Tancevskis' claim for slander of title. Further, we reject: (1) the Tancevskis'
argument that the litigation privilege did not provide the Kellys immunity , in
filing of the lis pendens; and (2) the invitation to acknowledge a per se slander
of title claim for the mistaken filing of the lis pendens.
C.
The Tancevskis and the Kellys contest the trial court's remedy. The trial
court imposed a "temporary easement permitting the encroachment of the
driveway onto [the Kelly] property . . . [requiring it] to remain until the repair
or replacement of the driveway at" the Tancevskis' property. Thereafter, "[u]pon
the repair or replacement of the driveway the easement [would] terminate[], and
A-2452-22 19 the owner of [the Tancevskis' property] is to construct the driveway so that it is
in compliance with the property line and does not encroach on" the Kelly s'
property.
The Tancevskis argue that the trial court "went about fashioning an ad-
hoc, provisional and completely unworkable remedy consisting of a temporary
driveway." They contend "[s]uch a 'split the baby'-style remedy, rather than the
permanent reliefs available under [N.J.S.A. 2A:14-6], was entirely unsupported
and requires reversal." The Tancevskis assert that "the appropriate remedy
involving property encroachments for which ejectment is no longer a viable
remedy is a permanent easement, not the temporary construct conjured by the
trial court."
In addition, the Tancevskis contend the Kellys failed to share with them
or produce at trial how the driveway relocation was possible considering "the
site's topography, improvements and location of the septic system, which
partially lies beneath the driveway itself, yet still satisfy the Borough's minimum
driveway design standards."
In turn, the Kellys contend that the trial court erred "by failing to set a
time frame for" the Tancevskis' compliance. The Kellys assert the "failure to
provide a deadline defeats the intended remedy" because the Tancevskis have
A-2452-22 20 "until the end of time to repair or replace the driveway." Moreover, the
Tancevskis have "no incentive to make repairs that are going to cost them
money."
"[A] court's equitable jurisdiction provides as much flexibility as is
warranted by the circumstances." Matejek v. Watson, 449 N.J. Super. 179, 183
(App. Div. 2017). Indeed,
[e]quitable remedies "are distinguished for their flexibility, their unlimited variety, their adaptability to circumstances, and the natural rules which govern their use. There is in fact no limit to their variety and application; the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties."
[Sears v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403, 411-12 (E. & A. 1938) (quoting Pom. Eq. Jur. § 109 (4th ed. 1918)).]
For the reasons previously stated in this opinion, we reject the Tancevskis'
claim for a permanent easement. Moreover, the trial court accepted as credible
Patrick's testimony "that if [the Tancevski]s stopped using the area of the
driveway that encroached on [the Kelly]s' property that there would still be
sufficient frontage for the driveway pursuant to the applicable . . . ordinance."
Given our deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and factual
A-2452-22 21 findings, we conclude there is no reason to disturb the judge's remedy requiring
the eventual relocation of the driveway.
Moreover, we have no reason to disturb the trial court's open-ended
remedy. The Kellys waited years before instituting a cause of action for
nuisance, failed to sustain their cause of action, and suggested similar remedies
through the years. Under these circumstances, we conclude there was no error
in not requiring removal within a certain time frame.
Affirmed.
A-2452-22 22