Patrick Denyan Lane v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 4, 2003
• Docket: 06-02-00027-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-02-00027-CR ______________________________

PATRICK DENYAN LANE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court No. F01-02286-NP

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Grant,* JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross *Ben Z. Grant, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Patrick Denyan Lane appeals his conviction by a jury for aggravated robbery. After Lane pled true to the enhancement paragraphs in the indictment, the trial court sentenced him to forty years' imprisonment. The trial court also made an affirmative finding that Lane used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. On appeal, Lane contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction and that the victim's in-court identification violated his due process rights. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual Background:

Angela Hobbs was purchasing gasoline July 17, 2000, around 6:00 a.m. at a convenience store in Dallas. As she pumped her gasoline, the driver of a white Cadillac drove into the station at the same pump opposite from Hobbs. A man got out of the Cadillac and asked Hobbs for directions. The man then came closer and threatened to stab her if she said anything. The man looked Hobbs in the face when he threatened her and displayed a knife. Hobbs was able to run away from the immediate area. The man did not pursue her, but got in her car, grabbed her purse, ran to his car, and then drove away. Hobbs went inside the gasoline station, where she called police. The police arrived quickly and began pursuing the Cadillac. The chase included a helicopter unit, but the police soon lost track of the vehicle and its driver in a wooded area. Less than an hour later, police found the white Cadillac abandoned in that same wooded area with Hobbs' purse and its contents on the floorboard. Two knives were also found in the vehicle. Police dusted the car and its contents for fingerprints, but only found three "usable" prints, two on the trunk and one on the passenger side mirror, none of which matched the appellant's.

Hobbs told police the robber "wasn't like dark skin or light skin, he was just brown - brown skin-colored" and weighed about 130 pounds. She stood about five to six feet away from the man when he first arrived at the gasoline pump. The man later got as close as two feet from Hobbs. Hobbs identified Lane in open court as the man who robbed her. Hobbs stated, repeatedly, she was certain of her identification of Lane.

John Hopes testified for the State. He lives in the same neighborhood where the white Cadillac was abandoned, and his sister previously dated Lane. As Hopes gave his dogs water on the morning of July 17, Lane ran to Hopes' house. Lane identified himself to Hopes and told him the police were going to get him (Lane) and that he needed a place to hide. Lane offered to pay Hopes in exchange for hiding him. Hopes testified Lane was out of breath and desperate for a place to hide. Hopes also stated he had no doubt it was Lane who approached his home on the morning of July 17. When Hopes did not provide sanctuary to Lane, Lane ran away. Hopes then went inside his home and called police. Hopes gave officers Lane's name and other general information.

Detective Richard Wilson later talked to Hobbs, Hopes, and Lane's former girlfriend. From those conversations, Wilson developed Lane as a suspect. Wilson compiled a photographic line-up with Lane's driver's license photograph placed in slot number five. For the remaining five pictures, Wilson chose men who had similar facial characteristics: mustaches, hair styles, age, and race. Hobbs had not told officers the suspect wore his hair close cut or had facial hair.

About a week after the robbery, Hobbs met with Wilson to view the photographic array. Wilson did not tell her to pick anyone out of the line-up, but did ask if she saw the man who robbed her. Hobbs selected picture number five (Lane's) as the man who robbed her. Hobbs later testified she had no trouble selecting number five as the man who robbed her. After Hobbs picked Lane's photograph from the line-up, Wilson told her, "I believe this [picture five] is the right person." Wilson later testified he said this because he wanted to enlist Hobbs' support in prosecuting the man who robbed her.

Based on Hobbs' identification of Lane, Wilson prepared an application for an arrest warrant. Hobbs' application listed Lane's weight as 170 pounds, not 130 pounds as described by Hobbs in her initial telephone call to police shortly after the robbery. Wilson changed the suspect's weight on the warrant because he thought Hobbs had erroneously "guesstimated" the robber's weight.

Analysis:

In his first point of error, Lane contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the essential element of identity, absent the unduly suggestive line-up. The victim did not tell police the robber had facial hair or had "almond shaped" eyes. Nonetheless, the line-up included only pictures of persons with facial hair. Additionally, Lane weighs approximately forty pounds more than the person described by the victim. Lane believes these factors contributed to Hobbs' misidentification of him as the robber, and he contends that if all taint from the misidentification through the faulty photographic array were removed, the overwhelming weight of the evidence would support granting a new trial. Before the issue of factual sufficiency may be resolved, we must first decide whether the photographic array was unduly suggestive.

1. Preservation of Error.

A defendant may attack an in-court identification through a motion to suppress. Wallace v. State, 75 S.W.3d 576, 584 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. granted). A hearing is then conducted outside the jury's presence. Id. This process is generally sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Id. This procedure was followed in this case. Therefore, the issue has been preserved for the Court's review.

2. The Photographic Array.

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress identification for abuse of discretion. Woodard v. State, 931 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it so deviates from applicable guidelines and principles that the court's decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

When analyzing the admissibility of an in-court identification, the reviewing court uses a two-step analysis: 1) Was the photo display impermissibly suggestive? 2) If it was suggestive, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the suggestive procedure gave rise to a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."

Mitchell v. State, 974 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998), vacated on other grounds, 989 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); see also Wallace, 75 S.W.3d at 584 (citing In re G.A.T., 16 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)) (listing two-pronged test).

The evidence shows that, during her 9-1-1 call to police, Hobbs described the suspect as a black male, about 5'7" tall, weighing 130 pounds, and in his mid-twenties. Less than one and one-half hours later, police received a tip from Hopes that a person being sought by police was sighted in a location a few blocks away from where the robber abandoned the Cadillac. Hopes described the man as out of breath and desperate for a place to hide. He also told police the man's name was Patrick Lane, whom Hopes knew as his sister's former boyfriend. From this evidence, Wilson developed Lane as a suspect in the robbery. Given the state of the investigation at the time, there was no obligation to prepare a line-up fitting a description of someone not a suspect. See Wallace, 75 S.W.3d at 585. The argument that the persons in the photographic array have characteristics not described by the victim at the time of the 9-1-1 call has no validity. Cf. id. at 584 (allegation that array did not contain anyone matching original description by witnesses has no validity). The record before the trial court does not convey the idea that Wilson used the array in an unduly suggestive manner or indicate the pictures themselves led to a misidentification. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by finding the photographic display was not unduly suggestive.

As the second step of the analysis, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has outlined five nonexclusive factors that should be weighed against the corrupting effect of any suggestive identification procedures in assessing reliability under the totality of the circumstances:

1) the opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the crime;

2) the witness' degree of attention;

3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the accused;

4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and

5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Wallace, 75 S.W.3d at 585. "We are required to review the trial court's findings on these factors, regarded as matters of historical fact, deferentially in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. These factors should then be weighed de novo against the corrupting effect of the suggestive pretrial identification procedure." Wallace, 75 S.W.3d at 585.

Hobbs had ample time to view the robber, especially his face, during the commission of the crime. At times, the robber was as close as two feet from her. There was no evidence she was intoxicated or had impaired vision. She gave police a description of the man's vehicle, his clothing, and his height-demonstrating at least a moderate level of attentiveness during the encounter. While Hobbs described the suspect as weighing approximately forty pounds less than Lane's weight at trial, this evidence alone is not sufficient to label her identification as erroneous, given the totality of the circumstances. Cf. id. (discrepancies between early descriptions of suspect and defendant's actual appearance do not necessarily lead to misidentification when evidence is viewed under totality of circumstances). Our review of the photographic array admitted into evidence shows two other men in the array have eyes of a similar oval shape to Lane's eyes. Hobbs was quite positive photograph number five (Lane) was the person who committed the robbery. Only one week passed between the crime and the identification of Lane from the array. Therefore, examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding Hobbs' identification of Lane, we do not believe there was a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. See id. at 584.

The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on the motion to suppress identification are supported by the evidence presented in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lane's motion to suppress.

3. Factual Sufficiency.

In his final point of error, Lane contends that, absent the victim's identification of him at trial, the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support his conviction. He further contends the victim would not have identified him at trial as the robber absent her erroneous identification of him from the unduly suggestive photographic line-up.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently reaffirmed the Clewis ⁽¹⁾ standard for reviewing factual sufficiency:

In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict only if the evidence supporting guilt is so obviously weak, or the contrary evidence so overwhelmingly outweighs the supporting evidence, as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). While a reviewing court has some authority to disregard evidence that supports the verdict, it must be appropriately deferential so as to avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the fact[-]finder. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 944, 121 S.Ct. 1407, 149 L.Ed.2d 349 (2001). The reviewing court should not substantially intrude upon the jury's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony.

Ortiz v. State, No. 73692, 2002 WL 31116634, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2002).

We have already found Hobbs' pretrial identification of Lane was not the product of an unduly suggestive photographic array. It follows that her in-court identification would not be the product of an overly suggestive pretrial identification. Additionally, the victim explicitly testified at trial that her in-court identification of Lane was made independently of her pretrial identification from the photographic array. Hobbs never wavered in the surety of her in-court identification. Nor does the overwhelming weight of the remaining evidence suggest Hobbs erroneously identified Lane. The evidence is thereby factually sufficient to support the conviction. Lane's final point of error is overruled.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Donald R. Ross

Justice

Date Submitted: January 17, 2003

Date Decided: February 4, 2003

Do Not Publish

1. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

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                                                         In The

                                                Court of Appeals

                        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                                                ______________________________

                                                             No. 06-10-00083-CR

                                WILLIAM ALLEN COOPER, Appellant

                                                                V.

                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                      On Appeal from the 102nd Judicial District Court

                                                          Red River County, Texas

                                                          Trial Court No. CR01517

                                          Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

                                                          Opinion by Justice Carter

                                                                   O P I N I O N

            In the 50s, before the advent of video cameras and cell phone videos, a popular song advised us that standing on the corner and watching females pass by was acceptable conduct and that “you can’t go to jail for what you’re thinking.”^[1]  Watching may still be acceptable conduct, but recording that parade may violate the law in Texas today.

            William Allen Cooper was convicted by a jury of an offense entitled Improper Photography or Visual Recording.  The offense is a state jail felony, and on two counts, he was sentenced to the maximum punishment:  two years in a state jail facility on each prosecution and a $10,000.00 fine.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.15 (Vernon Supp. 2010).

I.          Issues on Appeal

            Cooper raises several issues on appeal, including a Batson^[2] claim, issues about the unsupported assessment of costs against him, and issues concerning the harm caused by improperly admitted evidence and an improper opening statement by the prosecutor—that attempted to convince the jury to convict based not on the evidence, but on evidence that it could not see until punishment (when the rest of the story would be revealed).  We need not address those issues, as we reverse both convictions based on insufficiency of the evidence.

            As applied to this prosecution, the statute criminalizes the act of photographing/recording a visual image of another at a location not a bathroom or private dressing room without that person’s consent, and with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.^[3]

II.        Facts

            Cooper was convicted for making video recordings (shot through a window) of females walking down the sidewalk, or down the street, in front of either his home or business.  The subjects were fully clad and were not in a private area.  We have duplicates made by the State of the only two tapes involved, containing several hours of video, which the State edited into a short “best of” video for the jury’s perusal.  All of these were introduced into evidence and made available to the jury.  The videographer used the zoom function on the camera at various times to obtain close-ups of specific parts of female anatomy.  Those close-ups are what the State relies upon to prove intent—the statute requires the video to have been made with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of a person.  The State argues that this choice of subject matter would allow a jury to find the requisite intent, and counsel does not argue to the contrary.

III.       Sufficiency of the Evidence

            The critical issue in this review is whether the evidence is sufficient to allow a rational jury to decide that the State had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cooper was the videographer.  In evaluating Cooper’s legal sufficiency challenge, we apply the Jackson standard as explained in Brooks.

The relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

            In the Brooks plurality opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found “no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and the Clewis^[4] factual-sufficiency standard, and these two standards have become indistinguishable.”  Brooks v. State, No. PD-0210-09, 2010 WL 3894613, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2010) (4-1-4 decision).  Further, a proper application of the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard is as exacting a standard as any factual sufficiency standard.  See id. at *11.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Cochran pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has rejected a legal sufficiency test that requires a finding that “no evidence” supports the verdict because it affords inadequate protection against potential misapplication of the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal cases.  Id. at *16 (Cochran, J., concurring).  Rather than meeting a mere “no evidence” test, legal sufficiency is judged not by the quantity of evidence, but by the quality of the evidence and the level of certainty it engenders in the fact-finder’s mind.  Id. at *17.

            We thus examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”  Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).  If we determine that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, the proper remedy is to reverse the case and order acquittal.  See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41–42 (1982); Taylor v. State, 626 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1981, pet. ref’d).

            We measure the evidence “by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.”^[5]  Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  The hypothetically correct jury charge “sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”  Id. 

            A.        Evidence of Cooper as the Recorder  

            Certain matters are undisputed.  The videos were taken from inside Cooper’s house and from inside his business (a detail shop).  They were taken with a camera that was found near his residence and that had previously been in his residence.  The tapes themselves were found inside his house.  The evidence also shows that Cooper did not have sole access to either his home or business.  Cooper had teenage children who visited the house, Maria Gooden (Cooper’s ex-girlfriend) had an eighteen-year-old son, and Cooper had employees at the business.  There is no testimony from any source that any individual saw Cooper using the video camera either while taking these videos, or at any other time.

            The State relies on the location of the filming, the testimony of a police officer, Brandon Harbison, and the testimony of Cooper’s ex-girlfriend as evidence that Cooper filmed the video. 

            The police officer testified the ex-girlfriend (Gooden) had told him that Cooper made the videos because she had seen him on the recording.  The officer did not testify that Cooper made the videos—only that he had been told by Gooden that Cooper had done so. 

Q.        Do you know whether or not Mr. Cooper was the one videotaping these girls, the one who was operating the camera?

A.        I was told so by Maria Gooden.^[6]

The language used by the officer in his nonresponsive answer to the question does not provide direct testimony that Cooper made the video.  It provides evidence that the ex-girlfriend told him that Cooper made the video.  Even if a portion of this evidence was admitted before the jury, since the officer was merely quoting Gooden, the basis of the evidence must stand on the testimony of Gooden. 

            On redirect examination, the officer testified that “he was in the video -- one of the videos, and I don’t remember which tape it was on, for a very short time.”

            Gooden testified that after she found the camera in the house, she thought Cooper was operating the camera, because she had seen images of Cooper on it when she viewed the first tape.  Objections were raised to her testimony, along with impassioned discussion before the judge (and out of the hearing of the jury) by counsel, who stated that he had watched the DVD copies of the tapes (which the State then reaffirmed were true and accurate copies of all of the tapes) and had seen nothing with Cooper appearing. 

            After the discussion at the bench, the trial court ruled as follows:

THE COURT:  Ladies and gentlemen, there was a question about a clip, and I have sustained the objection.  The tape will speak for itself.  And so you shall disregard any reference to the tape.  

Accordingly, Gooden’s prior testimony about what she had seen on the tape was removed from the jury’s consideration.

            Despite this directive from the trial judge, the prosecutor attempted to obtain the same testimony again:

Q.        At one point I believe you testified you thought you saw him or you could identify --

[Defense counsel]:  Judge, we’re going to -- we’ll re-urge our motion -- objection.  I’m sorry.  I mean this -- I’m not sure this isn’t the same question just rephrased.

            . . . .

THE COURT:  Well, let’s get to playing the tapes so the tapes will speak for themselves.  We don’t need the commentary as to what they are or whatever.

As a result of these proceedings, none of the testimony of Gooden about what she observed on the video was placed before the jury during that exchange.  The court quite reasonably concluded that the jury could observe the videos and reach its own conclusions without her extraneous explanation of what she believed she had seen on one of them—at some undefined and unspecified point in the recording.

            Later, however, the State attempted to circumvent the trial court’s ruling, and to some degree succeeded. 

            The prosecutor asked Gooden:

Q.        Do you know who was making these videotapes that you found?

A.        William Cooper.

Q.        And how do you know that?

A.        Because there’s a clip in one of them that he’s wearing his shirt that I used to wash, and I know his build and body and his favorite chair. 

Then, on cross-examination, the following transpired:

Q.        Now, you say he’s in one of these videos?

A.        Yes.

Q.        So if he’s in one, who took that picture?

A.        He was holding the camera.  You could see him holding the camera at this angle.  Like that.

Q.        How do you know that?

A.        You can see it.  It’s a quick clip.  You can rewind it and watch it again.

IV.       Analysis of Sufficiency of the Evidence that Cooper Recorded the Videos

            A.        The Video Recordings

            The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has very recently explained the test for legal sufficiency of the evidence in Brooks.  The sole hypothetical provided by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for our elucidation is one that shows the court intends for review to be not just of the quantity (“no evidence standard”), but the quality of the evidence presented.  That hypothetical is easily applicable to the situation before this Court in this case.

The store clerk at trial identifies A as the robber.  A properly authenticated surveillance videotape of the event clearly shows that B committed the robbery.  But, the jury convicts A.  It was within the jury’s prerogative to believe the convenience store clerk and disregard the video.  But, based on all the evidence, the jury’s finding of guilt is not a rational finding.

Brooks, 2010 WL 3894613, at *11 (emphasis added).  Under a pure “no evidence” analysis, there is obviously some evidence in the hypothetical to support conviction of robber A.^[7]  The clerk testified A did it.  In Judge Cochran’s concurrence joined by Judge Womack, it is explained that legally sufficient evidence is of such sufficient strength, character, and credibility to engender certainty beyond a reasonable doubt in the reasonable fact-finder’s mind—evidence lacking that strength is legally insufficient.  Under this analysis, the above example is legally insufficient.^[8]

            Just as in the example in Brooks, under a “no evidence” or “quantity” analysis, there is some evidence to support conviction.  Gooden testified that she saw Cooper in the videotape.  Harbison testified, albeit very briefly and in some conflict with his own prior testimony, that he had seen Cooper in a very short clip in the videotape.  The State has not attempted to identify where such evidence may be found on the videos.

            This Court has the videos.  We have reviewed them carefully.  At various points, the inside of the residence or business is visible and identifiable.  There is a little red chair as described by Gooden—but unoccupied.  The video quality is very poor—there are four thick lines of static running across the screen for their entirety.  The focus of the camera is on females walking up and down a public street.  The zoom feature is used regularly to focus on particular portions of their anatomy.

            What does not appear in any of these videos is the critical fact.  There is no recording of any portion of the videographer taking the pictures of the two complainants—or of any individual taking any other videos of other females through the windows.  At no point does the body of the individual taking the pictures become visible, in any part.  There is no picture of Cooper, or of any shirt that could have been recognized by Gooden. 

            In summary, there is no testimony that anyone saw Cooper filming the videos, but there is testimony that they saw Cooper on the videotape.  After a painstaking review of all of the evidence, including the videos themselves, it is clear that the video recordings do not contain any pictures of Cooper—or anyone else—that could reveal who was operating the camera when making the recordings that are the subject of this prosecution.  It is, therefore, under the explanations made in Brooks of sufficiency review and the hypothetical provided, and applying the standard of Jackson as explained therein, not rational for a jury to conclude that Cooper took the videos based upon the testimony of Gooden and Harbison.

            B.        Circumstantial Evidence

            Is the remaining evidence sufficient to allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper was the videographer?  Ownership of the camera proves ownership.  Without more, it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the camera was used at a particular time by a particular person.  There is no evidence that Cooper had sole possession of the location from which the videos were made.  The evidence shows to the contrary.  The uncontroverted evidence shows that at least several other people had access to both locations over an extended period of time. 

            The question as properly sent to the jury in its charge, consonant with the indictment, asked whether it found

from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 2nd day of October, 2008, in Red River County, Texas, the defendant, WILLIAM ALLEN COOPER, did intentionally or knowingly commit the offense of Improper Photography or Visual Recording, by then and there, with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, record by videotape a visual image of another, namely, [Jane Doe] at a location that was not a bathroom or private dressing room, without the consent of the said [Jane Doe], then you shall find the Defendant  guilty of improper visual recording as charged in the indictment.

            By analogy, in many controlled substance cases, the issue is whether one, not in exclusive possession of the drug, has sufficient contact (links) to it to be jointly in possession.  If that were the only issue here, we would find no difficulty in affirming a jury finding that Cooper had possession of the camera—it was found in his house, the camera was his, etc.  But here, another step is required—there must be evidence that Cooper recorded the images.  Proving that he at one time had possession of the video camera does not provide any evidence that he filmed the particular recordings involved.  Under the review of the evidence required by Brooks, even in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could not conclude that this evidence is such as to permit it to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper recorded those visual images. 

            We reverse the conviction and render a judgment of acquittal.

                                                                                    Jack Carter

Date Submitted:          October 20, 2010

Date Decided:             November 16, 2010

Publish

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^[1]“Standing on the Corner” from the show “The Most Happy Fella” (1956) (Frank Loesser) Recorded by The Four Lads, Dean Martin, and The King Brothers.

^[2]Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

^[3]Section 21.15.     Improper Photography or Visual Recording

                (a)           In this section, “promote” has the meaning assigned by Section 43.21.

                (b)           A person commits an offense if the person:

                                (1)           photographs or by videotape or other electronic means records, broadcasts, or transmits a visual image of another at a location that is not a bathroom or private dressing room:

                                                (A)          without the other person’s consent; and

                                                (B)          with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person;

                                (2)           photographs or by videotape or other electronic means records, broadcasts, or transmits a visual image of another at a location that is a bathroom or private dressing room:

                                                (B)          with intent to:

                                                                (i)            invade the privacy of the other person; or

                                                                (ii)           arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or

                                (3)           knowing the character and content of the photograph, recording, broadcast, or transmission, promotes a photograph, recording, broadcast, or transmission described by Subdivision (1) or (2).

                (c)           An offense under this section is a state jail felony.

            (d)           If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under any other law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section or the other law.

            (e)           For purposes of Subsection (b)(2), a sign or signs posted indicating that the person is being photographed or that a visual image of the person is being recorded, broadcast, or transmitted is not sufficient to establish the person’s consent under that subdivision.

^[4]Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

^[5]Malik controls “even in the absence of alleged jury charge error.”  Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

^[6]Counsel objected to the evidence as hearsay.  His objection was sustained, but the court declined to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. 

^[7]As mentioned earlier, Judge Cochran, in a concurring opinion, explained that the United States Supreme Court had rejected a legal sufficiency test that requires a finding that “no evidence” supports the verdict.  Brooks, 2010 WL 3894613, at *16 (Cochran, J., concurring).

^[8]Further supporting this reasoning is the source of the hypothetical:  a dissent in Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (which two members of this plurality had joined).  In that opinion, Presiding Judge McCormick explained,

A properly applied Jackson v. Virginia standard, therefore, is much more exacting than Clewis claims.  Jackson v. Virginia requires the reviewing court to consider all the evidence in the “light most favorable to the verdict,” and then it requires the reviewing court to decide whether the jury’s finding of guilt is “rational.”  A properly applied Jackson v. Virginia standard is essentially as exacting a standard as a “factual sufficiency” standard which means that when the evidence meets the Jackson v. Virginia standard, it can never be “factually insufficient” and when the evidence is “factually insufficient,” it will always be insufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.

Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 15–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).